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THE QUALITATIVE DIMENSION OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT "REASONABLENESS"
Sherry F Colb*
Supreme Court doctrine protects two seemingly distinct kinds of interests
under the heading of privacy rights: one "substantive," the other "proce-
dural." The Fourth Amendment guarantee against "unreasonable searches
and seizures" has been generally interpreted to protect procedural privacy.
Searches are typically defined as governmental inspections of activities and
locations in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
from observation. In the typical case, this reasonable expectation of privacy
may be breached only where the government has acquired a quantitatively
substantial objective basis for believing that the search would uncover evi-
dence of a crime. Substantive privacy rights have not normally been consid-
ered in this inquiry.
This Article argues that a focus on the quantitative basis for finding
probable cause is incomplete. As a corrective, Professor Colb urges a vision of
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement that contains both sub-
stantive and procedural safeguards. This critique of the quantitative ap-
proach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that the Court ought to
engage in substantively balancing the interests served by particular classes of
searches and seizures against the costs of such government activity for the
individual's sense of security and privacy, even in cases in which the govern-
ment must also have probable cause and a warrant before proceeding. Such
an integration of substantive and procedural privacy, one that engaged in a
Fourt Amendment inquiry regarding the intrusiveness of a search or seizure,
would more effectively further the privacy values embraced by the Court's
criminal procedure and substantive constitutional precedents.
INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court doctrine protects two seemingly distinct kinds of in-
terests under the heading of privacy rights: one "substantive," the other
"procedural." Substantive privacy consists of the constitutionally pro-
tected liberty to engage in particular activities or to enjoy a given status
without undue interference by government. Examples of substantive pri-
vacy rights include the unenumerated rights of contraception, abortion,
procreation, marriage, and parental control over the education and up-
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bringing of children.' When the Court recognizes a substantive privacy
right as fundamental, that recognition results in a prohibition against di-
rect governmental regulation of the protected privacy right absent nar-
row tailoring to a compelling interest. 2 The Court has situated substan-
tive privacy rights in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.3
Procedural privacy is a feature of the Fourth Amendment guarantee
against "unreasonable searches and seizures."4 Under the Court's prece-
dents, the government must ordinarily have an evidentiary foundation for
subjecting people to "searches."5 Searches are defined as governmental
inspections of activities and locations in which an individual has a reason-
able expectation of privacy from observation. The government may frus-
trate this reasonable expectation (by performing a search) only after ac-
1. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (nonmarried couples' use of contraception);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (married couples' use of contraception); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (parental right to private education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (parental right to foreign language instruction). The Supreme Court has rejected
the claim of a right to engage in homosexual relations, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), but may be reconsidering its position on that question. See Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that an amendment to the Colorado Constitution
prohibiting all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexual
persons from discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause) ("We must conclude
that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to
make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a
class of persons a stranger to its laws."); Ann Laquer Estin, When Baehr Meets Romer:
Family Law Issues After Amendment 2, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 349, 366 (1997) (noting that
'we might even conclude that the case [Bowers v. Hardwick] was overruled sub silentio in
Romer").
2. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 16-7 to 16-12, at 1454-65
(2d ed. 1988). The Court has, in recent years, taken to using the term "liberty interest,"
see Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990), or sometimes simply "liberty," see Casey, 505
U.S. at 844, where it formerly used the term "privacy." Although the use of this term has
coincided temporally with a less generous approach to substantive due process, the Court
has not connected the terminological change with the attitudinal change and has also not
repudiated the conception of unenumerated rights as rights of privacy. Accordingly, and
to highlight connections between substantive and procedural privacy, this Article utilizes
the older terminology.
3. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; supra note 1 (citing cases relying upon the Due
Process Clauses as constitutional sources of substantive privacy entitlements).
4. U.S. Const. amend. IV (stating that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized").
5. In this Article, I focus primarily on searches rather than seizures. However, much
of what I say regarding searches is true also of seizures. See infra notes 24-50 and
accompanying text (discussing traffic stops).
1998] 1643
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quiring a quantitatively substantial objective basis for believing that the
search would uncover evidence of crime.6 Often, though not always,
"probable cause" represents the quantitative standard of confidence re-
quired to authorize a search. As a rule, a magistrate performs the judicial
functions of deciding in advance of a search whether the probable cause
standard is met and of issuing a warrant if it is. Like the jury in a criminal
trial, the police generally do not evaluate the constitutionality of criminal
statutes at issue in a given case. They focus instead on whether or not
they have met the quantitative burden of probable cause.
In rare cases, the Court has blurred this substantive/procedural dis-
tinction. The Court has held, for example, that a "search" of a person's
internal organs, through surgery, is not necessarily permissible just be-
cause there is probable cause to believe that such a search would uncover
an incriminating bullet.7 More typically (and formalistically), however,
the Court considers the legality of a search to turn exclusively on whether
there is a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that evidence of
a criminal offense is present in a given location. With some notable ex-
ceptions, the Court has tended to overlook substantive matters in evaluat-
ing the reasonableness of a challenged search or seizure.8
This Article argues that there are often-overlooked affinities between
substantive and procedural privacy. In particular, the Article urges a vi-
sion of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement that contains
both substantive and procedural safeguards. The procedural safeguards
include the familiar obligation of the police to prove to a magistrate or
trial judge that, prior to performing a search, they had "probable cause"
or some other quantitative measure of confidence that a proposed search
would disclose evidence. Such an obligation ensures that law-abiding citi-
zens remain relatively free of governmental intrusion into their private
spaces. 9 The substantive part of the inquiry questions the legitimacy of
the specific criminal law invoked as a basis for overriding the interest in
6. The government may, of course, conduct searches for reasons other than criminal
investigation. The Court has generally considered such investigations as falling within a
class of searches and seizures subject to the reasonableness balancing exception to the
"rule" requiring probable cause and a warrant for searches and seizures. See, e.g., New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (upholding under reasonableness balancing test
searches of children at public school without probable cause or a warrant); see also infra
notes 17-20 and accompanying text (examining in greater detail the "reasonableness
balancing" test in contemporary Fourth Amendment doctrine).
7. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding that the intrusiveness of an
operation, along with the fact that the bullet that might have been recovered in surgery
was not essential to the state's case, rendered the bullet removal surgery an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment).
8. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 759 (1984) (White, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that, in his view, there is "little to commend an approach that looks to 'the
nature of the underlying offense as an important factor to be considered in the exigent-
circumstances calculus'").
9. For more about the role of law-abiding behavior or innocence in determining
one's entitlement to privacy, see generally Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and
[Vol. 98:16421644
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remaining free from governmental observation. This entitlement to free-
dom from observation was most famously articulated in a Fourth
Amendment case,10 but it is also familiar from debates about the scope of
substantively protected privacy." I propose in this Article that Fourth
Amendment doctrine should explicitly consider the costs to privacy of
various ordinary, routine intrusions, along with the relative strength of
the government interests at stake in enforcing a given set of criminal stat-
utes through a challenged investigative technique. I recommend, in
other words, that Supreme Court doctrine recognize that an "unreasona-
ble" search in violation of the Fourth Amendment occurs whenever the
intrusiveness of a search outweighs the gravity of the offense being
investigated.
Assimilating substantive privacy concerns into Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence would yield doctrinal innovation and (in my view) pro-
gress. An important feature of what I call "substantive reasonableness"
addresses the potential for disproportionality between searches otherwise
supported by probable cause and a warrant when the crime at issue is
relatively minor.12 This critique of the current doctrine suggests that the
Court ought to engage in substantively balancing the interests served by
particular classes of searches and seizures against the costs of such gov-
ernment activity for the individual's sense of security and privacy. This
approach construes Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" as having qual-
itative as well as quantitative content. Any governmental intrusion that
rises to the level of a "search" or "seizure"' 3 might, on this theory, be
Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1456 (1996)
[hereinafter Colb, Innocence].
10. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (defending what he conceptualizes as the individual right to be "let alone").
11. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the right to freedom from observation in one's bedroom ought to decide
the legality of a home arrest for consensual sodomy).
12. For a critical proposal regarding the appropriate role of proportionality analysis in
Fourth Amendment doctrine, see Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth
Amendment, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1991) (developing an alternative scheme of procedures
for regulating searches and seizures, in which, inter alia, greater intrusions require greater
preliminary quantitative certainty); see also Akhil R_ Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757 (1994) (proposing a radical revision of Fourth
Amendment law in accordance with text, history, and logic); Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349 (1974) (exploring the costs
and benefits of a sliding-scale approach tojustifying greater and lesser intrusions in the law
of search and seizure).
13. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (holding that "Fourth
Amendment seizure [of the person] .. . occur[s] ... only when there is a governmental
termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied"); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (approving a definition of seizure of the person as occurring
"when the [police] officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen"); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (explaining that "whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized'
that person").
1998] 1645
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disproportionate and therefore unreasonable, in spite of the sufficiency
of the evidence suggesting that the search or seizure would uncover
illegality.
Additionally, substantive Fourth Amendment reasonableness might
place special limits on searches and seizures that interfere with the enjoy-
ment of substantive constitutional entitlements. The ability to exercise
such entitlements freely might accordingly be understood to depend on
the people's confidence that the state will not only refrain from incarcerat-
ing people for the exercise of their rights, but that the state will also re-
frain from observing their exercise. Consider, for example, the parent's
right to raise her children as she sees fit, within some designated limits
(such as prohibitions against abuse and neglect, and mandatory educa-
tion and vaccination laws). Jane Doe might decide not to permit her
child to watch television, because she believes that watching television is a
waste of time that might be better spent in more intellectually or physi-
cally active pursuits such as reading, practicing the violin, or riding a bicy-
cle. It may not be sufficient for Doe to know that the government will not
"interfere" with her no-TV rule by imposing a fine or imprisonment or by
otherwise forcing her to expose her child to eight hours of television per
week. To exercise freely her right to parental autonomy, Ms. Doe might
require in addition the security of knowing that the government will stay
out of her home and leave unobserved her chosen parenting practices, at
least absent individualized suspicion of serious harm.
In the pages that follow, I critique the Supreme Court's overall fail-
ure to integrate substantive and procedural privacy. I argue in support of
such integration and set forth the broad outlines of a doctrinal method
for its accomplishment. The proposal I advance is, as much as possible,
faithful to privacy values otherwise embraced by the Court's constitu-
tional jurisprudence. This Article does not undertake the development
of a comprehensive program for including qualitative reasonableness as-
sessments in Fourth Amendment law.14 Its objective is instead to demon-
strate that current doctrine is inadequate, even on its own terms, and to
urge that what is missing is a more thorough attention to qualitative rea-
sonableness in reviewing the constitutionality of searches and seizures.
14. Such a comprehensive program would include decisions as to the generality or
specificity of qualitative rules (i.e., whether all house searches or all car searches would be
considered equivalent or whether portions of houses or cars would represent distinct levels
of intrusion which would trigger distinct levels of scrutiny). Such decisions, I believe,
would be made by lower courts in the first instance and ultimately by the United States
Supreme Court, as has been true traditionally for the contours of constitutional doctrine.
The decisions would not, in myjudgment, be left to police officer discretion. See Sherry F.
Colb, Freedom From Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different From All Other Rights?,
69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 781, 845-46 (1994) [hereinafter Colb, Incarceration] (arguing in the
context of the right to be free from incarceration that police officers should not be
invested with the power to prioritize among criminal statutes, because they may devalue
laws that criminalize traditionally ignored conduct such as domestic violence).
1646 [Vol. 98:1642
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On my approach to substantive reasonableness, the intrusiveness of a
search or seizure would drive the Fourth Amendment analysis, as it does
in the extraordinary case of the investigative use of surgery. The Court
would first recognize that a proposed police intrusion is substantial. This
recognition would trigger the substantive weighing of the gravity of the
crime or crimes defined in the law being enforced, against the invasive-
ness of the proposed governmental intrusion. The weighing would result
in a finding that the Court either should or should not apply a substan-
tively more demanding standard (or even, in theory, an absolute prohibi-
tion) to such intrusions. The Court might conclude, for example, that to
search a home, the police must be investigating (and have probable cause
pertaining to) a serious offense, perhaps one involving violence or sub-
stantial property conversion. This conclusion would add a substantive,
qualitative inquiry to a useful but incomplete quantitative approach. As
will also become clear, adding substance is entirely consistent with retain-
ing procedure.
Part I of this Article examines and critiques the procedural, quantita-
tive emphasis of contemporary Fourth Amendment doctrine. To illus-
trate the inadequacy of the prevailing approach, it surveys and evaluates
the law of traffic stops. I recommend an alternative approach, one based
upon a policy of integrating substance and procedure, that would supple-
ment existing law to protect more effectively those traveling in cars from
the intimidations and intrusions of arbitrary and suspicion-based police
stops. Part I next acknowledges the underlying assumption of this
Article: that privacy is valuable. It considers a set of arguments that
Fourth Amendment privacy is overrated, and concludes by responding to
these arguments.
Part II contends that within Fourth Amendment doctrine itself, one
occasionally sees signs that the Supreme Court realizes the inadequacy of
focusing exclusively on quantitative and procedural matters, although the
Court's doctrinal responses to this realization are themselves inadequate.
Part II begins by identifying an exceptional group of cases in which the
Court has explicitly engaged in a form of substantive reasonableness anal-
ysis to take account of the strength or weakness of the interests support-
ing an allegedly unreasonable search or seizure and has weighed these
interests against the intrusiveness of challenged police activity. The Part
then analyzes a second category of Fourth Amendment decisions that
reveals the special importance that the Court places upon protecting the
home from even ordinary, routine searches and seizures. This second
group of opinions necessarily rests on the assumption that greater intru-
sions require greaterjustification. The Court's selection of the home as a
special locale for privacy also evidences a link between Fourth
Amendment privacy and the exercise of substantive constitutional privacy
rights.
Part III turns to a number of substantive constitutional law cases that
explicitly embody the connection between Fourth Amendment privacy
1998] 1647
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from observation and the freedom to enjoy substantive due process pri-
vacy entitlements. 15 The Part examines these cases, especially Griswold v.
Connecticut and Stanley v. Georgia, in terms of their tacit acknowledgment
of the threat that a purely quantitative Fourth Amendment doctrine
poses to unenumerated privacy rights.
Part IV outlines a proposal for an improved doctrine of reasonable-
ness scrutiny. 'The Part first examines a specific application of the new
reasonableness in the context of a space in which people tend to crave
absolute freedom from observation, even though they are not engaging
in any recognized constitutionally protected activity: the inside of a pub-
lic restroom stall. The Part then considers the nexus between a Fourth
Amendment reasonableness doctrine that consciously integrates quantita-
tive and qualitative privacy concerns, and a traditional and revered sub-
stantive due process privacy right-the right to parental autonomy.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS PROBLEM
A. Current Doctrine, Its Shortcomings, and a Proposal
Two primary lines of cases inform the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment freedom to be secure against "unreasonable searches and
seizures." The first constitutes the "rule" that to perform a search or
seizure, the government must satisfy the probable cause and warrant re-
quirements. 16 The second line of cases can loosely be described as the
exception to the rule. The cases in this category excuse the police from
both the warrant and the probable cause requirements and impose in
their place a more flexible "reasonableness balancing" test. This test usu-
ally involves the Court in weighing the utility of a particular kind of
search or seizure in serving some "special law enforcement interest"
against the degree of intrusiveness entailed in the particular technique.' 7
15. Henry Monaghan has offered a similar analysis in discussing the procedural
implications of First Amendment free speech rights. See generally Henry P. Monaghan,
First Amendment "Due Process," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1970).
16. In some cases, only probable cause is required, because obtaining a warrant would
be impracticable for any of a number of reasons. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 579 (1991) (automobile exception). Nonetheless, I refer to the reasonableness
exception to probable cause and a warrant to make clear that the greater doctrinal divide
is between searches and seizures that require probable cause (and usually a warrant as
well), on the one hand, and those that require neither, on the other.
17. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679
(1989) (upholding, under Fourth Amendment challenge, the reasonableness of
suspicionless drug testing of employees applying for promotion to positions that either
involve interdiction of illegal drugs or require employees to carry firearms); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34 (1989) (upholding, as a matter of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness, mandatory blood, urine, and breath tests-for
drugs-of railroad employees who are involved in serious train accidents); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (upholding school principal's search of a student's purse
for cigarettes, noting that the warrant requirement is "unsuited to the school environment
... [because it] would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools").
1648 [Vol. 98:1642
HeinOnline -- 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1648 1998
1998] FOURTH AMEADMENT "REASONABLENESS" 1649
When a class of searches or seizures falls within the reasonableness excep-
tion, this usually means that the class is relegated to a lesser level of pro-
tection than when the warrant and probable cause rule applies.18 At this
reduced level, at which there generally need not be any individualized
suspicion, 19 the Court tends to take a deferential approach to judging the
efficacy of the challenged practice in pursuing the "special" interest en-
tailed, an approach that typically downplays the intrusiveness of the inves-
tigative technique. 20
In addition to the rule that requires probable cause and a warrant
and the reasonableness balancing exception to that rule, there is a third
approach that the Court has sometimes taken to defining Fourth
Amendment reasonableness. Very rarely, the Supreme Court has held
that although probable cause and a warrant are necessary, they are not by
themselves sufficient to justify a particular search or seizure. The Court
announced such a principle, for example, in connection with police use
of deadly force against a suspect (a Fourth Amendment "seizure")21 and
18. "As the Court's current efforts illustrate, reasonableness is a slippery concept that,
without definitional restraints, can allow the range of acceptable government intrusions to
expand and overwhelm the privacy interests at stake." Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth
Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Teny, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 383,
384-85 (1988) [hereinafter Sundby, Undoing the Mischief].
19. See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634 (holding that "it is
reasonable to conduct such tests [random drug testing of railroad workers after a serious
accident] in the absence of... reasonable suspicion that any particular employee may be
impaired"); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976) (upholding
interrogative stop at permanent border checkpoint to ascertain a motorist's residence
status); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (upholding routine annual
inspections by city housing department). In Camara, the Court took the unusual step of
requiring a warrant based upon a non-individualized form of probable cause. Such a
warrant would authorize inspections on the basis of conditions in an entire area rather
than conditions in an individual residence or even a particular building. See id. at 538.
Scott Sundby faults the duo of Camara and Tery v. Ohio for the expansive application of
the current Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing test and for the Court's
consistent tendency to uphold without much analysis invasions of privacy that are
scrutinized under this test. See Sundby, Undoing the Mischief, supra note 18, at 385.
20. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment permits a limited protective sweep incident to any home arrest and broad
protective sweeps when an arresting officer has a reasonable belief that the area to be
swept harbors individuals posing a danger to those on the arrest scene); O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (noting that the need for efficient and proper operation
of the workplace outweighs a public employee's privacy interest in his office, and
explaining that "[a]s with the building inspections in Camara, the employer intrusions at
issue here 'involve a relatively limited invasion' of employee privacy") (quoting Camara,
387 U.S. at 537); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 (1987) (explaining that the need
to preserve the deterrent effect of the supervisory arrangement of probation outweighs the
probationer's privacy interest in avoiding random searches of his house); Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591-92 (1974) (plurality opinion) (holding that warrantless
examination of automobile's tires and taking of paint scrapings were de minimis invasions
of constitutional interests and were therefore justified).
21. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1985).
HeinOnline -- 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1649 1998
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the surgical probing for evidence (a Fourth Amendment "search").22
Such cases are unusual because of the degree of violence involved in the
search or seizure. The Court has declined invitations to extend their ra-
tionales to the more common intrusions addressed by the Fourth
Amendment.23 These conventional invasions include searches of houses
for evidence, arrests of individuals for the commission of crimes, and
stops of vehicles, for highway traffic violations. Thus, when Justice Scalia
recently had occasion to remark upon traffic stops, he observed that, in
general, if an officer has probable cause, there is an almost irrebuttable
presumption that his actions in stopping a vehicle are ipso facto reason-
able. 24 Fourth Amendment doctrine rarely requires a court to look for
anything beyond the quantitative sufficiency of pre-stop evidence of a
traffic infraction in assessing the "reasonableness" of a traffic stop.
One case exemplifying the Court's formalistic, purely quantitative
approach to the Fourth Amendment, Whren v. United States, involved a
traffic stop based upon probable cause.2 5 In IWren, the police became
suspicious of a driver they observed. 26 Initially, the police lacked an ar-
ticulable basis for their suspicion and were therefore precluded from
stopping the driver. The officers subsequently followed their suspect,
waiting for him to act in a manner that would justify a stop.2 7 Ultimately,
the suspect made a turn without signaling and accelerated "unreasona-
bly."28 The police could now legally stop him on the basis of the prob-
able cause they had to believe that he had committed a traffic violation.
Once the stop had occurred, the police were constitutionally able to look
inside the suspect's car and discover that Whren had committed a drug
offense. Prosecution and conviction followed, and eventually the case
came before the United States Supreme Court.29
The police arguably did nothing wrong in deciding to follow a vehi-
cle that had aroused their suspicions.8 0 When an officer feels an inar-
ticulable suspicion, we would not necessarily want to require that she ig-
22. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985).
23. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1978) (upholding a
search of a third-party newspaper upon probable cause and a warrant, without requiring a
heightened showing of need).
24. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817-18 (1996) (asserting that "[w]ith
rare exceptions not applicable here .... the result of that balancing is not in doubt where
the search or seizure is based upon probable cause" and that "[w] here probable cause has
existed, the only cases in which we have found it necessary actually to perform the
'balancing' analysis involved searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner").
25. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).




30. Merely following a suspect does not, for example, constitute a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 574-75 (1988)
(holding that police officers following a fleeing suspect in their patrol car have not "seized"
the suspect).
1650 [Vol. 98:1642
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nore the suspicion and go on her way. What distinguishes the officers'
conduct in Whren from the hypothetical conduct of a prudent police of-
ficer, however, is that the officers in Whren did not wait for something to
confirm or dispel suspicions of a serious offense. Instead, the Whren of-
ficers were waiting for the targeted driver to commit a traffic violation.
The officers' wait promised to be a fruitful one. "Vehicle stops for
traffic violations occur countless times each day .... 31 Given the vast
number of traffic laws, it may now be the case that "we all violate traffic
laws almost every time we enter the car."3 2 As one author has observed,
"[p] olice officers in some jurisdictions have a rule of thumb: The average
driver cannot go three blocks without violating some traffic regulation."33
It follows from this state of affairs that any officer who is suspicious about
an individual driving a car but who lacks an articulable basis for the suspi-
cion may legally "wait for [the suspect] to violate one of a litany of traffic
laws that govern the roads,"34 and when, for example, "[o] ur suspect for-
gets to signal a left turn, [the officer] gains probable cause to make the
traffic stop. '35
The ease with which the police may stop any driver on whom they set
their sights is especially troubling in view of the fact that, as the Court has
acknowledged, "[a] utomobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often neces-
sary mode of transportation to and from one's home, workplace, and lei-
sure activities," "[m]any people spend more hours each day traveling in
cars than walking on the streets," and "[u]ndoubtedly, many find a
greater sense of security and privacy in traveling in an automobile than
they do in exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes of travel. '3 6
Once an individual is stopped, moreover, much more serious intrusions
become permissible largely on the basis of safety risks inherent in the stop
situation, risks which therefore do not vary depending on the seriousness
31. NewYork v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113 (1986) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 659 (1979)).
32. Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death
of Teny v. Ohio, 28 Loy. U. Chi. LJ. 145, 168 (1996).
33. David A. Harris, Essay, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87J. Crim. L. & Criminology 544, 558 (1997).
Harris concludes that "[a]ny time we use our cars, we can be stopped by the police virtually
at their whim because full compliance with traffic laws is impossible." Id. at 582.
34. Levit, supra note 32, at 145.
35. Id.
36. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979). David Harris cogently describes the
role of the car in modem American life:
Simply put, it is difficult to imagine a more American activity than driving a car.
We use our cars for everything: work .... play, and myriad other activities that
make up everyday life .... In short, there are few activities more important to
American life than driving.
Harris, supra note 33, at 557.
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of the reasonably suspected offense.3 7 As Justice Kennedy put it in a
later, dissenting opinion,
[t]he practical effect of our holding in Whren, of course, is to
allow the police to stop vehicles in almost countless circum-
stances. When Whren is coupled with [Maryland v. Wilson,
which permits the police to order passengers in a stopped vehi-
cle to exit the vehicle], the Court puts tens of millions of passen-
gers at risk of arbitrary control by the police.38
In waiting for a traffic violation that would give them broad authority
to detain their suspect and to curtail his privacy, the officers in Whren
were concededly uninterested in prosecuting or apprehending anyone in
connection with a routine traffic offense. The officers' goal instead was
to obtain a legal basis for a stop that they had already planned to carry
out, a stop for which they initially lacked the requisite level of suspicion. 9
37. Such measures might include, for example, a search incident to arrest. See
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (permitting and defining a search incident
to arrest as "a search of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate
control'"). The Court has indicated that when the driver of a vehicle has been or will be
arrested, the scope of a permissible search incident to arrest automatically extends to
"articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an
automobile,'" since such articles "are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the
area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon.'" Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). The scope of the
permissible passenger-compartment search itself includes an examination of "the contents
of any open or closed container found within the passenger compartment, 'for if the
passenger compartment is within the reach of the arrestee, so will containers in it be within
his reach.'" Id. (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
If an officer has reasonable suspicion for a stop, based on something less substantial
than probable cause, perhaps an anonymous informant's tip, the officer may perform a
weapons frisk upon a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous,
because "the policeman making a reasonable investigatory stop should not be denied the
opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect." Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 146 (1972). The Court has "expressly recognized that suspects may injure police
officers and others by virtue of their access to weapons, even though they may not
themselves be armed." Michigan, 463 U.S. at 1048 (1983). Although an officer
theoretically needs an articulable suspicion of danger tojustify a weapons frisk, the Court
has expressed the view that "the possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the
ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that
evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop." Maryland v.
Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 (1997). This possibility of uncovering a more serious offense,
of course, is-almost by definition-supported by neither probable cause nor a reasonable
suspicion that would have independentlyjustified a stop. On a similar rationale, the police
may order a driver and/or the passengers in a lawfully stopped vehicle to exit the car. See
Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886 (passengers); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977)
(per curiam) (driver). The Court explained with respect to the presumptively innocent
passengers of a stopped vehicle that "the motivation of a passenger to employ violence to
prevent apprehension of such a [hypothetical, more serious] crime is every bit as great as
that of the driver." Id.
38. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
39. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (noting that after the police had
followed the suspect for a while without developing an articulable basis for suspicion, "the
Pathfinder turned suddenly to its right, without signalling, and sped off at an
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The Court held in Whren that the motivation of the officers was not a
relevant legal consideration. Because the officers had probable cause to
believe the suspect had turned without signaling and had accelerated
"unreasonably," they were objectively justified in stopping the vehicle.40
The Court reasoned that it would be impractical to inquire into what
truly motivated the police in each individual case.41
Instead of an objection to the pretextual nature of the particular
stop, an objection that would have relied on the officers' subjective states
of mind, the petitioner in Whren offered the Supreme Court an alterna-
tive, objective rationale for invalidating the stop. Under the objective ap-
proach proposed by petitioner, the legal question would be whether a
reasonable officer in the circumstances presented would have stopped
the vehicle absent an ulterior motive.4 2 Note the distinction between this
and a subjective test. Under the objective approach, regardless of how
genuine the particular officer's motives, a stop would still be unreasona-
ble if there were no objectively reasonable basis for the stop, given the
circumstances, notwithstanding probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation had occurred. Under the proposed approach, in other words,
probable cause to believe a traffic offense had occurred might potentially
provide an insufficient basis for satisfying Fourth Amendment
reasonableness. 43
Consider the profound implications of this proposed objective ap-
proach. There are currently no Fourth Amendment limitations upon an
officer's power to stop a driver as to whom the officer has probable cause
to suspect a traffic crime, however trivial. Nevertheless, police officers do
not stop every driver observed committing a traffic violation. In fact, as
drivers understand, the police routinely ignore many violations. This oc-
curs largely because the underlying purpose of most traffic rules is to
prohibit the sort of conduct that might endanger the safety of drivers,
passengers, and pedestrians, and traffic infractions do not invariably cre-
ate such danger.
'unreasonable' speed[,]" at which point "[the policemen followed, and in a short while
overtook the Pathfinder when it stopped behind other traffic at a red light").
40. See id. at 810 (asserting that "[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred").
41. I have elsewhere expressed agreement with this view. See Colb, Innocence, supra
note 9, at 1490-91 (contending that "[p]retextual searches should.., not be actionable
under the Fourth Amendment in most cases").
42. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
43. For the related contention that a full custodial arrest might be unconstitutional in
the case of a minor traffic offense, see Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (asserting that while petitioner did not raise this issue to the
Court, "a persuasive claim might have been made in this case that the custodial arrest of
the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments").
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Under conditions in which there are virtually no cars or pedestrians
in the vicinity of a particular vehicle, for example, the driver of that vehi-
cle's failure to signal a lane change or failure to come to a complete stop
at an intersection is innocuous. Conversely, under heavy traffic condi-
tions, one could avoid violating all specific rules and nonetheless drive
recklessly and place people's safety in jeopardy. Such driving would, of
course, violate the broad requirement that every driver exercise caution,
but this requirement itself demands the exercise ofjudgment (of the sort
called for by an. objective reasonableness inquiry) rather than a mechani-
cal application of law to fact seemingly called for in the case of simple
violations. The police are therefore fully qualified and experienced in
distinguishing between technical infractions and dangerous driving.
Under petitioner's suggested objective analysis in Wren, we would
thus conclude that the reasonable police officer would not stop a driver
who violated a rule under the first (formal rule violation) set of condi-
tions (though he might pursue alternative avenues of enforcement), 4 4
but would stop a driver who had obeyed the precise letter of the law
under the second set of conditions (unsafe driving). Though police
might in current practice stop the first kind of driver (formal rule viola-
tor) on occasion, it is often apparent that the officer has an inappropriate
ulterior motive for the stop.45 The Fourth Amendment reasonableness of
stopping a driver would accordingly turn on the hazardousness of the
driver's operation of her vehicle rather than upon the formal legal status
of her specific conduct under the traffic laws.4 6
44. See infra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing traffic citations as an
example of a less restrictive alternative to traffic stops for the nondangerous instance of a
traffic violation).
45. Another possibility is that the police officer is bored and not otherwise occupied,
as appeared to be the case in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650-51 (1979)
("Characterizing the stop as 'routine,' the patrolman explained, 'I saw the car in the area
and wasn't answering any complaints, so I decided to pull them off.'"). As I observe
elsewhere, however, the officer's explanation for the stop in Prouse does not rule out the
harm of being targeted by a police officer as the one among others who is stopped. See
Colb, Innocence, supra note 9, at 1489-90.
To the extent that it is standard practice, moreover, for a particular police department
to stop anyone committing a minor traffic offense, perhaps due to a low incidence of
serious crimes, one version of the "objective" approach might still invalidate such stops. In
such a regime, suspects could not complain that other persons would not have been
stopped based on similarly trivial offenses because, by hypothesis, the police routinely
would enforce the formal traffic law strictly against everyone. Such a strict enforcement
policy might thus doom the petitioner's specific argument in Whren, insofar as that
argument focuses upon what the police in the locale would in fact do if their motives were
pure. Since subjective motivation is not, however, the primary focus of my critique of
Whren, I would reject the jurisdiction-specific approach to defining objective
reasonableness and embrace a truly objective standard, under which harmless traffic
violations would not provide an adequate basis for a Terry stop of a vehicle, regardless of
how common or well-motivated such stops might be.
46. The District of Columbia-the jurisdiction in which the Whren stop took place-
itself had police regulations which "prohibited officers in plain clothes and officers in
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The reader might wonder at this point whether the proposed objec-
tive test for Fourth Amendment reasonableness would effectively eviscer-
ate the traffic laws (which, after all, mediate driver and pedestrian expec-
tations and thereby contribute globally to traffic safety). The response to
this valid concern is twofold. First, the reason people obey the traffic laws
(to the extent that they do) is probably not primarily the fear of being
stopped by police. Since the police usually do not stop people for ordi-
nary traffic violations, most people (excluding those who are consistently
stopped pretextually47 ) do not expect to be stopped for such violations as
low-level speeding, or yielding rather than stopping at an intersection.
The outside possibility of a stop, at least when police are not in view,
therefore may not presently work as a very strong deterrent to traffic
violations.
The second answer to the worry about nullifying the traffic laws is
that there are ways of penalizing drivers without pulling them over and
creating a confrontation that gives rise to so many safety risks.48 An of-
ficer could, for example, record the license number of a violator and
issue a citation to the owner of the vehicle. The government could
thereby achieve deterrence (and some measure of retribution) without
having to stop drivers who have not, in the specific case, created a serious
hazard. Though limiting stops to situations presenting actual hazards re-
quires factually sensitive determinations, such determinations, are entirely
appropriate if, as I have suggested, it is dangerous driving, rather than
unmarked vehicles from making traffic stops unless the violations posed an immediate
threat to others." Harris, supra note 33, at 549 (citing D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department General Order 303.1 (Traffic Enforcement) (effective April 30, 1992)). The
Court could recognize a more general version of this principle in evaluating the
reasonableness of a stop (by plainclothes or uniformed police) when a driver has
committed a trivial or harmless traffic offense.
47. See, e.g., Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for
Civilian Review Boards, 28 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 551, 559-60 (1997) (examining a
study done by the Orlando Sentinel in which almost 70% of police stops were of African-
American or Hispanic drivers, minority drivers were held for, twice the length of time
during stops, and of the cars that were searched, 82% were driven by minorities); Tracey
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333 (1998); see also Harris,
supra note 33 (examining the disproportionate role of race in determining which drivers
police stop for traffic offenses).
48. Cf. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997) (noting that "[iun 1994 alone,
there were 5,762 officer assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops");
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973) (explaining, in the context of
search incident to arrest, that "[t]he danger to the police officer [who stops a car to arrest
a suspect] flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and
uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest," citing a study which "concludes that
approximately 30% of the shootings of police officers occur when an officer stops a person
in an automobile"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (suggesting that "there is the
more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against him" since "American criminals have a long tradition of armed
violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line
of duty, and thousands more are wounded").
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formal violation of traffic rules, that justifies stops and their associated
costs. Moreover, given the plethora of traffic regulations, police must en-
gage in such judgments already, albeit with the discretion to depart from
this sort of practice on occasion to target individuals whose driving poses
no dangers but whom the police nonetheless wish to stop for some other,
illegitimate reason.
As noted above, the Court does purport to assess directly the substan-
tive reasonableness of searches and seizures in one doctrinal context, the
so-called "reasonableness balancing" cases. The Court's approach to
these cases, however, is not to supplement the quantitative probable cause
standard with a qualitative balancing of interests, as would be the case
under the proposed objective standard rejected in VWren. Instead, rea-
sonableness balancing doctrine ordinarily operates as a mechanism that
permits searches and seizures when the government lacks individualized
probable cause. The Court adopts this less demanding standard when
the government has a "special need" thatjustifies dispensing with individ-
ualized determinations. 49 The reasonableness balancing cases accord-
ingly provide little in the way of actual balancing 50 and instead simply
remove the quantitative restraints on an otherwise unlimited investigative
prerogative.
B. More Modest Reformss
In response to the doctrinal reality that demands less under "reason-
ableness balancing" tests than under the probable cause rule, liberals 5'
have urged the Court to limit the number of "exceptions" to the latter
and have also sought to expand the category of government practices that
constitute searches and seizures triggering Fourth Amendment limits.5 2
49. For a critique of the "special needs" cases for their failure to provide for ex ante
review of intrusions, see Slobogin, supra note 12, at 33-36.
50. This is not to condemn all of what Scott Sundby describes as "initiatory
intrusions'-searches that are not based upon an individualized suspicion. See Sundby,
Undoing the Mischief, supra note 18. I would, however, require, as Sundby would, that
such searches be greatly limited. See id. at 384-85. I would also insist that they generally
conform to the model of the health and safety inspection approved in Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. 594 (1981), in which there was truly a minimal incursion on personal privacy. See
infra note 310 (discussing Dewey approach to suspicionless inspections).
51. I use the term "liberals" to refer to those who would like the Court to develop
broader protection of the individual against government intrusions upon privacy and
liberty.
52. An especially important form of investigation, which the Court has held to be
outside the scope of Fourth Amendment protection, is the use of government informants
to solicit information from suspects, record conversations, and provide for electronic
transmission to government officials. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-54
(1971) (plurality opinion) (holding that a suspect's Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated when, absent a warrant, government
investigators overheard conversations between the suspect and a government informant
who knowingly concealed a radio transmitter); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
302-03 (1966) (holding that a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
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Both of these steps might help to preserve the application of individual-
ized suspicion requirements to government investigation. 53 An expan-
sion of Fourth Amendment coverage might also increase (or at least not
reduce) the scope of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to Fourth
Amendment violations. 54 Such liberal strategies, while perhaps enhanc-
when a government informant testified about the content of confidential conversations the
informant had with the defendant at the government's direction, without benefit of a
warrant); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211-12 (1966) (holding that an undercover
police officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by entering the defendant's home
when the defendant invited him in to purchase marijuana). These decisions have
generated a great deal of controversy, because of the arguably serious intrusions on privacy
they categorically exclude from constitutional scrutiny. See Tracey Maclin, Informants and
the Fourth Amendment: A Reconsideration, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 573, 634-35 (1996)
(arguing that "[a] home or private conversation should not lose its constitutional
protection against promiscuous police intrusion merely because an individual has allowed
a third party's presence"); Slobogin, supra note 12, at 40, 103-04 (describing the Court's
"not a search" approach to undercover operations and criticizing it on the ground that
such investigations tend to be more intrusive than the typical house search and also tend to
generate a sense of distrust of government and of one's friends that is destructive of citizen
allegiance to the government and of democracy); see also Richard B. Parker, A Definition
of Privacy, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 275, 294 (1974) (arguing that, on a definition of privacy that
protects control over who can sense us-a definition very much like the one I propose as
privacy from personal knowledge-"the bugged informer usurps control over the number
of people actually listening").
53. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
1468, 1501 (1985) (arguing that "strong solutions are necessary" due to the fact that
Fourth Amendment legal doctrine "is . . . full of fictitious rules and multifaceted
exceptions (and exceptions to those exceptions)"); Tracey Maclin, When The Cure For
The Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than The Disease, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 37 (1994)
[hereinafter Maclin, Cure Worse Than Disease] (arguing that "the problem with the
Court's 'special needs' cases ... is that 'government may infringe privacy pretty much as it
wishes, unconstrained by any serious judicial review'") (quoting William J. Stuntz, Implicit
Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 553, 555
(1992)); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 820,
855-56 (1994) [hereinafter Steiker, Second Thoughts] (contending that "[r]equiring
warrants as the touchstone of constitutionally 'reasonable' searches responds to the lessons
that history has taught about the nature of modern police forces and our legacy of racial
discrimination-lessons that a regime of case-by-case determinations of 'reasonableness'
seems bound to ignore"); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth
Amendment, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 257, 294 (1984) [hereinafter Wasserstrom, Incredible
Shrinking] (suggesting that "[w]ithout the warrant requirement. . . the police could
search and seize as they pleased, deterred only by the remote possibility that in a civil suit a
jury would find that they not only acted unreasonably, but also in bad faith").
54. See Yale Kamisar, Comparative Reprehensibility and the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1987) [hereinafter Kamisar, Comparative
Reprehensibility] (arguing that a proportionality approach to Fourth Amendment
exclusion which would assess the relative "reprehensibility" of the police officer and of the
criminal in determining whether to exclude illegally obtained evidence would constitute a
"pernicious modification of the exclusionary rule"); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth
Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 307, 340 (1982) (noting that admission of "evidence supposedly obtained by
the police in an innocent and relatively slight failure to toe the fourth amendment line...
seems to me an unwise step to take" because "in the long run a 'good faith' exception
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ing the individual's privacy and freedom to some extent,5 5 amount ulti-
mately to a formalistic and accordingly inadequate device for effectively
protecting privacy.56 Insisting on a minimum quantum of evidence
(probable cause), without a substantive inquiry into evidence of what, ulti-
mately leaves privacy vulnerable. 57
would produce many unfortunate consequences and would do a disservice to even the
deterrence objective"); Maclin, Cure Worse Than Disease, supra note 53, at 69 (quoting a
State's Attorney expressing the view that "[t]he exclusionary rule is there to maintain the
integrity of the court system"); Steiker, Second Thoughts, supra note 53, at 848 (stating
that "[d]espite its many flaws, the exclusionary rule is, I am convinced, the best we can
realistically do"); George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Balancing the Fourth
Amendment Scales: The Bad-Faith "Exception" to Exclusionary Rule Limitations, 45
Hastings L.J. 21, 23 & passim (1993) (contending that to "rebalance the [Fourth
Amendment] scales, a bad-faith category of Fourth Amendment violations should be
established at the other end of the spectrum from the good-faith violations," a category
that would require the exclusion of evidence obtained in the course of a flagrant violation
of the Fourth Amendment, even if it would normally fall within an exception to the
exclusionary rule); Wasserstrom, Incredible Shrinking, supra note 53, at 395 (arguing that
"[b]ecause the exclusionary rule is a remedy adopted to effectuate the fourth amendment,
it makes eminently good sense to apply the rule where magistrates issue warrants without
probable cause or without sufficient particularity.").
55. Robert Weisberg has suggested that conventional accounts by both liberals and
conservatives have tended to exaggerate the real-world impact (both positive and negative)
of the clash between the Warren Court's criminal procedure doctrine and that of the
Burger Court that followed. See Robert Weisberg, Criminal Procedure Doctrine: Some
Versions of the Skeptical, 76J. Crim. L. & Criminology 832, 833 (1985). To the extent that
"the Supreme Court doctrine has been a vastly over-rated and over-invested phenomenon,"
as Weisberg suggests, the substantive vacuum that has characterized this body of law might
be at least partly responsible. Id. at 834.
56. I use the lerm "formalist" in the same way that I did in Colb, Innocence, supra
note 9, at 1466-67. A Fourth Amendment formalist is one who focuses on procedure
without elaborating a substantive vision of the ideal or intended beneficiary of the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. As the use of the term
arises in this Article, the formalist is one who defines a search in the absence of probable
cause and a warrant as the essential Fourth Amendment violation but does not articulate
the contours of a "probable cause to believe what?" that might effectively limit the degree
to which the legislature may expand governmental authority to search by simply expanding
the scope of the substantive criminal law. See WilliamJ. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and
the Civil-Criminal Line, 7J. Contemp. Legal Issues 1, 1 (1996) [hereinafter Stuntz, Civil-
Criminal Line] (arguing that because "[l]egislatures decide what is and is not a crime,"
and "courts alone decide what the law of criminal procedure looks like," the consequence
is that "the government's natural incentive is to evade or exploit the procedural civil-
criminal line by changing the substantive civil-criminal line" (emphasis omitted)); see also
William J. Stuntz, 'he Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 Yale L.j. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, Criminal Justice].
57. This is not to say, of course, that procedurally oriented strategies are not crucial to
the vitality of a continuing and developing substantive reasonableness regime. Particularly
as long as police officers and other government officials retain qualified immunity against
liability-for violating rights that are not yet clearly established, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982), the primary avenues for the litigation of novel Fourth Amendment
claims of the sort that I propose will be suppression motions, appeals of suppression
motions, and appeals of convictions based upon evidence admitted over suppression
motions. Though police will play an important role in applying any new standards in the
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Consider an analogy from a closely related context. Then-Justice
Rehnquist suggested that it makes little sense to regulate the process by
which individuals may be divested of government-granted entitlements
when such entitlements may constitutionally be eliminated altogether by
the legislature.58 Recent welfare reform legislation illustrates the perspi-
cuity of Justice Rehnquist's observation. Notwithstanding the continuing
vitality of the procedural due process regime of Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill,59 welfare legislation has successfully divested large
numbers of individuals of what were previously statutory entitlements.60
field, it will be the United States Supreme Court's responsibility to interpret and enforce
the application of expanded Fourth Amendment limits. If there is to be a heightened
standard with respect to bedroom searches, for example, such that only the most serious
offenses would justify the intrusion, the Court would recognize this heightened standard
and make the final judgments about which crimes do and do not meet the reasonableness
standard. As to vehicle stops, the Court would similarly decide what sorts of factual
predicates justify them (including reasonable suspicion of a violent offense, for example,
but not a routine, nonthreatening traffic violation), while the police would, of necessity,
retain broad discretion to determine when a specific driver has provided that factual
predicate. Such heightened standards would contrast sharply with current quantitative
doctrine in substantive content, but they would rely upon tried and true procedural
mechanisms for their enforcement, including primarily the exclusionary rule championed
by liberal attorneys, scholars, and jurists.58. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (plurality opinion of
Rehnquist, J.) (arguing that "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in
determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the
sweet"). Though this principle was explicitly rejected eleven years later by a majority of
eight, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985), its
underlying insight-that procedural guarantees cannot alone provide protection for
individual constitutional entitlements-continues to be true today.
59. 470 U.S. at 545-47 (holding that when state law creates a property right, the
termination of that extant property right must be accompanied by procedures the
adequacy of which rests on the U.S. Constitution rather than state legislative prerogative).
60. See Personal Responsibility And Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112-61 (1996) (amending Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-617 by adding §§ 401-419). "The 1996 Act... eliminates aid to 300,000
children with serious disabilities and denies federal medical and subsistence aid to legal
immigrants. Food Stamp cuts of $28 billion over six years will reduce the average food
stamp benefit from 80 cents per person per meal to 66 cents, accounting for inflation."
Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare As We Know It, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 471,488 n.135 (1997) (book
review); see also An Act Concerning Welfare Reform, Pub. Act No. 95-194, 1995 Conn.
Legis. Serv. 95-194 (West) (codified as amended, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b). This Act
terminates benefits after twent"-one months and allegedly saved Connecticut
approximately $133 million over the next two years. See Christopher Keating, Senate
Passes Welfare Reform Package, Hartford Courant, May 25, 1995, at A3; see also An Act
Regarding Assistance to Needy Families, Pub. Act No. 90-17, 1997 Mll. Legis. Serv. 1503
(West) (codified in 305 Ill. Comp. Stat.) (replacing the federally fun~ded AFDC program
with temporary, state-funded transitional assistance that would be terminated by the State
at its discretion, without any due process protections for recipients while recipients
searched for jobs); 305 IMI. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9A-9(h) (West 1998) (prohibiting the
Illinois Department of Public Aid from approving a recipient's "participation in any post-
secondary education program, other than full-time, short-term vocational training for a
specific job, unless the individual also is employed part-time"); Wis. Stat. Ann.
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Similarly, purely procedural, quantitative limits on search and seizure
cannot provide an effective defense against an assault on Fourth
Amendment privacy interests by the legislature, a body that is usually
more sympathetic to the needs of law enforcement than to the rights of
suspected criminals.6 ' If, in order to perform a search, a police officer
needs only probable cause to believe that some crime has occurred, the
legislature can oblige the officer by expanding the scope of the criminal
law until the point at which such probable cause (to believe that some
crime has been committed) easily exists. As we saw above, this has effec-
tively become the state of affairs in the area of traffic stops. 62
The nature of contemporary Fourth Amendment protection against
ordinary searches and seizures thus turns very much on substantive legis-
lative choices. As a result, in order for the judicial branch to assert real
limits on police enforcement practices, it would need to integrate a sub-
stantive element into its Fourth Amendment analysis to a much greater
extent than it currently does.
The Court has chosen to stay out of the area of substance in evaluat-
ing most searches and seizures partly because of the subjectivity that
seems to be an inevitable component of nonquantitative reasonableness
analysis. Just as the Court has avoided expanding the category of
unenumerated rights subsumed under the rubric of substantive due pro-
cess,63 it prefers to leave the scope of enforceable criminal law in the
§ 49.19(4) (h) (West 1997) (requiring that aid recipients cooperate in establishing
paternity or else be disqualified from eligibility for assistance so that "protective payments"
for the child would be paid to a person other than the person charged with the care of the
dependent child).
61. For an elegant account of why it is rational for legislatures to undervalue the
rights of criminal suspects, see Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and
the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of
the Accused?, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1079, 1089 (1993) (arguing that with some narrow
exceptions, "legislators undervalue the rights of the accused for no more sinister, and no
more tractable a cause than that a far larger number of persons, of much greater political
influence, rationaly adopt the perspective of a potential crime victim rather than the
perspective of a suspect or defendant"); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365-66
(1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[tihe legislature's objective in passing a
law authorizing unreasonable searches.., is explicitly to facilitate law enforcement" and
that "[I] egislators by virtue of their political role are more often subjected to the political
pressures that may threaten Fourth Amendment values than are judicial officers"); Stuntz,
Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 56, at 18 (observing that "potential criminal suspects and
defendants are obviously not a major force with legislatures" because "the cost to legislators
of overbroad liability is likely to be small[, and] [t]he forces pushing for overbreadth seem
fairly powerful").
62. See supra Part IA
63. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267-68 (1997) (explaining, in
the context of right-to-die claims, that the Court has "'al vays been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in
this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended'" and has also feared that "[b]y
extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest," it would "place
the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action" (quoting Collins v.
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992))); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
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hands of legislative majorities.6 This preference may not, on its face,
seem incompatible with preserving procedural privacy as the domain of
judicial review. An incompatibility results, however, not from any inher-
ent problem in honoring majority rule, but from the unavoidable fact
that substantive and procedural privacy are not two closed systems. The
authority to regulate the one can be made to compensate for judicial
restraints upon the authority to regulate the other, in a sort of "conserva-
tion of police power." An understanding of this dynamic relationship be-
tween substance and process helps illuminate the steps necessary to pro-
tect privacy from legislative and executive caprice.
One necessary step in implementing a substantive Fourth
Amendment reasonableness doctrine would be deciding the level of gen-
erality at which such analysis would take place. As in the context of other
substantive rights, such as First Amendment free speech 65 and
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection,6 6 the Court in adopting sub-
stantive Fourth Amendment balancing would have to decide whether to
perform such balancing on an ad hoc basis, deciding each case on its
facts, or whether instead to make categorical judgments. The Supreme
Court has already had to make this decision with respect to the current
124 (1989) (holding that there exists no substantive due process right held by a biological
father with respect to a child born of his extramarital relationship with a married woman).
64. See Colb, Incarceration, supra note 14, at 783 (discussing how the courts "do not
substantively scrutinize the necessity and value of a particular criminal law even though a
person's liberty from incarceration hangs in the balance").
65. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 2, §§ 12-1 to 12-39, at 785-1061; Arnold H. Loewy,
Obscenity, Pornography, and First Amendment Theory, 2 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 471
(1993) (discussing the exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment protection); John
Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 Yale L.J. 1293 (1993) (discussing the history of
freedom of speech and the varying standards of review under the First Amendment).
66. Although Equal Protection doctrine typically includes three levels of scrutiny,
recent decisions have sometimes departed from a strict three-tiered analysis. See Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (applying a heightened level of rational-basis scrutiny for
"'[d]iscriminations of an unusual character'" to strike down a Colorado constitutional
amendment barring cities from passing anti-discrimination legislation protecting gays and
lesbians (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928))); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (dispelling "the notion that strict
scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact'" (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
519 (1980))); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985)
(applying rational-basis scrutiny to strike down a city's classification of retarded adults).
Justice Stevens has maintained, in fact, that in equal protection cases, the Court should
(and to some extent does) apply a level of scrutiny that is commensurate with the specific
issue at bar. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1010 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); City of
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452-53 (Stevens, J., concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Bush v. Vera, Justice Stevens explained:
[O]ur equal protection jurisprudence can sometimes mislead us with its rigid
characterization of suspect classes and levels of scrutiny. As I have previously
noted, all equal protection jurisprudence might be described as a form of rational
basis scrutiny; we apply "strict scrutiny" more to describe the likelihood of success
than the character of the test to be applied.
Bush, 517 U.S. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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quantitative Fourth Amendment analysis.67 The Court has required prob-
able cause, for example, with respect to one set of intrusions, while reduc-
ing the evidentiary standard to reasonable suspicion for another. Under
a substantive Fourth Amendment regime, the Court would have to decide
whether to adopt a similar categorical approach in setting threshold
levels of intrusiveness as well as threshold levels of government interests
justifying various levels of intrusion. Alternatively, it might take an ad hoc
approach, which would involve balancing particular intrusions against the
government's interest in enforcing the law at issue in a specific case. The
choice between these two approaches (or something in between) mirrors
the familiar choice between rules and standards.68
This Article is agnostic on the rules/standards question. The main
problem with current Supreme Court doctrine in the Fourth
Amendment area is its almost complete failure to engage in any substan-
tive scrutiny at all, the consequences of which are evident in such areas as
the traffic stop, which we have examined in some detail. A move in the
direction of greater substantive analysis, in my view, would therefore con-
stitute an essential and substantial improvement in the doctrine, whether
the Court ultimately chose to embrace a case-by-case or a categorical
approach.
One might, of course, object to the enterprise of integrating sub-
stance and process to reinvigorate the right of privacy on the distinct
ground that privacy does not constitute a worthwhile objective. William
Stuntz has made this objection and proposed that our case law ought to
(and to some extent already does) substitute for privacy a set of goals
more appropriate to modern concerns regarding police misconduct.69
67. See Slobogin, supra note 12, at 68-75 (criticizing the current categorical
approach and defending the quantitative sliding scale against Anthony Amsterdam's
critique); cf. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, supra note 12.
68. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standaids, 106 Harm. L.
Rev. 22, 56-69 (1992) (contrasting "rules," rigid, justiciable directives that set bright lines
for the decisionmaker, and "standards," more general statements of policy that give the
decisionmaker greater discretion to consider all relevant factors); see also Pierre Schlag,
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985) (describing the rules/standards debate
from a skeptical perspective); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953,
953 & passim (1995) (proposing that the choice of whether to employ rules or standards
ought to turn on a contextual inquiry into the aggregate likelihood of errors and abuses
under each alternative approach). In support of standards over rules in the Fourth
Amendment context, Slobogin suggests that clear rules are an illusion and that "even
seemingly 'bright-line' rules usually become blurred as the police and the adversarial
process test their outer limits." Slobogin, supra note 12, at 71 (citation omitted).
69. See, e.g., MrlliamJ. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure,
93 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1048 (1995) [hereinafter Stuntz, Privacy's Problem] (claiming that
"[f we could start over, perhaps privacy would not receive constitutional protection
anywhere" (emphasis omitted)); id. at 1060 (contending that although "[the substantive
consequences of privacy protection may have been acceptable in Boyd's era .... they are
not acceptable now" and that "[p]erhaps it is time to reconsider the protection"); id. at
1068 (observing that "[t]here are signs that this state of affairs is changing, that police
coercion is displacing privacy as a focus of attention in the law of criminal investigation"
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The main focus of this Article is on the means of protecting privacy, as-
suming that it should be protected. The challenge to privacy, however,
raises an important issue, and addressing it briefly will sharpen our sense
of both why privacy matters and how best to interpret and effectuate pri-
vacy rights. The following subpart therefore takes up the challenge
posed to Fourth Amendment privacy.
C. Does Privacy Matter?
Consider Stuntz's claims that the importance of privacy has dimin-
ished in modem society and that this diminution is most conspicuous
outside of the criminal law context. In the civil arena, for example, we
tend to accept as lawful the government's demands for private or business
disclosures through self-reporting requirements and the subpoena
power.70 Because Fourth Amendment privacy fails to occupy an impor-
tant place outside the criminal law, the argument goes, it accordingly
ought to be less of a concern within the criminal justice setting as well.71
The Fourth Amendment law might instead focus upon physical confron-
tations between private persons and the police and upon other kinds of
circumstances under which the potential for police violence is great.72
On such an approach, it is only the violence of police-citizen encounters
and indicating that "[t]his change is a good thing; it should proceed"). But see Daniel
Yeager, Does Privacy Really Have a Problem in'the Law of Criminal Procedure?, 49 Rutgers
L. Rev. 1283, 1284 (1997) (responding to Stuntz that "privacy retains a significant position
in the law of criminal procedure").
70. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1976) (holding that a
government's request that a bank turn over copies of an individual's deposit slips and
checks does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S.
648, 660-62 (1976) (holding that the requirement of completing and filing income tax
returns-even as applied to those earning money illegally-does not compel an individual
to incriminate herself in violation of the Fifth Amendment); California v. Byers, 402 U.S.
424, 433-34 (1971) (plurality opinion) (holding that a statute requiring motorists involved
in an automobile accident to stop and identify themselves does not violate the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incriminating testimony); id. at 427-28
(explaining the centrality of self-reporting within our society and observing that "[a]n
organized society imposes many burdens on its constituents"; "commands the filing of tax
returns for income"; "requires producers and distributors of consumer goods to file
informational reports on the manufacturing process and the content of products, on the
wages, hours, and working conditions of employees"; and requires "[t]hose who borrow
money on the public market or issue securities for sale to the public [to] file various
information reports[; likewise,] industries must report periodically the volume and content
of pollutants discharged into our waters and atmosphere"); Shapiro v. United States, 335
U.S. 1, 32-33 (1948) (upholding ,against Fifth Amendment challenge a subpoena
requiring a wholesaler to turn over various business records that he kept pursuant to
government regulations, notwithstanding the fact that those records were to be used
against the wholesaler in a criminal prosecution).
71. See Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 69, at 1043.
72. See id. (criticizing the Supreme Court for "penaliz[ing] an officer for turning
over a stereo turntable to look at a serial number without sufficient cause, but . . .
ignor[ing] unprovoked police violence during the course of an otherwise legal search of a
private home" (citations omitted)).
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and the fear that people consequently experience that furnish a persua-
sive rationale for a Fourth Amendment regime that selectively regulates
criminal law enforcement encounters. The violence factor could thus be
said to elucidate the otherwise elusive doctrinal distinction between the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment in the criminal and civil contexts,
respectively. 73
The critique of privacy encompasses substance as well. If privacy
were truly as significant as doctrinal rhetoric suggests, its protection
would necessarily extend to circumscribing the content of the law as well.74
Such an extension of privacy, however, would have substantive implica-
tions that would contradict most modern constitutional law and its nar-
row interpretation of substantive due process, following the overruling of
Lochner.75 A robust Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence is, on this
hypothesis, an anachronism-the consequence of an approach favored
during the Lochner era that reflected a mistakenly expansive vision of
property and privacy rights.76 The early twentieth century was a time of
greater constitutional restraints on the government, both substantive (re-
garding private conduct that could be circumscribed) 77 and procedural
73. See id. at 1060-68.
74. See id. at 1047-48.
75. See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Very Rational Court, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 1509, 1521
(1993) (observing that "since 1937 no governmental regulation of economic rights has
been invalidated on substantive due process grounds"); Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal
Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 483, 503 (1997)
(arguing that the "complete and definitive rejection of substantive due process [following
the Supreme Court's decision in Olsen v. Nebraska] lasted until 1965 when, in Griswold v.
Connecticut, the Court revived and reaffirmed that part of the doctrine concerning
personal rights and the right of privacy in particular"). Compare Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 63-64 (1905) (striking down a NewYork statute prohibiting bakery employees
from working more than ten hours a day or sixty hours a week, as an interference with the
right of contract between employer and employee), with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 392-93 (1937) (repudiating the Lochner line of cases and holding that the
liberty guaranteed under the Constitution does not bar the regulation of contracts in the
public interest).
76. This approach included, inter alia, an absolute bar against the seizure of an
individual's propert by the government. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 637-38
(1886) (holding unconstitutional a subpoena requiring the production of an individual's
property as evidence against him, on the theory that "to require such an owner to produce
his private books and papers, in order to prove his breach of the laws, and thus to establish
the forfeiture of his property, is surely compelling him to furnish evidence against
himself," and that accordingly, "[a) witness, as well as a party, is protected by the law from
being compelled to give evidence that tends to criminate him, or to subject his property to
forfeiture"). Stunt2 suggests that "the substantive implications of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment privacy protection may not have seemed as troubling a century ago as they do
today." Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 69, at 1018.
77. See Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45, 63-64 (1905); see also Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 559 (1923) (invalidating minimum wage for women workers).
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(regarding investigative techniques that could be legally employed).TS In
the modem era, by contrast, the substantive due process doctrine is quite
limited, the government is free to regulate substantively in areas that were
formerly off limits,79 and there is no serious judicial review of informa-
tion-gathering devices such as "tax forms, OSHA inspections, routine gov-
ernment employment practices, and a host of other things .... ,"80 The
continuing vitality of the Fourth Amendment privacy ideal is thus dubi-
ous, on this analysis.
The proposal that follows from this description of Supreme Court
precedent is the elimination of Fourth Amendment privacy protection, a
process that may indeed already be underway.8' Going the distance
would entail an explicit transposition of the Fourth Amendment protec-
tion against informational disclosure into a protection against police use
of force and coercion.8 2 These latter are serious harms, protection
against which would not have the necessary (and undesirable) civil impli-
cations that a consistent doctrine protecting privacy would have. Stuntz
concludes his analysis by declaring that " [i]f we could start over, perhaps
privacy would not receive constitutional protection anywhere."8 3
If the foregoing critique of privacy is correct, then substantive and
procedural privacy should be integrated only in the sense that both be-
long in the ash bin of history. There is reason, however, to be skeptical of
this assessment. The argument against privacy set forth above rests in
large part on a mischaracterization of what privacy means in ordinary life
and in Supreme Court doctrine. Properly defined, privacy matters.
The basic difficulty with the argument against privacy is the selection
of informational secrecy as the sort of "privacy" that the Court has pro-
tected under the Fourth Amendment. The notion of a constitutional
right to keep secrets from the government has not actually driven the
content or the rhetoric of Fourth Amendment doctrine. The Court,
therefore, need not reconcile a suspect's expansive rights against infor-
mational disclosure in the criminal context with the absence of such
rights in the civil context.84 The Court's guiding principle in interpret-
78. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 637-38; see also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)
(invalidating search and seizure of private property evidence that did not constitute fruits
or instrumentalities of crime).
79. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding, under due process
challenge, law prohibiting the practice of debt adjustment outside the lawful practice of
law); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (rejecting equal protection challenge
to regulation of opticians from which sellers of ready-to-wear glasses are exempt).
80. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 69, at 1019.
81. See id. at 1020.
82. See id. at 1044.
83. Id. at 1048 (emphasis omitted).
84. See Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy's Problem, 93 Mich. L.
Rev. 1079, 1086 (1995) [hereinafter Seidman, Problems with Privacy] (critiquing Stuntz's
attack on Fourth Amendment privacy and arguing that "[t]he simple fact is that modem
Fourth Amendment law has mostly assimilated the collapse of protection for informational
privacy per se").
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ing the Fourth Amendment has instead been one aspect of the "right to
be let alone"-a concept that is distinct from a right to keep information
secret from the government. This vision of privacy, articulated by Justice
Brandeis in his dissent from the Court's opinion in Olmstead v. United
States,85 ultimately became the prevailing approach in Katz v. United
States.8 6 The privacy denoted by Justice Brandeis is a privacy from what I
shall call governmental "personal knowledge" of the individual's private
life.
What is "personal knowledge" and how does it differ from ordinary
information? In the law of evidence, personal knowledge refers to the
requirement that, to qualify as a lay witness in a proceeding, a person
must have directly perceived a material event through the use of one or
more of her five senses.8 7 Under the Fourth Amendment, the govern-
ment's obligation to respect individual privacy has generally amounted to
a prohibition against such direct perception of individuals' physical or
mental states, activities, conversations, and other personal experiences
that are manifestly hidden from observation, absent some justification
that would quaJlify a proposed inspection as "reasonable." Governmental
"personal knowledge" accordingly encompasses searches of bedrooms,
bathrooms, closets, and desk drawers contained inside an individual's
home. It also includes tape-recordings and electronic transmissions of an
individual's telephone conversations conducted in a secluded place (such
as a closed telephone booth). It extends to pat-downs of a person's body,
strip searches, and body cavity searches.
Richard Parker urged a very similar definition of privacy in an article
published twenty-four years ago, in response to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. White.88 Parker offers the following definition of
privacy as best capturing intuitions about the meaning and value of pri-
vacy: "privacy is control over when and by whom the various parts of us can be
sensed by others. By 'sensed,' is meant simply seen, heard, touched,
smelled, or tasted."89 As Louis Michael Seidman has argued persuasively,
"[i]t is one thing to fill out a form that requests information about even
the most personal details of one's life. It is quite another to discover after
the fact that someone has been observing these personal details firsthand
85. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment "conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men").
86. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (asserting that "although a closely divided Court
supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any
material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the
narrow view on wit.ch that decision rested").
87. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 (stating that "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal
knowledge of the matter").
88. 401 U.S. 745 (1971); see Parker, supra note 52.
89. See Parker, supra note 52, at 281 (emphasis in original).
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with a telescope aimed at one's bedroom window."90 Though in either
case the government's objective might be to obtain information, the disclo-
sure-of the sought-after information is not the principal harm suffered
during searches and seizures. Indeed, as the Court has reiterated, there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy at all in keeping secret the fact
that one is involved in a crime (of which the government hopes to learn
through its investigations). 91
One might take issue with the notion of governmental "personal
knowledge." The government, after all, is not a "person" who can see,
hear, smell, or otherwise experience directly the hidden activities of indi-
vidual private persons. This objection, however, misses the fact that the
government acts through agents-specific people who do perceive events
directly through their senses and who accordingly might provoke shame
and distress in those private individuals who have experienced govern-
ment surveillance.
The Court flagged the distinction between informational disclosures,
on the one hand, and "personal knowledge" invasions of privacy, on the
other, in a decision holding that random drug-testing of student athletes
(through urinalysis) did not violate the Fourth Amendment.92 In reach-
ing its conclusion, the Court explained that "the degree of intrusion [en-
tailed in collecting a urine sample] depends upon the manner in which
production of the urine sample is monitored."93 As the majority
explained:
Under the District's Policy, male students produce samples at a
urinal along a wall. They remain fully clothed and are only ob-
served from behind, if at all. Female students produce samples
in an enclosed stall, with a female monitor standing outside lis-
tening only for sounds of tampering. These conditions are
nearly identical to those typically encountered in public
restrooms, which men, women, and especially school children
use daily. Under such conditions, the privacy interests compro-
mised by the process of obtaining the urine sample are in our
view negligible. 94
90. Seidman, Problems with Privacy, supra note 84, at 1090 (emphasis added).
91. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (holding that a field test
of cocaine is not a search because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the fact
of whether a white powdered substance found on a person is or is not cocaine); United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that subjecting luggage to a sniff test by a
trained narcotics detection dog was not a search because "[i]t does not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view"). Though
the Court's Fourth Amendment decisions suggest the personal-knowledge privacy
emphasis that I describe, one might argue that even informational privacy is worthy of
protection (as evidenced, perhaps, by the Fifth Amendment testimonial right against
compelled self-incrimination). A complete normative response to this position, however,
remains outside the scope of this Article.
92. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-66 (1995).
93. Id. at 658 (emphasis in original).
94. Id.
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The Court considered the respondents' claim that "the District's Policy is
in fact more intrusive than this suggests, because it requires the students,
if they are to avoid sanctions for a falsely positive test, to identify in ad-
vance prescription medications they are taking."95 Noting that in an ear-
lier decision, "we held that it [advance disclosure of medications] was not
'a significant invasion of privacy,' "96 the Court emphasized the potential,
within the meaning of the school district's policy, for limiting disclosure
of this information to medical personnel. 97 Like subpoenas and other
requests/demands for personal information, the Court viewed the
mandatory disclosure of personal facts regarding prescribed medication
as less significamt than the specifics of visual (and aural) observation of
personal behavior, which it chose to describe in some detail to show how
minimal such observation was.
The critique of Fourth Amendment privacy as anachronistic ac-
knowledges emphatically that the Fourth Amendment ought to continue
to restrict house searches and pat-downs (frisks).98 It supports such re-
strictions, however, as having more to do with a freedom from violence
and coercion than with "privacy."99 When an individual comes into di-
rect contact with the police, in other words, there is a frightening poten-
tial for eruptions of violence and coercion, particularly if police are them-
selves concerned about possible violence by the suspect.
Though potential violence is unquestionably a significant Fourth
Amendment concern, it does not exhaust the constitutionally problem-
atic features of police/citizen encounters. Conversely, the elimination of
this possibility of violence would not eliminate the need for Fourth
Amendment regulation of on-the-street encounters and house searches.
The consequence to an individual of being subjected to a police officer's
physical probe of his body, for example, is a profoundly humiliating inva-
sion of his privacy. 100 Being observed while one urinates to produce a
sample for a mandatory drug-test at a place of public employment simi-
larly intrudes upon a person's Fourth Amendment privacy. 101 To charac-
95. Id. at 659 (emphasis omitted).
96. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 n.7
(1989)).
97. See id. at 660. In addition to the requested data, the urinalysis itself provided
information about whether the student had used drugs. Because the information was
limited to drug use (and did not reveal such conditions as pregnancy, epilepsy, or
diabetes), because it was given only to medical personnel, and because it did not vary
according to the identity of the student (and therefore did not result in targeting), the
Court did not consider this informational disclosure significant either. Id. at 658.
98. See Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 69, at 1060-68.
99. See id. at 1064-68.
100. Cf. Sol Wachtler, After The Madness: Ajudge's Own Prison Memoir 28 (1997)
(describing "the stunning invasion of privacy known as a 'strip search'" and "the
experience of being stripped naked in front of strangers who then examine every crevice
and orifice of your body").
101. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting):
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terize some of this intrusion as "violence" might achieve consistency with
a rejection of Fourth Amendment "privacy." As Daniel Yeager has noted,
however, we would apply the words "violence" and "coercion" to such acts
only at the cost of expanding the words well beyond their ordinary
connotations. 0 2
In addition to the violent side of some searches and seizures, Stuntz's
critique of privacy identifies a second, distinct harm as legitimately en-
compassed within Fourth Amendment restrictions, one that is difficult to
define precisely. He explains that this other harm "is about preventing
invasions of dignitary interests, as when a police officer publicly accosts
someone and treats him as a suspect. Arrests or street stops infringe pri-
vacy in this sense because they stigmatize the individual, single him out,
and deprive him of freedom." 0 3 Stuntz soon abandons the privacy label
for this harm and states that "[t]he real harm ... arises from the indignity
of being publicly singled out as a criminal suspect and the fear that flows
from being targeted by uniformed, armed police officers."10 4 This sin-
gling-out harm is what I have described elsewhere as the "targeting
harm," in the commission of which the government singles out and treats
a given individual with suspicion absent adequate justification. 10 5 The
Court has itself focused implicitly upon this targeting harm in elaborating
upon the meaning of "reasonableness" in the Fourth Amendment.
10 6 It
has focused as well upon the fear experienced by an individual con-
The Government asserts it can demand that employees perform 'an excretory
function traditionally shielded by great privacy,' [Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989),] while 'a monitor of the same sex...
remains close at hand to listen for the normal sounds,' [ Von Raab, 489 U.S. at
661,] and that the excretion thus produced be turned over to the Government
for chemical analysis [despite the fact that] [t]he Court agrees that this
constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment-and I think it
obvious that it is a type of search particularly destructive of privacy and offensive
to personal dignity.
But see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Action, 515 U.S. 646, 659 (1995); supra notes 90-94 and
accompanying text.
102. See Yeager, supra note 69, at 1287 ("Stuntz is too brisk and too dependent on a
sense of 'coercion' that stretches the word all out of shape.").
103. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 69, at 1021 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 1064 (emphasis added).
105. See Colb, Innocence, supra note 9, at 1487. As Stuntz recognizes in his later
reference, see Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 69, at 1064, what I have called the
targeting harm is not a privacy harm at all but rather a harm that cuts across different
kinds of governmental actions talen against individuals (including prosecution and
conviction). It springs from the official's attitude toward the individual rather than from
the individual's loss of privacy or other liberty. See Colb, Innocence, supra note 9, at
1486-91.
106. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that in the absence of
reasonable suspicion tojustify a stop, an officer arbitrarily selecting a specific motorist for a
traffic stop to check for license and registration violates the Fourth Amendment); see also
Colb, Innocence, supra note 9, at 1487-90 (discussing Prouse and the targeting harm).
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fronting an officer under circumstances of having been singled oUt. 10 7
Stuntz complains, however, that the Court has subordinated such legiti-
mate pursuits of the Fourth Amendment to the informational privacy
right announced and praised in its Fourth Amendment cases.10 8
Although [ disagree with some of Stuntz's conclusions, we share sev-
eral important premises in approaching the proper interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment. Neither of us would adopt as a core Fourth
Amendment value the protection of informational privacy in the context
of criminal investigations. Both of us would reject a Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that provided no protection against police violence and
terror. Finally, we would both insist that the dignitary harm of being sin-
gled out for a search or seizure (i.e., targeting) be included among the
injuries recognized in Fourth Amendment doctrine. Any disagreement
we have with respect to these points concerns only the efficacy with which
the Court has pursued concededly appropriate objectives.
Where we fundamentally disagree is on the value that we would each
place upon what I have called privacy from personal knowledge. Stuntz
would not count (and does not seriously consider) this kind of privacy as
part of assessing the potential harm of a given search or seizure. 10 9 His
107. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657 (suggesting that the stop of a particular motorist on
the highway, whether by a roving border patrol or by a police officer checking license and
registration, may create "substantial anxiety").
108. Stuntz emphasizes that "the [two] interests [in informational privacy and in
freedom from targeting] are neither equally important to the law nor equally well
protected. On the contrary, informational privacy-privacy as nondisclosure-is and has
been preeminent." Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 69, at 1021 (emphasis omitted).
He supports this claim of primacy (and hence the error of the Court's ways) by arguing
that "[tihe concept [of plain view] makes sense only in terms of informational privacy. It
flows out of the interest in keeping secrets, not out of the interest in being free from
unreasonable police coercion or from other kinds of dignitary harms that search targets
may suffer." Id. at 1022. The allowance of plain-view seizures could be defended, however,
as perfectly consistent with a personal knowledge (rather than an informational) approach
to privacy. A valid plain-view seizure, by definition, requires that no unauthorized visual
surveillance or physical probing was a part of acquiring the justification for seizing the
object in question. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37, 142 (1990) (limiting
plain-view seizures to occasions on which it is immediately apparent that an item viewed
from a place where the officer is authorized to be and located in a place to which the
officer has authorized access, constitutes either fruits, evidence, instrumentalities of crime,
or contraband); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987) (holding that "immediately
apparent" means that the police must have probable cause to seize an item in "plain view");
Michigan v. Long. 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983) (noting that "[i]f, while conducting a
legitimate Terry search of the interior of [an] automobile, the officer should.. . discover
[and seize] contraband other than weapons," the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
does not preclude the admission of this evidence); cf. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S.
366, 379 (1993) (suppressing the evidence in the particular case as falling outside the
"plain feel" ,doctrmne because "the officer determined that the item was contraband only
after conducting a further search, one not authorized by Terry or by any other exception to
the warrant requirement").
109. See Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 69, at 1020-21 (explaining that "[in
legal discourse privacy encompasses, among other things, the ability to engage in certain
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renunciation of privacy as an important constitutional value is not, more-
over, confined to the procedural domain. He elsewhere directly criticizes
the doctrine of substantive due process for its recognition of substantive
privacy rights." 0 Stuntz suggests in Privacy's Problem that substantive due
process privacy is essentially similar to the Court's Lochner-era substantive
due process protection for economic rights, under which the Court re-
peatedly invalidated legislation regulating economic transactions."'
Stuntz then relies upon judicial and academic repudiation of the Lochner
jurisprudence to argue that the procedural privacy right recognized
under the Fourth Amendment ought to be repudiated as well. 1 2 He
thus makes a plea for consistency between substance and procedure: Just
as Lochner and its privacy progeny were wrong as a matter of substance,
the corresponding Fourth Amendment protection of privacy is wrong as a
matter of procedure.
Stuntz may, of course, legitimately disagree with the modern substan-
tive due process precedents, as others have before him." 3 Such disagree-
ment does not, however, follow inevitably from an opposition to Lochner.
conduct free from government regulation, freedom from being stared at or stalked or
.singled out' in public, the 'right to be let alone,' and the ability to keep certain
information or aspects of one's life secret" and claiming that "[ifn the law of criminal
procedure, two kinds of privacy seem to matter": the first is "privacy interests as interests in
keeping information and activities secret from the government" and the second "is about
preventing invasions of dignitary interests").
110. See Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 56, at 37 (maintaining that "[tihese
lines [that distinguish 'real' crimes from crimes that ordinary people do not view as
crimes] are no more (though no less) guided by determinate legal criteria than the line
between 'privacy' interests fundamental enough to gain the due process clause's
protection and interests that fail to register on the constitutional radar," and suggesting
that "the very thing that is most troubling about substantive due process [is] its
unanchored quality"). See generally supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (discussing
Stuntz's proposed link between substantive Lochner-like constitutional protection and
procedural overprotection of informational secrecy).
111. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278-79 (1932) (holding
unconstitutional a regulation limiting the number of businesses that could manufacture
ice); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 559 (1923) (holding a statute fixing
minimum wage for women workers an unconstitutional interference with liberty to
contract and a "naked, arbitrary exercise of power"); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590,
596-97 (1917) (holding unconstitutional an initiative that prohibited employment
agencies from collecting fees for their services); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 592-93
(1897) (holding unconstitutional on due process grounds a Louisiana statute prohibiting
the obtaining of insurance on Louisiana property from any company not licensed in
Louisiana).
112. See Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 69, at 1018 (suggesting that "the
substantive implications of Fourth and Fifth Amendment privacy protection may not have
seemed as troubling a century ago as they do today").
113. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 95-100, 110-26, 257-59
(1990);John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale LJ.
920 (1973); Lino A. Graglia, "Constitutional Theory": The AttemptedJustification for the
Supreme Court's Liberal Political Program, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 789, 794-97 (1987); see also
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 14-21 (1980) (criticizing the interpretation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as containing a substantive
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In arguing that Fourth Amendment procedural privacy doctrine is out of
step with the substantive repudiation of Lochner, Stuntz assumes an equa-
tion between Lochner's substantive due process of nearly a century ago
and privacy substantive due process of the modern era. He thus neglects
the possibility that the Supreme Court's rejection of Lochner simply sig-
nals a rejection of its underlying premise that every person possesses an
inherent economic liberty that flourishes through governmental noninter-
vention. 114 The Court has not repudiated the principle that there exist
unenumerated constitutional rights of privacy that are substantive in na-
ture. 115 Protecting Fourth Amendment privacy would therefore generate
no necessary tension between substance and process in constitutional
doctrine." 6
As the cases discussed in this section illustrate, Fourth Amendment
and due process privacy do matter to the Court, and, I believe, rightly so
(although I do not offer here a general defense of the substantive due
component); Robert H. Bork, Again, a Struggle for the Soul of the Court, N.Y. Times, July
8, 1992, at A19 (same).
114. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) (specifying that
freedom of contract is qualified, rather than absolute); see also Louis Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1410, 1416 (1974) (suggesting of the demise of the Lochner
jurisprudence that "its philosophical underpinning" of individual autonomy should not be
rejected and that "[w]hat could not stand was the foreign accretion to substantive due
process of laissez-faire, the apotheosis as constitutional doctrine that liberty of contract was
extraordinarily sacred and that economic regulation for the public welfare was not a
permissible purpose of government").
115. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (invalidating prohibition against married couples' use of contraceptives);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (prohibiting sterilization of thief on the
ground that because procreation is a fundamental right, any government entity depriving
some but not others of this right violates Fourteenth Amendment equal protection unless
such differentiation can be justified as narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest). Note that the Court in Griswold cited Skinner for the proposition
that "the right of privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one," Griswold,
381 U.S. at 485, and thereby transformed the holding in Skinner from one concerned
primarily with equal protection to one that provided authority for recognizing a
substantive right of privacy.
116. Indeed, several Justices illustrated their sense of the potential
interconnectednes between what are sometimes called "substantive due process" liberties
and Fourth Amendment rights at a recent oral argument in the case of County of
Sacramento v. Lewvis, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998), in which the issue presented was whether a
high-speed police chase ending in accidental but foreseeable injury or death violated the
Constitution. At the argument, "[s]everal Justices, including Chief Justice Willam H.
Rehnquist, appeared eager to subject incidents of this kind to a... different constitutional
analysis, not under the due process guarantee of the 14t' Amendment [under which it was
being argued] but under the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
seizures." Linda Greenhouse, Court Considering Whether a Police Chase Violated Rights,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1997, at A22; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, No. 96-1337, 1997 WL 770156, at *5-*6, *16-*17, *21-*22, *23,
*38-*41 (Dec. 9, 1997). The Court subsequently held that a police officer does not violate
substantive due process in causing such a death through deliberate or reckless indifference
to life in a high-speed chase. See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1711-12.
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process privacy doctrine). The lofty goals of Fourth Amendment privacy
doctrine are, however, in tension with the reality of an almost purely
quantitative set of standards governing the reasonableness of searches
and seizures.
II. CASES ACKNOWLEDGING QUALrrATIVE "REASONABLENESS"
In constructing a better Fourth Amendment doctrine, we need not
abandon the existing framework, for that framework contains the kernel
of an alternative. The Supreme Court has sometimes seen fit to pierce
the quantitative veil of "probable cause" and require the sort of reasona-
bleness that takes into account the gravity of the offense being investi-
gated, the seriousness of the intrusion involved, and/or the availability of
less restrictive alternatives in pursuing police objectives. Such cases are
exceptional and generally involve extraordinarily intrusive investigative
procedures. 117 The principle that emerges from the cases considered to-
gether, however, admits of a more expansive application without a radical
destabilization of existing doctrine.
A. Death and Extraordinary Bodily Intrusions
The easiest case of substantive reasonableness to come before the
Court involved police use of deadly force. In Tennessee v. Garner,118 the
issue presented was whether the Fourth Amendment permits police of-
ficers to use deadly force against a suspected felon attempting to flee and
evade capture. Even the question presented implicitly conceded that the
"seizure" involved in killing a person is not the same as that involved in
arresting a person. If the two were the same, then the "flight" component
would itself be superfluous. As long as police had probable cause to jus-
tify a felony arrest, they could choose the more expedient alternative of
using deadly force rather than arrest. The Court held, however, that even
adding a suspected felon's flight to the usual probable cause standard
(which might make deadly force the least restrictive means of successful
apprehension) would insufficiently limit the use of deadly force." 9 The
Court concluded that only when there is probable cause to believe that a
fleeing felon would cause death or substantial bodily harm if allowed to
117. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (observing that "[w]here
probable cause has existed, the only cases in which we have found it necessary actually to
perform the 'balancing' analysis involved searches or seizures conducted in an
extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual's privacy or even physical
interests").
118. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
119. See id. at 11 (asserting that "[t]he use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all
felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable," and that
"[w] here the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the
harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do
so").
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escape does the Fourth Amendment authorize the police to use deadly
force.120
Not surprisingly, the Garner standard of reasonableness resembles
the criminal law standard for justifiable homicide by private actors.12 1
Just as a private person may not kill a thief running off with the person's
wallet, so too the police may not use deadly force to prevent the escape of
a criminal suspect whose escape would not create a substantial risk of
harm to the population. As Justice White explained for the Court in
Garner, "[] t is not better that all felony suspects die than that they es-
cape."' 2 2 Though Tennessee argued that the authority to use deadly
force facilitates the arrest process, the Court roundly rejected this argu-
ment and, in the process, demonstrated that the application of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness could sometimes impose requirements be-
yond probable cause and could even involve substantive analysis of the
criminal law being enforced.
Garner, of course, may be distinguished from other cases. The
Supreme Court, after all, has rested an entire jurisprudence of capital
punishment on the premise that state killing is sui generis and that non-
capital precedents sometimes provide insufficient protection when ap-
plied in the capital context. The Court has declared by way of justifica-
tion that "death is different." 12 Particularly instructive is the fact that the
120. See id. at 11 (holding that "[a] police officer may not seize an unarmed,
nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead[,]" although "[wlhere the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to
the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using
deadly force").
121. See Model Penal Code § 3.04 (1985) (stating that "the use of force upon or
toward another penon is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately
necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such
other person on the present occasion," and that in order to use deadly force, the actor
must believe "that such force is necessary to protect himself [or a third party, see § 3.05]
against death [or] serious bodily harm").
122. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
123. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 171, 178 (1994) (7-2 decision on the
issue) (holding that at least when future dangerousness is an issue in a capital-sentencing
determination, the defendant has a due process right to require that the sentencing jury
be informed of his ineligibility for parole); see id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring)
(observing that "[t'he Court has explained that the [Eighth) Amendment imposes a
heightened standard 'for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case,'" (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)), and observing that "[t] hat
same need for heightened reliability also mandates recognition of a capital defendant's
right to require instructions on the meaning of the legal terms used to describe the
sentences (or sentencing recommendations) ajury is required to consider, in making the
reasoned moral choice between sentencing alternatives"); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333,
342 (1993) (stating that "the Eighth Amendment requires a greater degree of accuracy and
factfinding [in a capital case] than in [a] noncapital case[ ]" and that rights provided in
the capital context axe not necessarily generalizable to the noncapital context); Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) (stating that "[o]ur cases creating and clarifying the
'individualized capital sentencing doctrine' have repeatedly suggested that there is no
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condition from which death is different in capital cases is life imprison-
ment.12 4 Life imprisonment, though primarily a punishment implicating
Eighth Amendment and due process concerns, 125 also represents an al-
most absolute deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights. A convict serv-
ing a term of life imprisonment loses most of his privacy' 26 for the re-
mainder of his days. He also suffers a significant seizure in the form of
the government's deliberate and long-term deprivation of his freedom of
movement. Nonetheless, in the Court's approach to the constitutional
law governing punishments, life imprisonment does not compare with
death.
Whatever the merits of the "death is different" argument in the
Eighth Amendment context, the Court has not limited heightened or
substantive reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment to
cases in which death is at issue. In Winston v. Lee,127 for example, the
Court held that a "search" of a suspect's body for a bullet, through sur-
gery, could not be justified on the basis of probable cause alone. By con-
trast to Garner, however, the Lee Court did not set out a standard for de-
termining when-if ever-a surgical "search" for evidence might be
allowed. 128 Because the crime in Lee was serious,129 we do know that the
seriousness of an offense is not by itself a sufficient basis for the seizure,
just as it was not in Garner.'5 ° Necessity, or what is known as "narrow
tailoring" or "least restrictive alternative" analysis in the context of equal
protection, free speech, and substantive due process cases, evidently be-
comparable requirement outside the capital context, because of the qualitative difference
between death and all other penalties").
124. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-96 (finding that sentence of life in prison without
possibility of parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment, despite defendant's status as a first-time felon); id. at 996 (indicating
that "[w] e have drawn the line of required individualized sentencing at capital cases, and
see no basis for extending it further").
125. See generally Colb, Incarceration, supra note 14.
126. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984) (holding that a convict in
prison has no legitimate Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in his cell).
127. 470 U.S. 753 (1985). The Court observed that "[a] compelled surgical intrusion
into an individual's body for evidence... implicates expectations of privacy and security of
such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to produce
evidence of a crime." Id. at 759.
128. There is language in the opinion that suggests that such surgery would perhaps
be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment if essential to the government's case. See
id. at 766 (asserting that the fact that the "Commonwealth has available such substantial
evidence of the origin of the bullet restricts the need for the Commonwealth to compel
respondent to undergo the contemplated surgery" (emphasis added)).
129. Id. at 755 (explaining that "the respondent Rudolph Lee [was] suspected of
attempting to commit armed robbery").
130. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (holding "that such force may not
be used unless it is necessa2y to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer
or others") (emphasis added).
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comes part of the Fourth Amendment calculus once a very serious intru-
sion, even one that does not involve the use of deadly force, is at issue.18 1
In an analogous case in the due process context, Rochin v.
California,132 the Supreme Court held that police had violated the
Constitution when they forcibly took a suspect to the hospital to have his
stomach pumped after the suspect reacted to police questioning about
two capsules on his nightstand by swallowing the capsules. The capsules
turned out to be morphine, but the Court held that, because the officers'
conduct in obtaining the morphine from the suspect "shocked the con-
science," the evidence was inadmissible as a matter of due process. 133 Be-
cause the Court decided Rochin prior to its decision to apply the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule to the states,134 it is likely that similar facts
arising today would be addressed under the Fourth Amendment "reason-
ableness" principle and would be resolved on the basis of some of the
same principles discussed in Winston v. Lee (the surgery case).la5
131. In the case of free speech and other rights, the required criteria for
constitutionality of a direct burden on the exercise of a fundamental right include the
presence of a compelling governmental interest and the lack of less restrictive alternative
means of pursuing that interest. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 1502 U.S. 105, 121-23 (1991) (invalidating under the First Amendment
a statute requiring that income from works describing an individual's crimes be set aside in
an escrow fund devoted to compensation of victims and other creditors of the self-
described criminal). For a critical analysis of least-restrictive-alternative law, see Colb,
Incarceration, supra note 14, at 827-39.
132. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
133. Id. at 172. The Court concluded that:
[Tihe proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend
some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime
too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking
into the privaq of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove
what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents-this course of
proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even
hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to
permit of constitutional differentiation.
Id.
134. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (declining the invitation to
extend to state criminal trials the federal exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914)); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wo/f and accordingly
extending the application of the exclusionary rule to the states). The Court had occasion
again to consider evidence under the Rochin Due Process standard in Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128 (1954) (refusing to require under Due Process clause the exclusion of
evidence obtained through an illegal wiretap, finding that the government's conduct did
not shock the conscience), and Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (holding that
drawing blood from an unconscious suspect did not shock the conscience and that the
Due Process Clause therefore did not require suppression of the blood evidence).
135. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 n.5 (observing that "the procedure in Schmerber
[in which blood was taken from a person suspected of driving while intoxicated]
contrasted sharply with the practice in Rochin v. California, in which police officers broke
into a suspect's room, attempted to extract narcotics capsules he had put into his mouth,
took him to a hospital, and directed that an emetic be administered to induce vomiting,"
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Though these examples embrace a substantively demanding Fourth
Amendment reasonableness in the search and seizure context, the Court
has generally resisted extending the heightened reasonableness require-
ment beyond the extraordinary cases in which government officials seek
to penetrate the flesh of a suspect. The Court has, however, sometimes
treated the more ordinary search and seizure cases differently from one
another, depending on the degree of intrusiveness involved. Such cases
provide a basis in precedent for re-examining the Court's reluctance to
apply heightened reasonableness analysis more broadly than it is cur-
rently applied. The first of these cases is Payton v. New York.18 6
B. Slouching Toward Reasonableness
About four years before its decision in Payton, the Supreme Court
had upheld warrantless public felony arrests based upon probable
cause. 137 Relying on constitutional history, dicta from its own prior
precedents, and prevailing state practice, the Court in United States v.
Watso7i concluded that the usual requirement that an officer obtain a war-
rant prior to any search or seizure should not apply in the case of a public
arrest. In Payton, the Court faced the issue whether to extend the logic of
the warrant exception in Watson to arrests carried out in a suspect's pri-
vate home.138
An arrest warrant certifies that there is probable cause to believe that
the designated arrestee has committed a criminal offense.' 3 9 A neutral
magistrate issues the warrant based upon sworn evidence presented to
her by the police officer(s) seeking the warrant.140 The warrant proce-
and that "Rochin, recognizing the individual's interest in 'human dignity,' held the search
and seizure unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause" (citations omitted)).
136. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
137. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421 (1976) (explaining that "[t]he
balance struck by the common law in generally authorizing felony arrests on probable
cause, but without a warrant, has survived substantially intact").
138. Payton, 445 U.S. at 574-75 ("In United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, we upheld
a warrantless 'midday public arrest,' expressly noting that the case did not pose 'the still
unsettled question . . . "whether and under what circumstances an officer may enter a
suspect's home to make a warrantless arrest."'" (ellipsis in original)).
139. "If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or affidavits filed with the
complaint, that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the defendant has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant shall issue to
any officer authorized by lav to execute it." Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a).
140. See, e.g.,Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) ("The point of the
Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 450 (1971) ("[T]he whole point of the basic rule [that a warrant must be granted
by a neutral and detached magistrate] ... is that prosecutors and policemen simply cannot
be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to their own investigations-the
'competitive enterprise' that must rightly engage their single-minded attention."); cf.
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dure is meant to ensure that the zealous police officer, engaged in the
"often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,"141 does not arrest a
person as to whom he lacks probable cause.
The Supreme Court held in Payton that a police officer who wishes to
arrest an individual in her home must first obtain an arrest warrant, even
though the same arrest could have taken place in public without a war-
rant.142 The majority explained that a home represents the primary zone
of Fourth Amendment privacy.143 The Court reasoned that an arrest oc-
curring inside a person's home is more intrusive and disruptive than one
transpiring in public. This is because, in addition to the loss of liberty
inherent in any arrest, a home arrest also involves a loss of privacy, con-
sisting of police entry into the suspect's home and any accompanying
search of that home necessary to locate the suspect. The Court con-
cluded that an arrest warrant would therefore be required in the case of a
private arrest. In this way, the Court attempted to ensure that a person's
home would not be invaded lightly.
One might plausibly take issue with the assumption that because the
home is private, a home arrest is therefore more intrusive than a public
one. The very privacy from public scrutiny offered by the home might
alleviate rather than aggravate the embarrassment of being taken into
custody1 44 Even accepting, however, the Court's estimation of the rela-
Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that a search
warrant issued by a magistrate who would receive a five-dollar fee for issuing a warrant but
no fee for refusing to issue a warrant violated the protections afforded the defendant
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
141. Johnson, 3:33 U.S. at 14; see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15 (1995); Illinois v.
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 351 (1987).
142. Payton, 445 U.S. at 576, 588-90.
143. See id. at 585 (asserting that "[a]s the Court reiterated just a few years ago, the
'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed" (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972))); id. at 589-90 (noting that "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the
individual's privacy in a variety of settings" and that in no setting "is the zone of privacy
more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an
individual's home--a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms:
'The right of the people to be secure in their... houses... shall not be violated.' That
language unequivocally establishes the proposition that '[a] t the very core [of the Fourth
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.'" (ellipses in original) (alterations in original)
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))); id. at 598 (adding that
"the absence of any 17th- or 18th-century English cases directly in point, together with the
unequivocal endorsement of the tenet that 'a man's house is his castle,' strongly suggests
that the prevailing practice was not to make such arrests except in hot pursuit or when
authorized by a warrant"); id. at 596-97 (contending that "[t]he zealous and frequent
repetition of the adage that 'a man's house is his castle,' made it abundantly clear that
both in England and in the Colonies 'the freedom of one's house' was one of the most vital
elements of English liberty").
144. See, e.g., Wachtler, supra note 100, at 109. Judge Wachtler explains that:
It is difficult to convey the intensity and inflexibility ofthe deliberate humiliations
visited upon me on the orders of [the United States Attorney]. The very form of
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tive gravity of injuries, there are independent difficulties with the Court's
resolution of the Payton issue.
First, a warrant requirement does not ensure, as the Court seems
erroneously to have assumed,145 that home arrests occur only when the
public alternative is not feasible. If an officer has probable cause to justify
an arrest (a Fourth Amendment requirement regardless of where the
arrest occurs), then he would presumably be able to obtain an arrest war-
rant from a magistrate and carry out the arrest in private, even if a public
arrest would have been entirely feasible. Unlike in Lee (bullet surgery)
and Garner (deadly force), the Court in Payton does not require an officer
to demonstrate to the magistrate that he has some reason beyond the
usual showing of probable cause to perform a home arrest.
To the extent that the Court distrusted the zealous officers and
chose the more neutral magistrate in Payton for that reason, the solution
cannot effectively remedy the problem. A magistrate providing an arrest
warrant has reviewed only the question whether there is probable cause
to arrest the individual in question. Though the officer must also have
probable cause to believe the suspect is indeed inside his home at the
time of an arrest-probable cause to search for the suspect-the magis-
trate does not review the officer's judgment on this probable cause ques-
tion.146 In short, the Payton arrest warrant requirement not only fails to
ensure that a home arrest is necessary in a particular case, it does not even
provide a neutral magistrate's confirmation that the home-entry-the ele-
ment that distinguishes a home arrest from a public arrest-is based
upon probable cause to believe the suspect is at home. It is the police
officer alone who determines prior to the search whether there is prob-
the arrest could not have been contrived with any other purpose in mind. Why,
otherwise, would I have been melodramatically surrounded on a crowded public
highway, literally dragged from my car, and frisked and handcuffed for all to see?
... In my case... there was obviously not the slightest risk in delaying the arrest
until I reached a secluded neighborhood or even my home, which was five
minutes away.
Id.; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[A]
person can be just as much, if not more, irritated, annoyed and injured by an
unceremonious public arrest by a policeman as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his office
or home.").
145. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 (explaining that the Court has "long adhered to the
view that the warrant procedure minimizes the danger of needless intrusions" such as
physical entry by police into the home); see also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204,
214 n.7 (1981) (observing that the arrest warrant required in Payton "'necessarily also
authorizes a limited invasion of [the arrestee's] privacy interest when it is necessary to arrest
him in his home'" (emphasis added) (quoting Payton)).
146. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 602-03 (specifically noting that although "[i]t is true that
an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than a search warrant
requirement," the arrest warrant nonetheless "will suffice to interpose the magistrate's
determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen," and adding
that "[if there is sufficient evidence of a citizen's participation in a felony to persuade a
judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to
open his doors to the officers of the law").
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able cause to enter the house. Although the Court may have had a defen-
sible instinct that a home arrest is worse than a public arrest, the mecha-
nism selected by the Court to address its instinct-the arrest warrant
requirement-provided a blunt (if not entirely ineffectual) instrument
for protecting the individual's home against unnecessary arrest-related
intrusions. 14 7
About a year after deciding Payton, the Court held in Steagald v.
United States that when carrying out an arrest in the home of an individual
other than the arrestee himself, the police must obtain a search warrant
(specifying probable cause to believe that the criminal suspect who is sub-
ject to arrest is located in the home of the third party). An arrest warrant
alone, in other words, is an insufficient basis for arresting a suspect in an
innocent third party's home. 148 This result might seem better tailored to
its purposes tha:n the holding in Payton. In Steagald, unlike in Payton, the
home arrest requires an assurance from a neutral magistrate that the pri-
vacy of an innocent third party's home is not improperly invaded.
Recall that every home arrest requires that there be probable cause to
believe both that the suspect committed a crime and that he may be
found in the particular home in which he is sought.149 The function of
an arrest warrant, required by Payton, is to ensure through a neutral mag-
istrate that the s;uspect's arrest is justified, a matter that is separate from
the question of where that arrest should take place. The search warrant
required by Steagald, by contrast, might help increase the reliability of the
determination that the suspect is indeed located in the third party's
home. In this w-ay, the warrant ensures that the intrusion upon an inno-
cent third party's privacy is justified. Upon closer examination, however,
the seeming precision of the Court's approach in Steagald turns out to be
illusory.
One might expect that to justify an invasion of an innocent third
party's privacy in order to carry out the arrest of a suspect, the police
would have to show more than probable cause with respect to the sus-
pect's presence in the third party's home. They might have to show, for
147. One way in which the warrant requirement might "work" here is that a police
officer who can arrest in public might do so because obtaining a warrant is a nuisance. See
Ronald J. Allen, et al., Constitutional Criminal Procedure 720 (3d ed. 1995) (suggesting
that "[t] he arrest warrant requirement-like a search warrant requirement-may deter the
police from making home arrests"). This logic, however, is somewhat troubling if we
believe that the wan-ant requirement is meant to ensure that all arrests and searches truly
meet the probable cause standard rather than to exploit police inertia to discourage
legitimate searches and seizures.
148. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 205, 213-14, 216 (holding that a law enforcement
officer may not "legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third
party without first obtaining a search warrant").
149. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 603 (indicating that "for Fourth Amendment purposes, an
arrest warrant founded on probable cause [to believe that a citizen participated in a
felony] implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the
suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within" (emphasis added)).
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example, that there is not a less intrusive alternative to entering the third
party's home to arrest the suspect, perhaps because the suspect is hiding
himself there with no immediate plans of leaving. Otherwise, the third
party might legitimately ask why the police did not arrest the suspect in
public or in the suspect's own home instead.
The Court could have expressly required a showing of necessity, as it
implicitly did in Winston v. Lee with respect to the use of surgery.
15 0 It
could alternatively (or additionally) have required a showing that the of-
fense in question was serious enough to merit this especially intrusive al-
ternative, as it did in Tennessee v. Garner with respect to the use of deadly
force. 151 The Court did neither, however. It instead required only that a
magistrate review the application of the substantive standard that also
happens to govern the arrest of a suspect in his own home (which itself
requires only that a magistrate confirm the application of the substantive
standard that also governs a public arrest, i.e., probable cause to arrest).
Finally, it is not apparent why a search warrant would be especially help-
ful in the context of Steagald. If the purpose of the warrant is to check
police zeal in especially tempting law enforcement environments, the
Court does not explain, in either Payton or Steagald, why the police would
be most tempted in a third party's home.152
A third case addressing the issues surrounding home arrests and the
special threat they pose to Fourth Amendment privacy is Welsh v.
Wisconsin.15s Welsh involved the arrest of a man who earlier had driven
while intoxicated in the State of Wisconsin, a civil violation at the time.'
5 4
Upon their arrival at the scene of the violation, the police were directed
by a witness to the suspect's car, where they found a registration with an
address. They proceeded to the stated address, which turned out to be
the suspect's home. They promptly gained entry and arrested Welsh.
15 5
150. 470 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1985).
151. 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985).
152. One might argue that police behavior during public arrests is constrained by its
visibility to "the people." The people, however, will often know nothing about whether the
police have or lack probable cause against the suspect in question. Furthermore, an arrest
in "public" (i.e., not in a private home) need not have any nonparty witnesses. Finally, an
arrest in a third party's home may provide the greatest motivation for the police to exercise
self-control, since the resident is not under suspicion (and is therefore a credible witness)
and may care enough to testify against a police officer who has treated her visitor
improperly.
153. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
154. Id. at 746 n.6 (noting that "at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if
they were investigating and eventually arresting for a nonjailable traffic offense that
constituted only a civil violation under the applicable state law").
155. See id. at 742-43 (indicating thatJablonic, the witness, "told one officer what he
had seen" and that "[ t] he officer checked the motor vehicle registration of the abandoned
car and learned that it was registered to the petitioner, Edward G. Welsh," after which "the
police proceeded to the petitioner's home... gained entry into the house... [, and] the
petitioner was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of an intoxicant").
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In reviewing the facts of the case, the Supreme Court noted that the
home arrest took place at night, that the police found Welsh undressed
in his bedroom, and that they had failed to obtain a warrant for the
arrest.156 The State argued that the warrantless arrest was justified be-
cause there existed an "exigent circumstance" which excused the police
from having to obtain a warrant.15 7 Although the Court assumed, for
purposes of argument, that there was an exigent circumstance present-
the likelihood that critical evidence of intoxication while driving would
be metabolized out of existence during the time necessary to obtain a
warrant-the Court nonetheless held that the arrest violated the Fourth
Amendment and that it therefore tainted the evidence obtained in the
ensuing search incident to arrest.15 8 Because the arrest was performed in
a person's home at night, a time when the privacy interest in the home is
greatest, 15 9 and because the offense in question was "only a minor" (civil
rather than criminal) offense, the Court held that the police should not
have entered without an arrest warrant.160
The Court in Welsh did something it has usually refused to do: It
took note of both the gravity of the offense in question (a "minor of-
156. See id. at 743 (noting that "[w]ithout securing any type of warrant, the police
proceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9 p.m." and that, "[p]roceeding
upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, they found him lying naked in bed").
157. See id. at 753 ("[T]he only potential emergency claimed by the State was the
need to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level.").
158. See id. at 754 (indicating that "[e]ven assuming... that the underlying facts
would support a finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases
involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient," and that "a warrantless
home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol
level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant").
159. See id.; see also Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Marshall,J.,
dissenting) (contending that "[i]n my view, there is no expectation of privacy more
reasonable and more demanding of constitutional protection than our right to expect that
we will be let alone in the privacy of our homes during the night"); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971) (recognizing that a midnight entry into a home is an
"extremely serious intrusion"); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) (claiming
"it is difficult to imagine a more severe invasion of privacy than the nighttime intrusion
into a private home"). In an unpublished dissertation that is credited by scholars and
judges as an important source of Fourth Amendment history, see George C. Thomas III,
Remapping The Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1819, 1828 (1997) (book
review) (referring to various citations of this work by scholars and judges), William John
Cuddihy observes that the framers of the Fourth Amendment were strongly opposed to
nighttime searches. See William John Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and
Original Meaning, 602-1791, at 675-76, 1346, 1511 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Claremont College) (on file with UMI Dissertation Service).
160. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 (stating that "application of the exigent-circumstances
exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is
probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this case,
has been committed"); id. at 754 (indicating that "[t]he Supreme Court of Wisconsin let
stand a warrantles., nighttime entry into the petitioner's home to arrest him for a civil
traffic offense," but that "[s]uch an arrest.., is clearly prohibited by the special protection
afforded the individual in his home by the Fourth Amendment" and "[t]he petitioner's
arrest was therefore invalid").
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fense") and the intrusiveness of the particular search (a person's home,
at night). The Court effectively conducted a species of reasonableness
balancing that took seriously the substantive questions involved in the
particular search rather than either formalistically applying a purely
quantitative standard, or alternatively applying a deferential standard by
which virtually all ordinary law enforcement activity would be deemed
legal.161 Despite the Court's sincere efforts, however, its approach in
Welsh ultimately mirrors the imprecision evident in Payton and Steagald:
There is no real substantive scrutiny, and the warrant requirement is
misused.
First, the Court could have focused upon the actual substantive con-
tent of the offense in question (driving while intoxicated) and decided
the case on the basis of ajudgment about its seriousness relative to the
intrusions at issue. Instead, the Welsh Court specifically disavowed any
judicial judgment about the significance of the actual violation in ques-
tion and deferred instead to Wisconsin's classification of the,offense as
"civil" in deciding the case. 162 If Wisconsin were unhappy with the
Court's decision, it could, therefore, nullify it prospectively by simply
changing (legislatively) the status of driving while intoxicated from a civil
violation to a criminal offense. 163
161. See infra notes 169-175, 178-179, 181, 183, and accompanying text (discussing,
respectively, the Zurcher majority opinion and the drug testing cases: Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989), and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)). But
see Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321-23 (1997) (holding that candidates for political
office could not be required to take a drug test as a prerequisite to running for political
office, in spite of the flexible reasonableness-balancing approach, thd importance of drug
enforcement, and the limited nature of the intrusion, because there was no evidence that
drug abuse was a problem among candidates for political office).
162. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754 n.14 (explaining "[n]or do we mean to suggest that
the prevention of drunken driving is not properly of major concern to the States" but
"[t]he State of Wisconsin, . . . along with several other States .... has chosen to limit
severely the penalties that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while
intoxicated" and "[g]iven that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest
and most consistent indication of the State's interest in arresting individuals suspected of
committing that offense" (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); see also id. at 755-56
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (declaring that "I yield to no one in my profound personal
concern about the unwillingness of our national consciousness to face up to-and to do
something about-the continuing slaughter upon our Nation's highways, a good
percentage of which is due to drivers who are drunk or semi-incapacitated because of
alcohol or drug ingestion," and noting that "it is amazing to me that one of our great
States-one which, by its highway signs, proclaims to be diligent and emphatic in its
prosecution of the drunken driver-still classifies driving while intoxicated as a civil
violation.. . so long as it is a first offense," but concluding that "if Wisconsin and other
States choose by legislation thus to regulate their penalty structure, there is, unfortunately,
nothing in the United States Constitution that says they may not do so" (emphasis in
original)).
163. See Stuntz, Criminal Justice, supra note 56, at 54; cf. Colb, Incarceration, supra
note 14, at 792-94 ("the only substantive component of a 'valid' conviction is that the
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In addition to failing to take into consideration the content of the
"civil" violation at issue in performing its substantive analysis, the Court in
Welsh relied upon the warrant requirement to void an arrest the unrea-
sonableness of which does not appear to have turned in any way upon the
lack of what an arrest warrant might have provided (i.e., greater objectiv-
ity on the question of probable cause to arrest). In its opinion invalidat-
ing the arrest, the Court called attention to the great invasiveness of a
nighttime intrasion into a person's home and bedroom. 64 Rather than
apply a balancing test that might consider this invasiveness as part of the
analysis, however, the Court invoked the warrant requirement once
again, as it did. in Payton and Steagald, as a substitute for substantive pro-
tection against unnecessary and disproportionately harsh investigative
measures. Instead of holding that in the case of a truly minor offense,
the police may not enter a person's home during the night to arrest him
at all, the Court, by implication, held that the police could legally do
exactly what they had done in this case, as long as they first obtained a
warrant certifying probable cause to believe that Welsh had been driving
while intoxicated, a fact about which there appeared to be no dispute. 165
If the police had managed to obtain a warrant in this case, that would not
have improved any of the features of the situation that seemed to trouble
the Court-the intrusiveness of a home arrest, at night, along with the (at
least formally) minor nature of the offense in question.
Payton, Steagald, and Welsh collectively illustrate the Supreme Court's
rudimentary recognition of the need for Fourth Amendment substantive
balancing, even as they also reveal the Court's grasping for the wrong
criminal conduct not be constitutionally protected as a fundamental right," so that
"[g]ovemments may, in other words, place behind bars those who engage in trivial,
nonthreatening activity, provided the activity is prohibited by the criminal law and does
not qualify as a fundamental right"); id. at 791 (observing that "[t]hough liberty from
confinement is an essential, core right of citizenship, a criminal conviction nonetheless
extinguishes that right").
164. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754.
165. The identity of the offender in this case was clear from the outset. A witness
pointed out to the police the car that had been involved in the DWI incident. See Welsh,
466 U.S. at 742. The Court has repeatedly held that such a neutral witness's observations
may be credited by police without any special additional showing. See Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 233-34 (1983) (explaining that "if an unquestionably honest citizen comes
forward with a report of criminal activity-which if fabricated would subject him to
criminal liability--we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge
unnecessary"); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (indicating that "in some
situations-for example, when the victim of a street crime seeks immediate police aid and
gives a description of his assailant, or when a credible informant warns of a specific
impending crime--the subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an appropriate
police response") Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 221-22, 224 (1965) (explaining
that because its information came from interviewing "third parties with whom the said
taxpayer did business" and "third persons having knowledge of the said taxpayer's financial
condition," that "whereas some supporting information concerning the credibility of
informants in narcotics cases or other common garden varieties of crime may be required,
such information is not so necessary in the context of the case before us").
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tools.' 66 Justice Stevens furnishes a model for a more coherent approach
in his dissenting opinion in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.16 7 Zurcher presented
the issue whether a heightened standard for authorizing a search should
apply to situations in which the person searched is an innocent third
party and/or a newspaper (whose privacy might be necessary to a robust
free press).168
The lower courts held that in the case of a search of either an inno-
cent third party or a newspaper, Fourth Amendment reasonableness de-
mands some showing of necessity in addition to the quantitative probable
cause standard. 169 These courts theorized that, because such searches
are more intrusive and more constitutionally problematic than the search
of a criminal suspect's home, they should be avoided, through the use of
a subpoena, if at all feasible. 170 A majority of the United States Supreme
Court rejected the lower court's heightened reasonableness analysis and
referred approvingly to the probable cause standard, which transcends
the particular consequences of permitting a search in any given con-
166. Christopher Slobogin's proposal regarding proportionality is similarly
incomplete. See generally Slobogin, supra note 12. Slobogin's vision of proportionality
analysis speaks primarily to the relationship between the intrusiveness of a given search or
seizure and the quantitative standard appropriate to performance of that search or seizure
(what Slobogin terms the "certainty requirement"). See id. at 38, 47, 49-50, 68. Where
Slobogin discusses the possible link between the strength of the governmental interest
pursued (what Slobogin terms "harm severity") and the corollary demands of the Fourth
Amendment, he confines his analysis to a consideration of the possible lowering of the
quantitative standard in the presence of strong governmental interests, a possibility that he
ultimately rejects. See id. at 51-52. By contrast to my proposed regime, then, Slobogin's
program falis to consider banning altogether some kinds of generally allowable species of
searches or seizures (such as traffic stops or home searches), in those cases in which the
government lacks a sufficiently compelling interest (regardless of how high the
quantitative level of certainty preceding the search might be). Examples might include
home searches for evidence of illicit drug possession, the chemical analogue of obscenity
possession, and vehicular stops for technical traffic offenses that failed to create any
substantial danger. See infra notes 238-248 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's
decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), as a Fourth Amendment decision);
supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text (supporting the objective reasonableness test
proposed by the petitioner in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).
167. 436 U.S. 547, 577 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 560-61 (discussing the question regarding an innocent third
party); id. at 563-66 (discussing First Amendment implications of searching a newspaper);
see also Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 131-32, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
(addressing innocence and free press concerns), aft'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd,
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
169. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 552-53.
170. See id. The intrusiveness of the innocent-third-party search derives in part from
the search target's failure to act in any way to waive the privacy that would be subject to
invasion. For a discussion of what it would mean for a person to "waive" or forfeit some of
his privacy and of what role innocence might play in determining the scope of a person's
Fourth Amendment entitlements, see generally Colb, Innocence, supra note 9. For a
detailed examination of Zurcher in connection with innocence-related questions, see id. at
1503-09.
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text.' 7 1 The Court held that the search of a news office for photographic
evidence of a crime in which the newspaper itself was not implicated
could legally proceed on the basis of a warrant and probable cause
alone.172
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens proposes that the police
should have to demonstrate need before being permitted to search an
innocent third party, because an innocent person is likely to cooperate
with the police without having to endure the coercion and intrusion that
accompany the search of a criminal suspect. 173 Such a necessity require-
ment also would have effectively protected privacy in the home in the
scenarios presented in Payton, Steagald, and Welsh. Requiring a warrant,
by contrast, as the Court did in these cases, fell short of accomplishing
these substantive ends.
C. Reasonablemss Balancing
There is one set of cases in which the Court has been ready and
willing to apply an open-ended reasonableness balancing standard in
171. See Zurder, 436 U.S. at 554, 559; cf. Amsterdam, supra note 12, at 358 (arguing
that "'the definition of "reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific
commands of the jFourth Amendment's] warrant clause,'" which permits the issuance of
warrants based upon a showing of probable cause (quoting United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972) (alteration in original))).
172. See Zurzer, 436 U.S. at 567.
173. See id. at 581 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Mere possession of documentary
evidence... is much less likely [than possession of contraband] to demonstrate that the
custodian is guilty of any wrongdoing or that he will not honor a subpoena or informal
request to produce it."); see also Colb, Innocence, supra note 9, at 1508 n.131 (observing
that "[iut isJustice Stevens's position that the rule prior to Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967) was the 'correct' reading of the Fourth Amendment: warrants could be used only
to search for contraband, weapons, and plunder, not for 'mere evidence'" (citing Hayden,
387 U.S. at 301)); id. (noting that, according to justice Stevens, the "mere evidence" rule
of Hayden "guaranteed that only when it seemed likely that the object of the search would
be uncooperative--because he had apparently participated in the relevant crime-could a
search take place" but that "[i]f the person in whose possession the evidence was located
was an innocent third party, however, efforts would be made to avoid a search through the
cooperation of the individual" (citing Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 581 (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
For an alternative analysis of the mere-evidence rule in the context of Fourth Amendment
privacy and property interests, see Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure and The Positive Law:
Expectations of Privacy Outside The Fourth Amendment, 84J. Crim. L. & Criminology 249
(1993).
In a separate dissenting opinion, justice Stewart addresses the special importance that
attaches to an official search of a newspaper office, particularly given the historical
importance of the free press ideal in motivating the framing of the Fourth Amendment.
See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 571-76 (protesting that "we are here to uphold a Constitution" and
that "our Constitution ... explicitly protect[s] the freedom of the press"); see also Potter
Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of
the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1369-70
(1983).
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place of the probable cause and -warrant requirements. 7 4 These cases
are distinguished, however, not by exacting demands but by a relaxed
and deferential approach to the balancing at hand. The Court applies
the approach in settings implicating "special" law enforcement interests
distinct from the ordinary criminal investigative variety. These interests
include such diverse objectives as preventing undocumented foreign na-
tionals from crossing United States borders, 175 governing public
schools, 176 and regulating public employees. 177 Although the Court oc-
casionally holds that searches and seizures in these areas violate Fourth
Amendment reasonableness, 178 the conclusion that usually follows from
the Court's classification of a case as implicating a "special" law enforce-
ment interest calling for reasonableness balancing is the approval of the
government's actions with little inquiry into the governmental needs
174. Scott Sundby urges strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of reasonableness
analysis for initiatory intrusions (intrusions that are not based upon an individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing). In his view, "[t]he compelling government interest-least
intrusive means test would narrow the realm of initiatory intrusions primarily to situations
in which the government can demonstrate that lack of immediate action endangers the
public's safety." Sundby, Undoing The Mischief, supra note 18, at 442. Like me, Sundby
sees an important role for a substantive Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis in
which the government must have a very important interest before it may intrude upon
what I have termed ordinary privacy interests. Where we differ is on the proper scope of
substantive analysis. Sundby would apply strict scrutiny only to cases in which the
government lacks a warrant and individualized probable cause. I would, by contrast,
require that even a search that is supported by probable cause and a warrant be subject to
something akin to the compelling interest analysis that Sundby describes, to prevent
legislatures from defining substantive criminal law so expansively that the probable cause
and warrant requirements provide almost no protection. See supra notes 65-68 and
accompanying text.
175. See Ronald J. Allen, et al., supra note 147, at 809 (reviewing the history of
congressional and judicial approval of the notion that "[t]he routine search of a person
and the person's baggage upon entering the country need not be based on even
reasonable suspicion").
176. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663-65 (1995) (holding that a
public school may subject students on athletic teams to random, suspicionless drug tests);
NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985) (holding that a principal may search the
pocketbook of a student for evidence of school rules violations without a warrant or
probable cause).
177. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34
(1989) (holding that a public railroad could, without particularized suspicion, randomly
test its employees for drugs after a train accident in accordance with FRA regulations);
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (upholding
under Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing the suspicionless testing of employees
who apply for promotions to positions that directly involve the interdiction of illegal drugs
or require the incumbent to carry a firearm); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-26
(1987) (plurality opinion) (holding that public employer could search an employee's
office without a warrant or probable cause).
178. See Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1303-05 (1997) (holding that candidates
running for political office may not be required to undergo drug testing, because, even
though the drug test is not very intrusive, there must be some showving of need to justify the
test, and this showing was not met here).
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served or the relative gravity of the intrusion involved.' 79 Some commen-
tators have even gone so far as to suggest that the Court's reasonableness
balancing cases are characterized by their very failure to engage in any
actual balancing.'8 0
However charitably one describes the "reasonableness balancing"
cases, the substantive reasonableness standard I propose here is distinct
from the kind of "balancing" that characterizes those cases. Even the ar-
gument that some governmental interests are important or special enough
to merit an alternative "reasonableness balancing" approach implicitly as-
sumes that such balancing will be less demanding of the government
(and therefore more accommodating to the "special" interests) than the
probable cause and warrant requirements from which they constitute a
departure.' 8 1
179. See T.L 0., 469 U.S. at 369 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (suggesting that
"[a]il of these 'balancing tests' amount to brief nods by the Court in the direction of a
neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of
judicial will"); id. at 357-58 (contending that "[t]he Court's decision jettisons the
probable-cause standard-the only standard that finds support in the text of the Fourth
Amendment-on the basis of its Rohrschach-like 'balancing test'"); see also Skinner, 489
U.S. at 636, 639 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (claiming that "[t)he Court today takes its longest
step yet toward reading the probable-cause requirement out of the Fourth Amendment"
and that "the Court has now permitted 'special needs' to displace constitutional text in
each of the four categories of searches enumerated in the Fourth Amendment" so that
"[t]ellingly, each time the Court has found that 'special needs' counseled ignoring the
literal requirements of the Fourth Amendment for such full-scale searches in favor of a
formless and unguided 'reasonableness' balancing inquiry, it has concluded that the
search in question satisfied that test").
180. See Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the
Government Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 669, 719
(1988) (arguing that "[d] espite its label, the so-called 'special needs' formula has not been
confined to cases where intrusive police conduct was necessitated by emergency
conditions" and that "although the Court denies it, the special needs formula diminishes
the fourth amendment rights of individuals subjected to governmental intrusions
sanctioned by this doctrine" because "[t]he Court emphasizes the needs of government,
while offering only token attention to the privacy interests at stake and the benefits
provided by the probable cause and warrant rules," so, "[i]n short, the special needs
formula ultimately reflects a governmental perspective in interpreting the fourth
amendment").
181. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667 (asserting that "[the Customs Service has been
entrusted with pressing responsibilities, and its mission would be compromised if it were
required to seek search warrants in connection with routine, yet sensitive, employment
decisions"); Skinnra, 489 U.S. at 620 (contending that "[tihe Government's interest in
regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety.. . 'presents "special needs"
beyond normal law enforcement that mayjustify departures from the usual warrant and
probable-cause requirements'" (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74
(1987))); O'Connc, 480 U.S. at 722 (maintaining that "[i]mposing unwieldy warrant
procedures [in cases in which the employer wishes to enter an employee's office, desk, or
file cabinets for a work-related purpose] .... would conflict with 'the common-sense
realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision
became a constitutional matter'" (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)));
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (concluding that "the accommodation of the privacy interests of
schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to
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One exception among the Court's "reasonableness" balancing cases
which stands out for its subtlety and sensitivity to both sides of the intru-
sion/need equation is Terry v. Ohio.182 Terry involved an experienced po-
lice officer who had noticed several men pacing back and forth in front
of a store and interacting with one another in an otherwise suspicious
fashion. The officer, after observing several repetitions of what seemed
like ritualistic pacing, concluded that the men were preparing to rob the
store in question.183 The officer confronted the men and asked ques-
tions, the answers to which did not dispel his suspicions. The officer
searched the suspects for weapons and found that two of the men were
armed. The two men were subsequently convicted of carrying concealed
weapons. On the appeal of their convictions, the Supreme Court faced
the issue of the Fourth Amendment implications-if any-of such an on-
the-street encounter.
In deciding the question, the Court considered the argument that
this sort of encounter, which may include the stopping and frisking of
potential suspects for weapons, ought to lie completely outside the cover-
age of the Fourth Amendment.' 8 4 The police need flexibility, the argu-
ment went, in dealing with situations that arise in their presence and that
do not call for, or allow time for, obtaining a search warrant. Since a stop
is less severe than an arrest and a weapons frisk is less intrusive than a
typical search, it would be fair, on this reasoning, to classify stops and
frisks as falling outside the scope of the terms "search" and "seizure," set
out and regulated by the Fourth Amendment.' 8 5
The petitioner opposed such classification and argued that stops and
frisks should receive the same Fourth Amendment treatment that is ac-
corded other seizures and searches identified by the Court.'8 6 Accepting
the petitioner's proposal to apply the probable cause and warrant re-
quirements to stops and frisks, however, would have made it exceedingly
difficult for the police to intervene in criminal activity before or during
maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that
searches be based on probable cause" and suggesting that even the reduced level of
individualized suspicion present on the facts of T.L.O. might not be required).
182. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For an extensive discussion of the sensitivity of the Court's
balancing in Teny and a corresponding critique of the Court's failure to live up to Teny's
promise, see Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The
Gradual But Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. L.J. 567 (1991) [hereinafter
Williams, Broken Promises]. But see Sundby, Undoing the Mischief, supra note 18, at 385
(criticizing the Court's reasoning in Terry v. Ohio and faulting it along with Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), for the later devolution of "reasonableness
balancing").
183. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
184. See id. at 16 (stating that "[there is some suggestion in the use of such terms as
'stop' and 'frisk' that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment
because neither action rises to the level of a 'search' or 'seizure' within the meaning of the
Constitution").
185. See id.
186. See id. at 25.
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its occurrence, because the process of obtaining a warrant assumes that a
crime has already taken place and that what remains to be done is the
apprehension of suspected criminals and the seizure of evidence.
The Supreme Court, in a now-famous opinion by Chief Justice Earl
Warren, announced that the law enforcement interest in confronting
people who appear to be about to commit a crime is a "special" law en-
forcement inte:rest of the sort that should trigger a reasonableness balanc-
ing approach rather than the usual probable cause and warrant require-
ments. 187 In later cases, as we have seen, such an announcement would
come (in most circumstances) to decide the controversy. If a "special"
law enforcement interest were at stake, the Court would perform a defer-
ential, ad hoc balancing test, often without much analysis beyond the an-
nouncement itself, and would conclude with a determination that the
proposed governmental activity did not offend the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.188 By contrast, the application of reasonableness
balancing in Teny commenced rather than concluded the analysis.
The Court considered and rejected the proposal that stops and frisks
be declared a Fourth Amendment-free zone. It emphasized how fright-
ening, intrusive, and humiliating it is for a person to be stopped and
frisked by the police in public, even though a stop may not last as long as
a garden-variety arrest, and a frisk may not be as thorough as a typical
search.'8 9 The Court also, however, took seriously the notion that one
importantjob of the police is to prevent crimes that are about to happen,
rather than just to solve completed crimes reactively.190
The decision of the Court ultimately approved the measures taken by
the officer who had apprehended Terry and his co-arrestees. As Justice
Harlan emphasized in his concurring opinion, though, stops and frisks
would qualify as seizures and searches under the Fourth Amendment and
would accordingly require support in each case by objective, articulable
facts that would lead a person of reasonable caution to conclude that
criminal activity was afoot and that the person to be frisked was armed
and potentially dangerous. 191 Given the spontaneity of such police work,
it would not be realistic to require a search warrant. A probable cause
requirement would also defeat the purpose of preliminary and preventive
187. See id. at 27.
188. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-54 (1995); National
Treasury Employees;' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989); Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 618-20 (1989); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
719-26 (1987) (plurality opinion); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39
(1967); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) ("[T]he accomodation of
the privacy interests of school children with the substantial need of teachers and
administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict
adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the
subject of the search has violated or is violating the law.").
189. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25.
190. See id. at 22.
191. See id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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intervention.192 The Court held, however, that the police could not le-
gally act entirely on the basis of their subjective hunches or intuitions.' 93
A decision to stop or frisk would be subject to judicial review under a
reasonable-person standard. 194
The Court's approach in Terry provides a useful illustration of what a
generally applicable substantive reasonableness scrutiny might look like.
The majority explicitly applied a reasonableness-balancing test that, in
the particular case, relaxed the usual demands of the Fourth
Amendment. It did so without suspending the quantitative requirement
of individualized suspicion. The Court thereby demonstrated that resort
to reasonableness balancing might comfortably go hand in hand with a
requirement that virtually any individual intrusion, regardless of how dif-
ferent from the usual investigative pursuits of law enforcement, must be
based upon evidence tending to show that the particular person to suffer
the intrusion was engaged in criminal or otherwise illegal activity. 195 As
in the cases applying a heightened reasonableness standard, 96 then, the
balancing test in Terry did not amount to carte blanche for law
enforcement.
In addition to having retained an individualized suspicion compo-
nent in a reasonableness balancing context, the Teny decision is notewor-
thy for a second reason as well. In Terry, the "special" law enforcement
interest at stake appeared implicitly to limit the application of the new
standard. The reasonable-suspicion standard, in other words, would
seem, on the Court's reasoning, to apply only to factual scenarios impli-
cating the rationale articulated for the distinctive treatment of such cases,
namely, the need to prevent crime and disarm dangerous people. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Harlan made this caveat explicit. He asserted
that a police officer could not initiate an encounter with a suspect with-
out ajustification and expect to be authorized to frisk the suspect on the
basis of the real danger that such encounters will predictably entail:19
[I]f the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an
encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitu-
tional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make afbrcible stop.
Any person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a per-
son he considers dangerous. If and when a policeman has a
right instead to disarm such a person for his own protection, he
192. See id. at 20.
193. See id. at 22.
194. See id. at 27.
195. Some categories of searches might legitimately occur in the absence of probable
cause and a warrant and even in the absence of individualized suspicion. See supra notes
19-20.
196. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that use of deadly force
against unarmed fleeing suspect was an unreasonable seizure); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753 (1985) (holding unconstitutional court-ordered surgical removal of bullet from
suspect's body).
197. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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must first have a right not to avoid him but to be in his
presence.1'58
If we examine the import ofJustice Harlan's opinion, we see that he
did not mean to suggest that the police should run the other way (as
civilians might do) whenever they observe threatening, dangerous indi-
viduals in the vicinity. Instead, Justice Harlan implicitly acknowledged
that once a police officer has stopped a suspect, it would often follow that
the officer might legitimately fear for his safety. Justice Harlan understood
that such confrontations-including the vehicle stops that occur regu-
larly-are fraught with potential misunderstandings that could ultimately
prove fatal. 19 9 Therefore, Justice Harlan proposed that the stop of a sus-
pect is itself a critical event that almost automatically generates a danger-
ousness concern that authorizes a weapons frisk of the suspect.2 00 Ac-
cordingly, Justice Harlan insisted that the stop should be undertaken only
when truly justified. Such justification, given the potential for escalation
and violence, might arguably entail the scenario of a developing, serious
crime, such as the crime that was at issue in Terry itself.
Consider how the post-Terry cases involving stops (of vehicles and
pedestrians) might have been decided if Justice Harlan's concurrence
and the principles embedded in its logic had been adopted explicitly as
part of the majority opinion. First, only crimes that might yet be nipped
in the bud or otherwise frustrated would trigger the application of the
Terry analysis and its exception to the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements. The "stop" of a suspect in connection with a completed
crime would accordingly not be authorized on reasonable suspicion
alone. Second, the stop of a person as to whom the police had reason-
able suspicion with respect to a future crime would not necessarily be
authorized in every case. There would be times when the police would
have to avoid the danger of an encounter just like everyone else.20 1 The
"stop" would be limited to serious crimes, so that the intrusion of a stop
along with the accompanying potential for dangerous and even fatal out-
comes could be substantivelyjustified. Borrowing from the Court's analo-
gous statement about the use of deadly force in Garner, we could say that
it is not better that all minor crimes be prevented through potentially
198. Id.
199. See supra note 48 (quantifying the danger of vehicle stops).
200. Daniel Yeager has similarly suggested that Justice Harlan "wrote separately in
Terry to express his view that the right to frisk follows automatically from the right to stop."
Daniel Yeager, Searches, Seizures, Confessions, and Some Thoughts on Criminal
Procedure: Regulation of Police Investigation-Legal, Historical, Empirical, and
Comparative Materials, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1043, 1054 (1996). Yeager also opined that
Justice Harlan's view constitutes the current legal practice (at least with respect to the dual
authority to stop and frisk, if not with respect to the substantively meaningful standard for
the initial stop). 'Indeed," Yeager argues, "the behaviors [stop and frisk] are so
intertwined that often, as it was in Terry, it is the frisk that alerts us to the fact that a stop
has taken place." Id.
201. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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violent confrontations between suspects and police than that some minor
crimes be allowed to take place without intervention.20 2 The police could
thus only stop and frisk those suspects reasonably suspected of preparing
to engage in a potentially violent or otherwise serious clime.
In the years following Terry, the Court steadily moved further away
from the principle of limiting the stop-and-frisk authority to the crime-
prevention context. In 1985, the Court explicitly upheld stops and frisks
that occurred in connection with completed felonies. 203 It also permit-
ted Terry stops and frisks in the case of reasonably suspected narcotics
possession offenses, in which there is no necessary safety risk attached to
the suspected activity.2 0 4 Rather than representing a qualitatively distinct
circumstance, the on-the-street police encounter thus came to embody a
species of intrusion that, because less extensive than an arrest and a full
search, would be authorized on a standard that was quantitatively less de-
manding but substantively very much like the probable cause standard. 205
As we have seen, the Court has assembled in a variety of cases the raw
materials for what could develop into a robust substantive reasonableness
approach to Fourth Amendment questions. In the context of extraordi-
narily intrusive searches and seizures, the Court has explicitly announced
substantive balancing tests that require more than a quantitative showing
of probable cause and a valid warrant. In the context of more conven-
tional police intrusions, the Court has distinguished, albeit awkwardly,
between public arrests and home arrests, as well as between daytime
home arrests and nighttime home arrests. Such distinctions reveal ajudi-
202. Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (concluding that "[ilt is not
better that all felony suspects die than that they escape").
203. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (upholding stop of an
armed robbery suspect and indicating that although "[iv]e need not and do not decide
today whether Teny stops to investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted ....
[i]t is enough to say that, if the police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific
and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in
connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that
suspicion").
204. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (approving a stop that was
based on application of the drug courier profile and indicating that prohibiting such a
stop would have "serious implications for the enforcement of the federal narcotics laws");
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 151 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (embracing the view
articulated in a dissent by Judge Friendly in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
expressing "the gravest hesitancy in extending [the holding in Terry) to crimes like the
possession of narcotics," noting the "danger that, instead of the stop being the object and
the protective frisk an incident thereto, the reverse will be true" (quoting Williams v.
Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting))); see also Williams,
Broken Promises, supra note 182, at 578-79 (describing this expansion of police authority
to stop and frisk that occurred in the cases that succeeded Terry).
205. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1990) (applying a totality-of-
the-circumstances approach to reasonable suspicion, analogous to probable cause as
elaborated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), "the only difference [between Illinois v.
Gates and Alabama v. White] being the level of suspicion that must be established").
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cial inclination to permit a greater consideration of substance in evaluat-
ing even routine, ordinary searches and seizures. Finally, the Court has
constructed a doctrine of "reasonableness balancing" in which "special"
law enforcement interests permit the police to forego both probable
cause and a warrant. Though this class of cases has devolved into a defer-
ential approach to a variety of searches and seizures, the case in which the
approach was originally developed-Terry v. Ohio-contains a sophisti-
cated analysis that could have led, and might yet lead, to a less limited
(and less deferential) substantive reasonableness balancing approach
across the board.
Until this point, we have examined case law in the Fourth
Amendment area illustrating the Court's reluctance to apply a genuinely
demanding substantive balancing test in most of its criminal procedure
precedents, in spite of its own sense of the tension between the need for
greater protection of ordinary privacy and a purely quantitative approach
available in all but extraordinary circumstances. We turn in the next Part
to a set of cases in which the Court has been comfortable applying sub-
stantive balancing tests comparing the strength of governmental interests,
on the one hand, with the intrusiveness of government practices on indi-
vidual privacy, on the other. These cases proceed outside of the criminal
procedure context in what is known as the law of substantive due process.
Part III draws on the methods employed by the Court in this legally dis-
tinct category of cases to develop a framework for understanding the con-
sequences of a purely quantitative Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine,
both on privacy from unreasonable searches as well as on the independ-
ent vitality of the substantive due process entitlements.
III. LINKING THE Two Knoms OF PRIVACY
The Court has in the last century been relatively daring in balancing
interests regarding constitutional claims of right under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses. Specifically, the Court
has performed an exacting balancing test in assessing government inter-
ference with what are known collectively as substantive due process "pri-
vacy" rights. Such rights include decisions about whether or not to have
children and, for people who have children, decisions about the upbring-
ing and education of those children.20 6 By referring to both Fourth
Amendment rights and substantive constitutional law entitlements as fea-
tures of "privacy," the Court has, perhaps without intending to do so,
invited us to forge links between the logic of Fourth Amendment doc-
trine and the content of the particular liberties constituting substantive
due process.
206. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 838 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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A. The Private Bedroom
The decision that most explicitly calls attention to the connection
between substantive due process privacy and Fourth Amendment privacy
is Griswold v. Connecticut.20 7 Griswold involved a challenge to a law ban-
ning the use of contraceptives. In finding the law to be an unconstitu-
tional violation of marital privacy, the Court explained, "[v] arious guar-
antees [in the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy,"208 and "[t]he
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."' 209 Fourth Amendment privacy, in other words, is
a relevant source of law with respect to a couple's use of contraceptives.
How does this work? How would freedom from searches and
seizures absent probable cause or a warrant bear on whether the state
might ban the use of contraceptives? Justice Douglas, writing for the ma-
jority, suggests an answer with a question of his own: "Would we allow the
police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs
of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."210 The enforcement of a
law banning the use of contraceptives, in other words, might require
searches of these "sacred precincts," and such searches would unconstitu-
tionally undermine the privacy of the marital relationship. 211
This logic appears flawed, at least under familiar constitutional prin-
ciples. The Fourth Amendment generally requires that police only
search and seize once they have probable cause to believe they will find
evidence of crime. Whether evidence of a specific activity constitutes evi-
dence of "crime" depends, in turn, upon whether the particular jurisdic-
tion has a criminal statute banning the activity. Connecticut was a juris-
diction having such a statute concerning the use of contraceptives when
Griswold came before the United States Supreme Court. It would seem,
therefore, to follow that a search of a Connecticut couple's bedroom for
207. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
208. Id. at 484.
209. Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV).
210. Id. at 485-86.
211. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Poe,
Justice Douglas elaborated in greater detail on the nature of his objection to laws banning
the use of contraception by married couples:
The regulation as applied in this case touches the relationship between man and
wife. It reaches into the intimacies of the marriage relationship. If we imagine a
regime of full enforcement of the law in the manner of an Anthony Comstock, we
would reach the point where search warrants issued and officers appeared in
bedrooms to find out what went on .... [W]hen the State makes "use" a crime
and applies the criminal sanction to man and wife, the State has entered the
innermost sanctum of the home. If it can make this law, it can enforce it. And
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"telltale signs of the use of contraceptives" would raise no Fourth
Amendment difficulties as long as the police had probable cause to be-
lieve the bedroom contained such "telltale signs," along with a search
warrant attesting thereto.
Furthermore, we might ask, what would be so repulsive about al-
lowing the police to search marital bedrooms for evidence of contracep-
tive use? Certainly, if there were probable cause to believe that a murder,
a rape, or a robbery were committed in the bedroom of a married couple,
it would not have offended the Griswold Court to permit a search of the
bedroom-and even a search of the bedroom for contraceptives, to the
extent that such a search might help identify a suspect in connection with
a violent crime. If the Court would not ban all searches of marital bed-
rooms, nor even all searches of marital bedrooms for contraceptives, then
what did Justice Douglas and a majority of the Court mean by condemn-
ing the idea of a search for contraceptives in the marital bedroom?
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court appears to have balanced
what I have called the individual right of privacy from governmental per-
sonal knowledge against the government's interest in effectively fighting
contraceptive use. Marital privacy (including the substantive right to
marry,2 1 2 to have children, 21 3 and to educate those children 2 14 ) requires
as a prerequisite a physical privacy from governmental personal knowl-
edge of the married couple's home. If the government lacks a more com-
pelling justification for searching a marital home than the interest in
stamping out the crime of contraceptive use, then the search is accord-
ingly an unreasonable one, because it exposes the sacred precincts of the
marital quarters for an insufficiently important reason. It is this link that
begins to provide a response to critics of the "privacy" nomenclature in
defining substantive due process rights. 2 15
Searches for evidence of murder, rape, or robbery would also un-
doubtedly intrude upon marital privacy. Such searches, however, do so
in the service of more compelling governmental interests. Though the
Court, since 1965, has come to embrace as an independently fundamen-
tal right the decision whether to beget and bear children, 216 the language
212. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978) (recognizing as
fundamental the right to marry, though decided after Griswod).
213. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (finding a substantive
right to procreate, in the context of an equal protection challenge).
214. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (announcing a right
to send children to private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923)
(announcing a right to teach children a foreign language).
215. See, e.g., ]Henkin, supra note 114, at 1410-11 (suggesting that the "'right of
privacy' .... denomination" for substantive due process protection "is misleading, if not
mistaken" and that "[tjo date, at least, the right has brought little new protection for what
most of us think of as 'privacy'-freedom from official intrusion," and proposing that such
rights are more appropriately viewed as autonomy entitlements).
216. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(noting that the rigb t to decide whether to bear or beget a child "necessarily includes the
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of the majority in Griswold itself seemed focused largely on honoring a
married couple's need for physical, spatial privacy in facilitating their sa-
cred association, rather than on recognizing a specific interest in avoid-
ing conception.2 1 7
Twenty-one years after the decision in Griswold, in Bowers v. Hardwick,
the Court held that there is no privacy right among homosexuals to en-
gage in acts of sodomy.218 The Court went on to announce that such acts
could therefore be criminally prohibited.2 1 9 Justice Blackmun argued in
an angry dissent that the Court should have invalidated the criminal stat-
ute at issue on the same logic that had dictated earlier privacy decisions
regarding marriage and family.2 2 0 He declared further that "[t] his case is
no more about 'a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,'
as the Court purports to declare .... than Stanley v. Georgia was about a
fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States was
about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone
booth."'221 I will address Stanley v. Georgia22 2 shortly,223 but let us first
considerJustice Blackmun's reference to Katz, the 1967 case that ushered
in the modem era of Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence.
At first blush, Justice Blackmun's statement appears to confuse two
distinct sorts of rights. On the one side is the Fourth Amendment deci-
sion in Katz, which held that a police officer must have a warrant based
upon probable cause before he may record a telephone conversation tak-
ing place inside a public telephone booth.2 24 As I have discussed else-
right of a woman to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy"); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child"); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
(affirming "Roe's essential holding," including "a recognition of the right of the woman to
choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference
from the State .... [whose pre-viability interests] are not strong enough to support a
prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman's effective
right to elect the procedure").
217. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (noting "[w]ithout
those peripheral rights [including the rights announced in Meyer and Pierce] the specific
rights [listed in the Bill of Rights] would be less secure"). The principle of some rights as
prerequisites to the exercise of other rights is a familiar one. See, e.g., Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that "reason and reflection require us to
recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him").
218. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
219. See id. at 192-94.
220. See id. at 203-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
222. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
223. See infra Section III.B.
224. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967) (explaining that the Court
ucannot agree" that "surveillance of a telephone booth should be exempted from the usual
requirement of advance authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause").
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where, the Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements
do not imply any approval or protection for the individual's engagement
in criminal acts in private. 225 From the perspective of the individual who
commits his crimes behind closed doors, I have also argued that there
exists no entitlement to maintain the privacy of the area in which the
crime is taking place.2 26 The warrant and probable cause requirements
function in this sense as imperfect proxies for the presence of criminal
activity and evidence of criminal activity, so that the criminal act forfeits
the right to privacy in the specific location containing hidden evidence of
the act.2 2 7
By contrasi, the asserted right of the respondent Michael Hardwick
was the entitlement to privacy in his intimate associations, specifically the
right to engage in consensual, sexual relationships with other men with-
out governmental interference. 228 Such a putative right is unlike the war-
rant and probable cause requirements, which have nothing to do with the
nature of the cime being investigated and do not turn on the legitimacy
of criminalizing any particular conduct.229 Justice Blackmun appears, in
other words, to have refused to acknowledge the fact that Hardwick was
claiming a constitutional right to engage in acts of homosexual sodomy.
If we examine more closely the right asserted in Hardwick, however,
we see that it truly is closely linked to Fourth Amendment privacy in one's
home and, in particular, in one's bedroom. Like the petitioners in
Griswold, Michael Hardwick did not assert that he had an absolute right to
engage in consensual sexual practices with other men. The claimed right
was place-specific: Hardwick asserted that the government should not
have invaded the privacy of his home and his bedroom to investigate the
225. See Colb, Innocence, supra note 9, at 1466-68.
226. See id. at 1494-95 (suggesting that "if an individual deserves to be searched
because he has engaged in concealment for which he would have been legally subject to a
search had the police officer known of that concealment, that individual does not deserve
privacy from the search, even though he deserves not to be searched because of an arbitrary
decision to target him," and that "[i]t is accordingly not clear that we should 'reinstate' his
privacy by overloo6ing any evidence found in his possession" since "[t]he individual's
privacy was appropiately invaded; it was the unreasonableness of the search that constituted
the wrongdoing and that should therefore be rectified").
227. See id. at 1477 (contending that "[p]robable cause is thus an imperfect proxy for
ensuring that the official will find evidence concealed on the person or property of any
individual searched").
228. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition
of Rights, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057, 1065-66 (1990) (arguing that "Justice Blackmun may
have overstated [his] point" in Bowers v. Harwick by comparing it to Katz v. United States,
.since Katz involved a type of 'privacy' that 'does make the claimant's substantive conduct
irrelevant; at issue [in a case like Katz] is the government's manner of discovering the
conduct'" (quoting Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 749
(1989)) (alteration in original)).
229. Cf. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979) (holding that evidence will
not be suppressed when obtained incident to an arrest made on the basis of probable
cause to believe that the individual has violated a criminal statute that is later invalidated by
the Court as unconstitutional).
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crime of homosexual sodomy.2 0 Public sexual relations, the discovery of
which does not require searches of private places, are accordingly con-
ceded to be outside the scope of constitutionally protected privacy.
23
'
Under Justice Blackmun's analysis, the constitutionality of enforce-
ment of a criminal law that necessitates searches of bedrooms for items
on the order of "telltale signs of the use of contraceptives" 2 32 should be
carefully considered, because the privacy of the bedroom is at issue. It is,
in other words, not possible to segregate Fourth Amendment privacy
analysis completely from a substantive examination of the criminal law. A
ruling for Hardwick would therefore not have amounted to the an-
nouncement of a "right" to engage in homosexual sodomy. An affirm-
ance could have meant simply that the private space in which adults en-
gage in consensual sexual activity must not be intruded upon without
good reason (as it was intruded upon here, for example, to help ensure
that homosexual sodomy does not take place). Under this reading of
Griswold (and Justice Blackmun's dissent in Hardwick), the Fourth
Amendment threshold to the house and bedroom ought to be a substan-
tively heightened one.
Though this analysis of Griswold and Hardwick highlights the links
between substantive and procedural "privacy" rights, it is not intended to
disparage the independent legitimacy of substantive due process rights
announced under a "privacy" rubric, such as the use of contraception,
doctrinally distinct from a spatial privacy entitlement located within the
230. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (noting respondent's assertion
that the result ought to differ depending on whether or not the homosexual conduct
occurred in the privacy of his home). But see Peter Irons, Interview with Michael
Hardwick, in Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Law 125-31 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993)
(detailing the actual facts behind Hardwick, in which the police officer came to the
respondent's home to arrest him for holding an open beer can in public, a pretext for
harassment for Hardwick's sexual orientation, an orientation apparent to the police
because Hardwick worked as a bartender in the gay bar outside of which he had been
holding the open beer can).
231. It is, of course, theoretically possible for the police to discover private,
consensual sodomy without performing a search or seizure (for example, by relying on a
voluntary confession from one of the parties to the conduct). It is similarly possible for the
police to perform a search of a private home as a means of discovering evidence of public
(and therefore unprotected) homosexual sodomy (for example, by searching for
fingerprints that would link the suspect to the fingerprints found at the scene of the
crime). Such scenarios, however, are likely to be unusual. In the ordinary case, the private
home search for evidence of sodomy would concern private rather than public acts of
sodomy and might well be a necessary measure in the enforcement of a law banning such
private, consensual activity. Moreover, Justice Blackmun should not be faulted for
assuming that permitting criminalization of an activity would automatically also permit
searches and seizures on probable cause, since that assumption was and continues to be
part of Fourth Amendment doctrine, see, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818
(1996) (stating that "we are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what
point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself
can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement"), albeit a part
that I challenge in this Article.
232. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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rubric of the Fourth Amendment. It might indeed be the case that there
are some substantive rights that do not require physical privacy for their
exercise, and that must therefore be justified, if at all, on grounds unre-
lated to the Fourth Amendment. The right to abortion, for example,
might constitute such a right and might, for that reason, be better de-
rived from a principle of autonomy 23 3 and/or equality23 4 than from one
of privacy. For much of substantive due process, however, the term "pri-
vacy" is apt because it connects a class of substantive entitlements to the
spatial privacy they require. 23 5
B. Obscenity at Home
The issue of whether to heighten the Fourth Amendment threshold
to the home arose originally in Mapp v. Ohio,236 and then again in Stanley
233. See Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, supra note 114, at 1410-11 (proposing the
autonomy classification in place of "privacy" for all substantive due process entitlements).
234. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(stating that "[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives"); see
also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Essay, Some Thoughts On Autonomy and Equality in Relation
To Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375, 375 (1985) (proposing that the abortion right would
have been better grounded in a theory of equality than one of privacy). For a provocative
and compelling argument that the right to abortion stems from a basic entitlement to self-
defense against a private party causing substantial bodily harm, see Eileen L. McDonagh,
Breaking the Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent (1996). As Richard Parker
notes, moreover, "[i]f privacy is a loss of control over by whom one can be sensed, then to
be forced to go through pregnancy, childbirth, and especially raising a child is a severe loss
of privacy which can last many years." Parker, supra note 52, at 290-91. Using an
argument similar to McDonagh's, see supra, Parker thus links abortion privacy to Fourth
Amendment privacy (though, as McDonagh points out, it is the fetus rather than the
government that forces the unwanted intimacy (or the experience of being sensed without
consent) at issue).
235. Richard Parker contends that "privacy defined as control over who can sense us,
[is] valuable both for itself and as an empirically necessary condition for the exercise of
most other rights and freedoms." Parker, supra note 52, at 290.
236. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp, asJustice Harlan pointed out in dissent, the issue
presented had been whether a criminal law banning the knowing possession or control of
obscene material violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 672-73
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "the new and pivotal issue brought to the Court by
this appeal is whether... making criminal the mere knowing possession or control of
obscene material.., is consistent with the rights of free thought and expression assured
against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment"). We learn of this question in dissent
rather than in the majority opinion because the Court avoided the obscenity question and
instead utilized Mapp as a vehicle for announcing the application of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule to the states, thereby overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949). See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 646, 655. As Justice Harlan put it, "five members of this
Court have simply 'reached out' to overrule Wolf." Id. at 674 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see
also Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 69, at 1061 n.164 (contending that Mapp, along
with several other cases, is a "free speech[ ] case in disguise," noting that "Mapp was
litigated in the Supreme Court as a First Amendment case" and that "[tihe crime
charged-possession of obscene materials-was later invalidated on First Amendment
grounds" (citations omitted)). For a gripping fictionalized account emphasizing the
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v. Georgia.237 In Stanley, the issue presented was, on its face, one regard-
ing First Amendment freedom of speech and thought. The defendant in
Stanley challenged a Georgia statute under which he was charged with the
possession of obscene materials. He contended that punishing the "mere
private possession of obscene matter, violates the First Amendment."
23 8
The Court accepted Stanley's argument and held that "the mere private
possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a
crime."239
Upon a closer examination of the reasoning in Stanley, it is apparent
that the obscenity-possession question was never exclusively (or even pri-
marily) about the freedom of speech. As the majority in Stanley acknowl-
edged, "[i] t is true that Roth240 does declare, seemingly without qualifica-
tion, that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment."'241 The
Court distinguished, however, between the prior obscenity cases (to
which the opinion in Roth referred), which "deal for the most part
with use of the mails to distribute objectionable material or with some
form of public distribution or dissemination," 242 on the one hand, and
the Stanley case, which bans the "private possession of obscene materi-
als," 243 on the other. The distinction is between public and private, a
distinction we encountered in our discussion of Justice Blackmun's
Hardwick dissent.244 This distinction does not, however, normally consti-
tute a dispositive dimension of First Amendment free speech cases,
2 45
petitioner's racial identity along with her preference for the free speech argument in the
case, see David Dante Troutt, Bitch, Son of a Bitch, in The Monkey Suit 151-95 (1998).
237. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
238. Id. at 559.
239. Id. Note that in reviewing a criminal statute banning the possession and viewing
of child pornography, the Court came to a different conclusion, upholding the criminal ban
and finding compelling the proffered interest in protecting children from exploitation
and abuse. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 (1990).
240. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
241. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 560.
242. Id. at 561.
243. Id.
244. See supra notes 218-235 and accompanying text (analyzing Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 206-08 (1986)).
245. See Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988)
(invalidating unbridled discretion in issuing licenses in connection with public distribution
of newspapers); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 273 (1971) (asserting that "the
syllogistic manipulation of distinctions between 'private sectors' and 'public sectors' ... is
of little utility in resolving questions of First Amendment protection"); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1948) (holding that an ordinance requiring a permit from the chief
of police prior to using a sound amplification device was "unconstitutional on its face, for it
establishes a previous restraint on the right of free speech in violation of the First
Amendment"); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539-40 (1945) (stating that "[a]s a matter
of principle a requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would seem
generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly" and
"a requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a public speech to
enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the requirements of the
First Amendment").
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and, if anything, militates in favor of speech concerns in public arenas.246
The anomaly of Stanley as a First Amendment case becomes espe-
cially salient later in the Court's opinion. Consider the following argu-
ment made by the majority:
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right
to receive information and ideas .... This right to receive infor-
mation and ideas, regardless of their social worth ... is funda-
mental to our free society. Moreover, in the context of this
case-a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed
matter in the privacy of a person's own home-that right takes
on an added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted gov-
ernmental intrusions into one's privacy. 247
Obscenity is, by definition, information of little or no social worth. 248
Nonetheless, the Court tells us that the individual has a First Amendment
right to receive it. Unlike other information that the individual has a
right to receive, 249 though, the production, distribution, and dissemina-
tion of this information can be made subject to criminal penalties without
violating the First Amendment.250 One would think that, at the very
least, the providers of items that individuals have a constitutional right to
receive would have third-party standing to object to laws that criminalize
246. See' United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (explaining that
"[t]raditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First
Amendment protection"); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 130-31, 137 (1981) (explaining that the Court "has not hesitated in
the past to hold invalid laws which ... too broadly inhibited the access of persons to
traditional First Amendment forums such as the public streets and parks" and that "public
properties are appropriate fora for exercise of First Amendment rights").
247. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (citations omitted).
248. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that "[a] state offense
must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in
sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole,
do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" (emphasis added)).
249. In the commercial speech area, for example, the First Amendment provides
limited protection to speakers on the rationale that potential consumers have the right to
receive the proffered information. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
783 (1978) (holding that "[a] commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not
so much because it pertains to the seller's business as because it furthers the societal
interest in the 'free flow of commercial information'"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976) (holding that
commercial speech is protected under the First Amendment because "[e]ven an individual
advertisement, though entirely 'commercial,' may be of general public interest"); see also
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 (1975) (holding that an abortion advertisement,
because it contained information of clear public interest, was entitled to First Amendment
protection); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (invalidating, under
a First Amendment right to receive information, a law that directed the Post Office to
screen foreign, unsealed mail, and to detain communist propaganda with a notification to
the addressee that the mail would be destroyed absent a request for delivery by the
addressee).
250. See, e.g.,Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 186-87 (1964) (cited by the Court in
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 560); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959).
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their activity.25 1 The Court apparently fails to see any paradox, however,
in protecting a right to receive that which it is a crime to provide.
The latter part of the paragraph quoted above provides a more co-
herent rationale for the result reached in this case. "[I] n the context of
... a prosecution for mere possession.., in the privacy of a person's
home-that right takes on an added dimension. '252 It is less free speech
than the "fundamental... right to be free, except in very limited circum-
stances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy"
253
that renders unconstitutional the enforcement of a law that intrudes
upon the privacy of a person's home for "the mere private possession of
obscene matter."25 4 Part of the Fourth Amendment privacy right, on this
reasoning, includes limiting the types of occasions that give rise to gov-
ernmental authority to search a person's home. This would mean, under
a conventional approach, limiting the substantive content of the criminal
law.255
In an important sense, the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
governmental personal knowledge was therefore very much at issue in
Stanley. In support of this privacy argument against enforcement of the
Georgia obscenity law, the Court cited Griswold.256 The Court also noted
that "the States retain broad power to regulate obscenity."257 Nonethe-
less, "[w] hatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating
obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own
home."258 Such interests are not weighty enough, in other words, to jus-
tify the search of a person's home for evidence of obscenity.259 Stanley
251. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (holding that "appellants
[providers of contraceptives] have standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married
people with whom they had a professional relationship," because "[t]he rights of husband
and xwife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are
considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them").
252. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 559.
255. We saw that when Hardwick was decided, Justice Blackmun thought for similar
reasons that protecting the privacy of a person's bedroom from unwvarranted governmental
intrusion would require invalidation of a criminal statute that prohibited the mere act of
private sodomy. See supra notes 220-221 and accompanying text.
256. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
257. Id. at 568.
258. Id. at 565.
259. Like Justice Blackmun's Hardwick dissent, the opinion in Stanley leaves
ambiguous the matter of whether a person's home might be searched for evidence of
obscenity production, distribution, or dissemination. This ambiguity might appropriately
be left unaddressed because such evidence is normally acquired through other channels.
See, e.g., Glenn Rudolph, Comment, RICO: The Predicate Offense of Obscenity, the
Seizure of Adult Bookstore Assets, and the First Amendment, 15 N. Ky. L. Rev. 585, 585
(1988) (recognizing that state and local legislatures have frequently tried to limit obscenity
by enacting a "variety of statutes aimed at controlling or eliminating establishments that
disseminate sexually-explicit materials" rather than by regulating obscenity in the home);
Jeanne Fiander, Note, A Stealthy Encroachment: Obscenity and the Fourth Amendment
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shows the obscenity problem to be less a matter of First Amendment con-
struction than a distinctive, substantive type of Fourth Amendment ques-
tion: What substantive ends justify the means of invading a person's
home?
C. Privacy Matters, Redux
Griswold, Hardwick, and Stanley illustrate the possible connection be-
tween protecting substantive due process privacy rights (such as marital
association) and protecting the private spaces of a person's life from ex-
cessive intrusion by the police. They likewise illustrate the substantive
balancing that should rightfully accompany judicial consideration of law
enforcement practices threatening such significant zones of private space
as the house or the bedroom within it. William Stuntz identifies a related
substance/process connection in his critique of the Court's exclusively
procedural focus in defining the contours of constitutional criminal
law.260 In his critique, Stuntz concentrates on the ways in which states
may easily bypass purely procedural limitations such as probable cause,
simply by expanding the scope of the criminal law. To better protect
procedure, Stuntz claims, the Court would be well-advised to develop a
doctrine of substantive due process that limited the scope of the criminal
law. Specifically, Stuntz proposes a constitutional mens rea requirement
that would preclude the enforcement of laws against people who were
unaware that they were violating the law, as well as a constitutional desue-
tude doctrine that would prohibit the enforcement of laws that have
fallen into disuse.2 6' According to Stuntz, such modifications in constitu-
tional criminal law would be less radical and more appropriate than what
he criticizes as the Court's Lochner-esque substantive due process "privacy"
doctrine, a doctrine which he claims has little to do with privacy.2 62
Under Maryland -v. Macon, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 773, 773 n.2 (1987) (explaining that
legislative attempts to combat obscenity have centered on zoning restrictions, nuisance
statutes, and display legislation, all of which involve businesses rather than private homes).
It is at least plausible to argue that a search of the home for evidence to solve any obscenity
crime might also (and for many of the same reasons) fall within the scope of the Stanley
holding.
260. See Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 56, at 1-2.
261. I have advocated a related program of substantive limits on the criminal law. See
Colb, Incarceration, supra note 14, at 823. In my proposal, however, I suggest that the
criminal law be evAluated directly rather than through proxies such as ignorance of the law
or desuetude, instruments that give little guidance to police and prosecutors regarding
when they may or may not enforce the law. See id. at 845-46 (agreeing with Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979), that "[s]ociety would be ill-served if its police officers
took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and which are not constitutionally
entitled to enforcement," and proposing that "[e]xtending this principle to arrests for
violations of laws that are ultimately held not to serve a compelling interest, the police
officer involved cannot be expected (and perhaps should not even be allowed) to decide
what governmental interests are and are not compelling").
262. See Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 56, at 37.
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Though well-intentioned, Stuntz's program is ultimately impractical.
First, far from being a modest proposal, it is much more radical than
current substantive due process doctrine. Rather than protecting specific
activities, he urges the ongoing invalidation of criminal statutes that are
unenforced or that people may not know exist, an ambitious project that
would necessarily involve the courts in constant oversight of contempo-
rary law enforcement practices. Second, the tail would seem to be wag-
ging the dog in a scheme that used substantive regulation of the criminal
law as an instrument for strengthening the probable cause and warrant
requirements, as Stuntz suggests it should. The purpose of having such
procedural requirements should be as a means of protecting substance,
physical privacy, and perhaps-as I have suggested here-the right to en-
gage in activity that appropriately falls within the rubric of substantive
due process. Stuntz, however, has elsewhere rejected the legitimacy of
both physical privacy 263 and substantive due process privacy rights.264 It
is accordingly not surprising that procedure turns out to be primary (and
to drive substance) in Stuntz's program.
By contrast to Stuntz, I find it plausible to view substantive privacy
rights and Fourth Amendment privacy rights as parts of one integrated
whole, legitimately protected by the Constitution. For a person to be able
to enjoy the exercise of her right to marry, to use birth control, and to
make parental decisions regarding her children's upbringing and educa-
tion, she must have a physically private space-a zone in which the gov-
ernment may not acquire personal knowledge of her intimate life. Con-
versely, in order to enjoy fully the relief from personal observation that a
zone of physical (and-in our modem world-technological) privacy
provides, a person might need a broad freedom to decide what to do in
her private spaces, even when some of the chosen activities are them-
selves deemed less than fundamental (or perhaps even patently offensive)
by the Court. Absent such freedom, any physical privacy might be illu-
sory, because it would be subject to termination on the basis of suspicion
regarding such a large category of activities that the requisite suspicion
would become fairly easy for the government to acquire at will, rendering
the zone of privacy accordingly precarious.
263. See Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 69, at 1078 (contending that
"[c]riminal procedure needs reorienting," because "privacy protection as the centerpiece
of criminal procedure is reactionary- it harks back to a constitutional order that placed
severe limits on the size and regulatory power of the state, limits that have long since been
discarded"). For further analysis of this argument, see supra notes 70-116 and
accompanying text.
264. See Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 56, at 37 ("[T]he very thing that is
most troubling about substantive due process-its unanchored quality-is an argument
against extending aggressive constitutional regulation to criminal law.").
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rV. AN IMPROVED REASONABLENESS BALANCING
To the extent that the Fourth Amendment right against "unreasona-
ble" searches contemplates a zone of spatial privacy that facilitates pro-
tected activities and that also encompasses a necessary haven from obser-
vation that is valuable in and of itself, current Fourth Amendment
doctrine must change. This Article has, until this Part, articulated the
direction of such change and has identified several lines of cases that
have moved the law toward the recognition that change would indeed be
desirable.
This Part focuses on two private spaces in which the courts have been
insensitive to privacy. It argues that, in these two spaces, a greater atten-
tion to integrating substance and procedure would have better served the
privacy interesis that animate the Court's Fourth Amendment decisions.
Subpart A examines a case involving a public restroom, a space where
police have sometimes conducted visual sting operations aimed at appre-
hending people engaged in prohibited (though consensual) sexual prac-
tices. When an. individual uses the restroom, he strongly desires privacy,
even in the absence of any recognized constitutionally protected activity.
Subpart A analyzes the clash between this desire and current privacy doc-
trine. Subpart B considers a space we have already discussed at some
length-the home. In this Subpart, the analysis focuses on the important
connection between privacy in the home and the effective protection of
the right of the individual to engage in the raising of her children. Sub-
part B argues that the law has, until now, perhaps due to a preoccupation
with marital association, failed to recognize that the home is an essential
locus of parental rights, regardless of a parent's marital status. 265
A. Using the Fourth Amendment to Guard Space
As we saw in Griswold and Hardwick, legislation of private morality has
the potential to threaten the integrity of zones of privacy such as the
home or the private bedroom. Unlike in the case of crimes that have
victims, the so-called "victimless" morality crimes (such as consensual sex-
ual activity and perhaps the possession of some kinds of illicit drugs) do
not typically give rise to credible witnesses who willingly cooperate with
law enforcement authorities in their efforts to find the guilty parties.26 6
265. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual
Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (1995) (arguing that under current law
and social understandings, the core family is the association between two monogamous
sexual affiliates, and urging that this limited definition of family renders invisible the
secondary dependency that derives from having to care for a child and the need of any
guardian-child unit for legal validity, financial support, and privacy from government
interference).
266. As Chiefjustice Warren explained in Lewis v. United States, "'[t]here are rarely
complaining witne.sses [in such cases involving vice, liquor, or narcotics laws]. The
participants in the crime enjoy themselves.'" 385 U.S. 206, 210 n.6 (1966) (quoting Model
Penal Code § 2.10 commentary at 16 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)).
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As a result, perhaps, police and prosecutors investigating and prosecuting
such offenses must rely heavily upon searches and seizures. 26 7 In the case
of violent, serious crimes such as murder and rape, by contrast, there are
more likely to be aggrieved parties who willingly cooperate with the po-
lice and reduce the relative importance of searches and seizures.
Though there are arguably important interests at stake in limiting
the proliferation of drugs, obscene materials, and some kinds of consen-
sual sexual interactions, these interests are perhaps weakest and most vul-
nerable to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness challenge when they are
pursued at the expense of privacy at home and privacy in the bed-
room.
2 68 As the Court stated in Stanley, the privacy threshold guarding a
267. The important role of search and seizure in the prosecution of drug and weapon
possession offenses is reflected, for example, in the disproportionate number of
convictions for such offenses that are reversed on Fourth Amendment grounds. See
Kamisar, Comparative Reprehensibility, supra note 54, at 27 n.120, 28 (pointing out that
"[a] study of suppression motions in nine mid-sized counties in three states ... found that
the effects of illegal searches are concentrated in drug and weapons cases" (citing Peter F.
Noardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 Am.
B. Found. Res. J. 585, 599 T"l. 10), whereas "a recent five-year study [showed that] illegal
search problems were given as the reason for the rejection of only 117 of more than 68,000
robbery arrests, only thirteen of more than 14,000 forcible rape arrests, and only eight of
approximately 12,000 homicide arrests" (citing Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What
We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the 'Costs' of the Exclusionary Rule, 1983 Am.
B. Found. Res.J. 611, 640, 645)); Maclin, Cure Worse than Disease, supra note 53, at 43-44
(noting that "the exclusionary rule has not been responsible for the release of dangerous
criminals who prey on society," but that instead, "[t]he exclusionary rule's greatest impact
is felt in drug and weapons possession cases" (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
907 n.6 (1984))); Steven Yarosh, Comment, Operation Clean Sweep: Is the Chicago
Housing Authority 'Sweeping' Away the Fourth Amendment?, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1103, 1128
n.184 (1992) (observing that "'[flewer than 1% of Chicago defendants accused of violent
crimes have their cases thrown out because the evidence was illegally obtained,'" that
"[tlhe exclusionary rule plays a significant role only in drug cases where violence is not
involved," and that "[t]he rule has little impact on other kinds of cases" (quoting Joseph
Tybor & Mark Eissman, Illegal Evidence Destroys Few Cases: Justice in Chicago, Chi. Trib.,
Jan. 5, 1986, at 1)).
268. Of course, the home and the bedroom should not provide a refuge of privacy for
the commission of marital assaults, child-abuse, or forced sexual relations. See supra notes
212-217 and accompanying text (analyzing Justice Douglas's opinion in Griswold and
distinguishing between a search for evidence of contraceptive use, on the one hand, and
evidence of a violent crime, on the other). It is critical that the law not embrace, in the
name of privacy in the home, the sort of "hands-off" policy toward domestic violence that
characterized it up to and including the early part of this century. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel,
"The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117 (1996);
Model Penal Code § 213.1 (1962) (imposing criminal liability for rape only upon "[a] male
who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife) (emphasis added). The comments
accompanying the Model Penal Code section rely upon notibns of "family privacy" to
justify the retention of the marital rape exemption to "situation[s] of rape by force or
threat." See Model Penal Code § 213.1 cmt. 8(c), at 345 (1962) (asserting that
"[r]etaining the spousal exclusion avoids this unwarranted intrusion of the penal law into
the life of the family"). Such an approach appears to pervert the notion of privacy rights
into a license to harm and threaten the safety of one rights-possessing individual (a wife) in
the name of another's (a husband's) security from unreasonable search and seizure.
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person's home should be high enough to block the government from
investigating violations of criminal prohibitions otherwise appropriate
and legitimately enforced in public. Though the Court has held that the
Constitution protects "people, not places,"269 the people's privacy might
require greater protection in some places, such as the home or the bed-
room, than in others, such as the open field. 270
Beyond the home and the private bedroom, there are other spaces
in which the aggressive enforcement of morals legislation has a similar
potential to jeopardize a true freedom from observation. The public tele-
phone is one such "area."271 Another is the public restroom. Adults
(and some children) who take advantage of the availability of public
restrooms in parks, train stations, or various other locations, generally
prefer to use a closed, private stall, in order to remain alone and unob-
served while using the toilet. Young children tend to understand the pri-
vate nature of toilet functions and (much to their parents' embarrass-
ment) often joke about such functions with one another.
The desire for bathroom solitude would not appear to implicate
what we earlier called informational privacy, of the sort that Stuntz de-
scribed as the very definition of doctrinal Fourth Amendment privacy
and, accordingly, disparaged.272 Using the bathroom is not a mysterious,
informationally "secret" act in which only some but not others engage.
We have therefore not learned much information about a specific indi-
vidual after having observed him while he is so engaged. Nonetheless, we
have, in such a scenario, acquired "personal knowledge" of the individual
in a way that both viewer and viewee are likely to find quite awkward and
uncomfortable. This discomfort is evident, for instance, in situations in
which a bathroom stall door does not lock securely, and an unsuspecting
third person opens it while the stall is in use. The occupant typically
slams the door shut while the intruder looks away and perhaps mutters a
flustered apology.
On this issue of bathroom privacy, consider a Fourth Amendment
case from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Smayda v. United States.275
In this case, Joseph Smayda and Wendell Gunther appealed convictions
in connection with their violation of the Assimilative Crimes Act,274 which
incorporates the state criminal statutes of the jurisdictions in which fed-
269. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that "the Fourth
Amendment protecrs people, not places").
270. See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (conceptualizing the Court as holding
that "an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home... and unlike a field, ...
a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy"); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984) (finding no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in
.open fields").
271. See Katz, :389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
272. See supra Part I.C (discussing Stuntz's arguments defining and devaluing the
supposed Fourth Amendment privacy from disclosure of secrets).
273. 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965).
274. See id. at 251 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 13).
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eral enclaves (such as national parks) are located. In Smayda, the peti-
tioners were convicted of engaging in oral copulation with each other
through a hole carved between two stalls within a restroom in Yosemite
National Park, in violation of California law.2 75 Police, having had reason
to believe that such sexual acts were occurring in the restroom, arranged
for a hole to be cut in the ceiling over each stall, "for purposes of observa-
tion. '276 The hole was covered with a screen "so as to make it look like an
air vent."277 In the course of the investigation to root out offenders,
[s]ome 25 or 30 persons were observed who simply made the
normal use of the stall. Others were seen who peered through
holes in the partitions, looked at each other over the partitions,
masturbated, and at least two of whom performed an indecent
act through the hole in the partition, but not in violation of P.C.
section 288a. No arrests were made.278
On another night of toilet surveillance, after "[s] ix or seven persons
whose behavior was normal were observed," the police spotted petitioners
violating the statute and arrested them.2 79 Though "there was reason to
believe that someone might commit the offense that evening, there was
no reason to believe, at any time until after each appellant entered a stall,
that that particular person was about to commit it."'280 The police there-
fore lacked individualized suspicion prior to any individual bathroom
viewing. The Court of Appeals held that there was still no Fourth
Amendment violation, reasoning that "when people resort to such a pub-
lic toilet for criminal purposes, they deliberately take the chance that they
may be observed by police officers, and that they are not protected from
such observation" 281-a waiver argument. The court added that, alterna-
tively, no search had occurred, because "these stalls were, in essence, a
public place."282
Neither of these alternative theories is persuasive. "Guilty" parties
may, from their own perspectives, waive any right to have their guilty be-
havior remain private.283 That waiver, however, was not communicated
in Smayda to the relevant state actors -until after the observation had taken
place. Therefore, the waiver theory here does not justify the officers'
conduct with respect to the petitioners. The many innocent users of the
restroom, moreover, necessarily retained their Fourth Amendment rights,
and the cost of apprehending the guilty here was the search of more than
275. See id. at 252.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 253.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 254.
282. Id. at 255.
283. See Colb, Innocence, supra note 9, at 1501 (discussing how, "[b]y abusing
[one's] private space through illegal activity and concealment of evidence... one forfeits
one's Fourth Amendment privacy interest" in that particular space).
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30 innocent people who had in no way waived their privacy entitle-
ments.2 8 4 The Court of Appeals's alternative theory-that the inside of a
toilet stall in a public bathroom is a public place where occupants cannot
expect to be protected from observation-seems to contradict the com-
mon expectation of what the court calls the "normal" user of the bath-
room. People who choose to make use of a public restroom and to close
their stall doors (so that police who wish to observe must conduct surveil-
lance from a hole in the ceiling and conceal their presence with a decep-
tive screen) actually-and legitimately-expect to be free from
observation.
As the Court of Appeals suggested, it might be that the only way to
catch people engaged in the criminal activity implicated in Smayda is to
place under surveillance the restroom stalls in which such activity is sus-
pected to occur.28 5 There would rarely arise individualized suspicion
with respect to any specific persons who might use the bathroom. To
discover offenders, the suspicion that attaches to the particular stall (at a
particular time, on a particular night of the week) would have to suffice.
As in Griswold, the vitality of the criminal law at stake in Smayda was inti-
mately linked with the Fourth Amendment legality of effective law en-
forcement techniques. Just as apprehending people violating contracep-
tion prohibitions would require searches of marital bedrooms for telltale
signs of contraceptive use, so apprehending people violating the prohibi-
tions at issue in Smayda might require "clandestine surveillance by police"
of all persons using suspected toilet stalls over a period of time.2 8 6 On a
Fourth Amendment analysis that does not consider the gravity of the of-
fense at issue, the necessity of such tactics might well signal their "reason-
ableness." The Supreme Court has, on similar grounds, refused to hold
warrantless undercover operations to be unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 28 7 Under a qualitative analysis that includes a critical con-
284. See id. at 1480 (discussing the overbreadth theory of the exclusionary rule and
contending that "there is an affirmative case... for allowing the guilty to litigate Fourth
Amendment violations, in spite of the undeserving character of such individuals" to
protect the rights of innocent parties who could be damaged by illegal police searches but
who would be unlikely to initiate litigation); see also State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800, 801
(Minn. 1970) (noting in a related context that the "'[a]uthority of police officers to spy on
occupants of toilet booths-whether in an amusement park or a private home-will not be
sustained on the theory that if they wvatch enough people long enough some malum
prohibitum acts will eventually be discovered'" (quoting Bielicki v. Superior Court, 371 P.2d
288, 292 (Cal. 1962))).
285. See Smayda, 352 F.2d at 254.
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 n.6 (1966) (explaining that "in
the enforcement of vice, liquor or narcotics laws, it is all but impossible to obtain evidence
for prosecution save by the use of decoys. There are rarely complaining witnesses. The
participants in the crime enjoy themselves." (quoting Model Penal Code § 2.10
commentary at 16 'Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959))); see also Bryant, 177 N.W.2d at 805
(Otis, J., dissenting) (arguing on facts very similar to those in Smayda that the Minnesota
Supreme Court majority opinion erred in suppressing evidence based upon police
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sideration of both the invasiveness of enforcing a law effectively and the
significance of the legislation, however, the legitimacy of a law necessitat-
ing such intrusive surveillance would present an issue extending beyond
the usual substantive due process question of whether there is a funda-
mental right to engage in the prohibited activity. 288 In Griswold, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court took the latter approach and struck down a
ban on contraceptive use.28 9 In Smayda, although a fundamental right to
engage in sexual activities in public toilets is unlikely to exist, the appre-
hension of those who do so engage might simply not be an important
enough objective tojustify the surveillance of adult human defecation. 2 90
surveillance in a department store bathroom because, "[s]ince it would never be possible
to secure a search warrant in situations of this kind, I am of the opinion this surveillance
for a limited time and purpose was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth
Amendment").
Although the exclusion of undercover surveillance activity from the category of
"searches" subject to Fourth Amendment regulation is doctrinally distinct from a holding
that searching an occupied restroom stall is "reasonable," the distinction does little to
constrain the Court's approval of investigation that proceeds in the absence of
individualized suspicion. As we see in Lewis, for example, exclusion of undercover
operations from the definition of "search" can turn on a factor such as the impossibility of
enforcing narcotics laws without undercover operations-a consideration that is usually
not especially pertinent in answering the question whether a person might reasonably
expect privacy from the government in a given set of circumstances. In Smayda itself, the
Court of Appeals argued (as one alternative rationale for its decision) that there is no
reasonable expectation of freedom from observation in a "public" restroom. See Smayda,
352 F.2d at 255. The occupant of the restroom stall is unlikely to derive much comfort
from learning that the police who watched him use the toilet were not engaged in a
"search."
The court's first argument in Srnayda-that anyone using the restroom in the way that
petitioners did waives any interest in privacy-also has an analogue in the precedents
governing undercover operations. In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)
(plurality opinion), which upheld simultaneous transmission of a suspect's words by an
undercover informant to the police, Justice White's opinion for a plurality asserted that
[i]nescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his
companions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently doubts their
trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never materialize. But if
he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.
Id. at 752. This waiver argument is necessarily as flaved in the undercover context, see
Colb, Innocence, supra note 9, at 1511-12, as it is in the "public restroom" context. See
supra notes 282-284 and accompanying text.
288. Cf. Colb, Incarceration, supra note 14, at 805 n.97 (explaining that "[tihe
fourteenth and fifth amendment right to liberty from confinement ... constrains the
means by which the government may pursue an otherwise allowable end that does not
inherently implicate a fundamental right"); id. at 789 (arguing from the civil commitment
context that "[i]n order to justif [the deprivation of a person's physical liberty] .... the
state must have a stronger interest necessitating that confinement than the merely
'legitimate' interest in improving the citizens' comfort level," and that "[t]he state needs
an interest as strong as that present when the relevant individual poses a danger to herself
or to others").
289. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
290. One distinction between the respective facts of Griswold and Smayda is that
searches for contraceptive use held unconstitutional in Griswold would presumably proceed
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The public restroom is a useful area for our consideration, because it
helps us to disaggregate the need for privacy-from-observation as an end
in itself, on the one hand, and the need for privacy from observation as a
means of effectuating substantive due process privacy rights, on the
other. By contrast to the home, the public toilet is not an important loca-
tion for effectuating fundamental rights.291 We do not, as a society, ex-
pect or wish for people to express themselves sexually in the public rest-
room. If we did, then bathrooms would generally be unisex (thereby
facilitating, for example, the protected heterosexual married couple's ac-
cess to each other). In spite of its relative unimportance as a locus of
fundamental rights, however, people nonetheless value privacy from ob-
servation in the restroom. 292 I suggest that we incorporate this sort of
upon individualized suspicion. No party, in other words, took the position that police
ought to be able to conduct bedroom surveillance of every married couple as a means of
enforcing the ban on contraceptive use. In Smayda, by contrast, part of what may lead us to
reject as unreasonable the surveillance at issue is that it encompassed every user of the
stalls during a given time-frame, without individualized suspicion attaching to any specific
individual. Perhaps if the police had had probable cause to believe that a particular set of
individuals would be misusing the stalls, and they watched only those individuals, the reader
might view the Fourth Amendment claim as substantially less compelling. Even on this
analysis, however, it would still be appropriate to perform a substantive balancing between
the privacy rights at stake (taking into account the interests of those innocent people likely
to be swept within a more or less imprecise surveillance) and the competing governmental
interest in preventing the sexual use of the public bathroom. Furthermore, if the sort of
surveillance conducted in Smayda were determined to be the only way to enforce the
relevant criminal prohibition, the Court would face a dilemma very much like those it
faced in the cases allowing nonsuspicion-based "false-friends" to solicit, record, and
transmit the words of a suspect. The Court would have to decide between the formalistic
approach taken in Smayda and Lewis, in which a necessary enforcement tool is ipso facto
constitutionally permissible, and the more subtle, sensitive, and integrated approach taken
in cases such as Griswod Garner, and Justice Blackmun's dissent in Hardwick.
291. But see Taunya Lovell Banks, Toilets as a Feminist Issue: A True Story, 6
Berkeley Women's LJ. 263 (1990-1991) (contending that access to restrooms is essential
to full and equal participation in public life and that the differential denial of such access
to women has represented an important barrier to women's full equality); Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Gay Culture Weighs Sense and Sexuality, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1997, § 4 (Week in
Review), at 1 (discussing controversy in the gay community over the importance of
promiscuity and the perceived backlash of police crackdowns on sex in public restrooms,
gay discos, and pubs).
292. Indeed, some people have reacted with outrage at the prospect of the "Hygiene
Guard," a recently developed device that monitors whether individuals who enter the
restroom wash their hands before leaving. See Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Big Brother In
Workplace Bathrooms?, Wash. Post, Aug. 30, 1997, at Al (describing the monitoring
system and noting that "privacy advocates complain Hygiene Guard represents an
unprecedented intrusion" and that "[c]ivil libertarians described Hygiene Guard as 'Big
Brother in the bathroom'"). The objective, to ensure that employees do not circulate fecal
bacteria to others at the workplace, would seem to many people stronger than that at issue
in Smayda, and the Hygiene Guard certainly intrudes far less on the personal privacy of the
restroom user than (lid the surveillance in Smayda. This suggests that when it comes to the
privacy of toilet use, people are highly sensitive even to relatively minor investigative
measures and would be especially upset to learn that they had been observed by police
while enclosed in their stalls.
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value into the meaning of Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" when we
evaluate the legitimacy of law enforcement practices employed to facili-
tate the apprehension of those who are engaged in a broad range of of-
fenses occurring in such private spaces.
B. Using the Fourth Amendment to Guard Substantive Due Process
We saw in our discussion of Smayda, and in the Supreme Court's
warrant requirement jurisprudence of Payton, Steagald, and Welsh, that
heightening the threshold of allowable intrusion into designated private
spaces helps to protect zones of privacy that would otherwise be vulnera-
ble to legislative prerogative.2 93 We have also seen that some private
places, such as the home or bedroom, might additionally constitute criti-
cal zones for the exercise of substantive due process privacy rights, includ-
ing marital association and procreation. The Court implicitly recognized
the link between private spaces and substantive due process privacy in
Griswold, the decision protecting the use of contraceptives by married
couples. The Court might similarly see fit to acknowledge that link more
generally in approaching the analysis of enforcement of criminal laws
through home searches.
One area that would benefit from the integration of quantitative and
qualitative reasonableness assessments involves welfare benefits for fami-
lies with dependent children. By "welfare," I mean the provision by the
government of such necessaries as food, shelter, and medical care for
indigent families. The last few years have seen an increasingly punitive
political discourse about the need to tie receipt of welfare benefits to con-
ditions by which a recipient might enhance, reduce, or eliminate her wel-
fare eligibility by acting in socially "responsible" or "irresponsible"
ways.29 4 One component of the legal program that this discourse has
helped to generate attempts to encourage welfare mothers to avoid hav-
ing any more children,295 and to conduct themselves generally in a man-
293. See supra notes 138-168 and accompanying text (discussing Payton v. NewYork,
445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981); Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)).
294. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 Hastings LJ. 339,
341 (1996) (explaining how "[i]n the recent debates over welfare reform, lawmakers and
others made repeated appeals for legislative change that would end 'illegitimacy,' restore
personal responsibility, and get people (women and adolescent females) to stop having
children that they cannot afford to support without public assistance").
295. Many states, for example, have limited welfare benefits to support of a specified
number of children and no more. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-292(c) (1), (f) (West
1997); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11450.04(a) (West Supp. 1998); Ga. Code Ann. § 49-4-186
(1998); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 44:10-61(a) (West Supp. 1998); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 56, § 230.58
(West Supp. 1998); Va. Code Ann. § 63.1-133.48 (Michie 1995); see also Del. Code Ann. tit.
31, § 501 (1997) (policy statement discouraging welfare recipients from having children
while receiving benefits); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-17-1(4) (c), 43-17-35 (1) (a) (Supp. 1998)
(same).
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ner that meets the approval of a supervising social agency.2 9 6 Though the
intensity of these measures might be new, the question of government
control over the lives of welfare recipients has been with us for some
time.
In Wyman v. James,297 the Supreme Court held that discontinuing the
welfare benefits (AFDC) of a woman for her refusal to consent to a social
worker's home visit did not violate the woman's Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy rights. First, the Court took the position that a home visit by a social
worker is not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court reasoned that home visits are not conducted primarily for the
investigative reasons that have traditionally defined searches in the crimi-
nal law context.298 Moreover, as the Court elaborated, women could re-
fuse consent to the home visit (as Mrs. James did in this case), so that
there would be no actual search to violate (or even implicate) the Fourth
Amendment in the case of such refusals.2 99 The Court argued in the
296. At least three states permit regular supervision of welfare recipients to assure
compliance with state regulations. See 305 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/4-6 (West 1993); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 3763(5) (West Supp. 1997); S.D. Admin. R. 67:12:01:05 (1997).
Most states allow an initial home visit to verify applications for welfare benefits. See, e.g.,
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11265(c) (West 1991). Most recently, Mayor Rudolph W.
Giuliani of NewYork City instituted a pilot project in which people seeking Medicaid are
subjected to a home investigation very much like the one at issue in Wyman v.James. In one
case, an immigrant from Ecuador applied for Medicaid health insurance benefits for her
two-year-old son and provided the documentation evidencing his eligibility. In inspecting
her home, two city investigators "walked into her bedroom, peered into her closet and
spotted the evidence they later used to recommend rejection: a pair of blue jeans-men's
jeans, they insisted--hanging among her dresses." The Mayor apparently plans to expand
the pilot program to the entire city next year. Nina Bernstein, New Hurdle for Some
Seeking Medicaid: Home Inspections, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1998, at 43.
297. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
298. See id. at 317-18.
299. See id. This argument, that if there was no search (because a complainant
refused consent and accordingly suffered the loss of a benefit), there can be no Fourth
Amendment violation, mirrors an argument made byJustice Blackmun in his dissent from
New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979). Justice Blackmun argued there that the
defendant did not have a ripe Fifth Amendment claim, since the defendant had not
testified after the judge at his criminal trial ruled in a motion in limine that if the
defendant were to testify, his testimony could be impeached with compelled self-
incriminating statements given under a grant of immunity. See 440 U.S. at 464-65. This
justiciability argument, both in Portash and in James, ignores the problematic nature of
threats that might chill the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, whether the right
to exclude compelled, self-incriminating statements at one's criminal trial (without having
to refrain from testifying), or the right to enjoy privacy from governmental intrusion
(without having to give up eligibility for AFDC benefits) is at issue. A related argument
would permit the government to condition a benefit to which there is no constitutional
entitlement upon the waiver of a constitutional right, on the theory that the beneficiary
need only refuse the benefit to which she has no preexisting entitlement in order to
preserve her constitutional rights intact. This argument has been met with strong criticism
by scholars of constitutional law. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1989) (proposing an analytic framework for a robust protection
against "unconstitutional conditions" under which people must waive constitutional
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alternative that even if there were stipulated to have been a Fourth
Amendment search, the search would have been reasonable because its
objective-the child's welfare-constituted an unassailable, compelling
purpose. Notice that this alternative argument does not rest upon the
assumption that welfare is not an entitlement and that it is therefore legit-
imate for the receipt of welfare to be conditioned upon the waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights.300 The second argument instead takes seri-
ously the privacy deprivation suffered by welfare recipients and engages
in a balancing of the cost of home visits to the mother's privacy against
the benefit of such visits to the child's security.
In forming a reaction to the Court's second argument, a number of
points in the James opinion are particularly noteworthy. First, the Court
declared the importance of privacy in the home, specifically focusing
upon the significance of being able to exclude unwanted intruders for
the individual's sense of security. The Court explained:
When a case involves a home and some type of official intrusion
into that home, as this case appears to do, an immediate and
natural reaction is one of concern about Fourth Amendment
rights and the protection which that Amendment is intended to
afford. Its emphasis indeed is upon one of the most precious
aspects of personal security in the home: "The right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects."30'
After acknowledging the import of the right that respondent
pressed, the Court denied her claim by relying heavily on the very strong
public interest in protecting the welfare of children and in preventing
their exploitation. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun stated:
The focus is on the child and, further, it is on the child who is
dependent. There is no more worthy object of the public's con-
cern. The dependent child's needs are paramount, and only
with hesitancy would we relegate those needs, in the scale of
entitlements to gain access to government benefits); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. Rev. 593 (1990) (contending that in the
modem regulatory state, where government can routinely affect the exercise of
constitutional rights by funding and subsidy decisions, an unconstitutional conditions
doctrine premised on the pre-New Deal assumption that government funding is
exceptional, will not meaningfully protect the exercise of constitutional rights). As a policy
matter, the imposition of such conditions on receipt of government benefits ignores the
coercive circumstances under which an individual makes the "choice" to give up the
exercise of a protected right. Cf. Slobogin, supra note 12, at 96-97 (criticizing the waiver
argument in the context of employees who are subjected to governmental inspections,
arguing that "[a] surprise inspection is not made less offensive because its victim has, in
effect, been forced to consent to it in advance").
300. For a more detailed analysis of the conditioning of government benefits upon
the waiver of constitutional rights, see Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman:
Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare, 72 Denv. U. L. Rev. 931 (1995).
301. James, 400 U.S. at 316.
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comparative values, to a position secondary to what the mother
claims as her rights.30 2
The Justices seem to have conceptualized the case before them as
presenting a conflict between the needs of a child and the claims of the
child's mother regarding her own rights.
The Court. has not consistently characterized parents, the way that it
does here, as adversaries of their children when the parents have claimed
a protected liberty. Such an adversarial structure implicitly adopts the
premise that parents cannot be trusted to act in their children's best in-
terests. By contrast, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,30 3 the Court emphasized the
Amish parents' rights, as parents and as adherents of the Amish faith, to
shape the upbringing of their children in a way that was allegedly under-
mined by Wisconsin's educational requirements. The Court in Yoder did
not see the home-education claims of the Amish parents as a threat to
their children's access to a free, pluralistic education. The Court might
have legitimately viewed the case in such a manner, of course, because
the parents defended their home-education claims precisely on the basis
of an alleged interest in insulating their children from exposure to ideas
different from those espoused by the parents' Amish faith.A0 4 The Court,
however, deferred in Yoder to the Amish parents and proceeded on the
assumption that absent substantial evidence to the contrary, parents are
best situated to make decisions about their children's upbringing, even
when their decisions deny children access to state-provided benefits such
as school education beyond the eighth grade.
We might infer from a juxtaposition of James and Yoder that the
Court distinguishes between parents who are dependent on government
assistance (the poor) and those who are not. It would appear that the
Court believes that the former group is not entitled to the same presump-
tion of good faith as the latter. As Justice Marshall noted in dissent in
James:
These [the child abuse and exploitation that might go undiscov-
ered absent the challenged home visit] are heinous crimes, 30 5
but they are not confined to indigent households. Would the
majority sanction, in the absence of probable cause, compulsory
visits to all American homes for the purpose of discovering child
302. Id. at 31S.
303. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
304. Indeed, Justice Douglas made exactly this argument in his dissenting opinion.
See id. at 245-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that a child's "entire life may be
stunted and deformed" if her education is truncated based solely on her parents' wishes).
305. Though the statutory rationale of home visits may have been primarily the
determination of continuing welfare eligibility, seeJames, 400 U.S. at 311 n.2 (quoting the
statute under challenge describing the home visit condition as intended to make sure "that
assistance or care may be given only in such amount and as long as necessary") (citations
omitted), both majority and dissenting opinions focus their analysis on a distinct and more
compelling rationale-the safety of children. It is this latter rationale that accordingly
drives discussion of the case in this Article.
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abuse? Or is this Court prepared to hold as a matter of constitu-
tional law that a mother, merely because she is poor, is substan-
tially more likely to injure or exploit her children? Such a cate-
gorical approach to an entire class of citizens would be
dangerously at odds with the tenets of our democracy.30 6
It is likely that the Court would respond to Justice Marshall's accusa-
tions by rejecting the premise that Mrs. James had a real Fourth
Amendment interest at stake. Instead, the Court might explain, the deci-
sion does not reflect any negative judgment about the indigent but
merely affirms the government's authority to decide how to spend its
money. The Court has accordingly upheld other conditional spending
decisions by the government that had the effect of burdening various
constitutional rights.3 0 7 Because the Court addressed its second argu-
ment in James in terms of the Fourth Amendment and privacy, however,
and thereby put to one side the "consent" issue for purposes of argument,
it is appropriate for Justice Marshall and for us to analyze the decision
critically, in terms of its impact on the privacy rights of parents. This
impact, moreover, might logically and legally extend not only to parents
receiving welfare benefits, but to parents more generally, because tax ex-
emptions for dependents, to which all taxpayers with dependent children
306. James, 400 U.S. at 342 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Leroy H. Pelton, The
Role of Material Factors in Child Abuse and Neglect, in Protecting Children from Abuse
and Neglect: Foundations for a New National Strategy 131 (Gary B. Melton & Frank D.
Barry eds., 1994) (noting a strong correlation between poverty and the incidence of child
abuse). Pelton explains:
[S]ince AFDC status is merely an indicator of poverty, 40-50% of all child abuse
and neglect incidents occur within families receiving AFDC at the time of the
incident, and the great majority of families involved in such incidents have been
on AFDC at some time. For similar reasons, counties with the highest rates of
food stamp recipients are also the counties with the highest incidence rates of
child abuse and neglect.
Id. at 167. Regardless of whether poverty correlates with child abuse and neglect, however,
a family's poverty is unlikely to provide as reliable a predictor of abuse as complaints (by
the child himself, neighbors, teachers, or the child's peers) about suspected abuse in
particular homes.
An alternative account of the distinction between James and Yoder might be that the
Amish families in Yoder may have consisted of two-parent groupings, while the petitioner in
James was a single mother. Cf. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the
Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 177-93 (1995) (arguing that single
mothers and their children are denied privacy rights afforded to families that conform to
traditional notions of the nuclear family).
307. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (upholding the
constitutionality of federal regulations which prohibit health care professionals from
engaging in abortion counseling under any project funded by Title X of the Public Health
Service Act); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment which severely limits the federal funding of
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require that a state participating in the
Medicaid program pay for nontherapeutic abortions).
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are entitled, count as government subsidies that might therefore be sub-
ject to conditional funding precedents.8 0 8
In criticizing James, it would certainly be unfair to accuse the Court
of failing to perform substantive reasonableness balancing. The Court
specifically emphasized the compelling nature of a child's safety needs, in
overriding the competing interests of the mother. Indeed, recent news
reports of child abuse and child murder by parents and custodians might
suggest to many that the government ought to become tougher rather
than more lenient in carrying out its enforcement of child welfare legisla-
tion.3 0 9 The problem with the Court's approach in James was that the
constitutional analysis was exclusively substantive and therefore contained
no quantitative measure of how likely a specific welfare parent was to be
engaged in abuse, neglect, or fraud.310 The Court thus required no indi-
308. For the proposition that a tax deduction qualifies as a government subsidy for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461
U.S. 540, 550-51 (1983) (upholding government decision not to subsidize, through the
deductibility of contributions, those organizations engaging in political lobbying); cf. Bob
Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 n.24 (1983) (leaving open the question
of whether the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment requires the denial
of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools).
309. The failure of state social workers to maintain competent protective services has
received increased scrutiny in recent years. See, e.g., Vivian S. Toy, Public Advocate Faults
Child Welfare Agency in the Deaths of 15, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1997, at B3 (quoting the
New York City Public Advocate's conclusion that "[tihe city is still failing to adequately
protect the most vulnerable children from the most horrible tragedies" after the 1995
death of Elisa Izquierdo); see also Another Preventable Death, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1997,
at A30; David L. Lewis, Child Deaths Probed: Suspicious Cases Up a Third in the City, N.Y.
Daily News, Jan. 16, 1998, at 8; Katherine Shaver, Md. Man Pleads Guilty in Death of
Daughter. Child Died 3 Months after First Abuse Reports, Wash. PostJan. 31, 1998, at B1;
Rachel L. Swains, Boy Who Died Had Shown Earlier Signs of Abuse, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1,
1997, at BI; Rachel L. Swarns, Weeks Before Baby's Death, Bruises Gave Sign of Trouble,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1997, at B3; Jim Yardley, Neighbors and Officials Blind to Neglected
Girl, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1997, at 51.
310. In faulting theJames Court for its failure to require some quantitative measure of
individualized suspicion, I do not mean to suggest that suspicionless searches are never
appropriate. For example, inspections of industrial workplaces in the interests of health
and safety pose little threat to personal privacy. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,
596 (1981) (upholding warrantless mine safety inspections conducted under the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act). In Dewey, the Court explained that:
The greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property
reflects the fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial
property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded
an individual's home, and that this privacy interest may, in certain circumstances,
be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless
inspections.
Id. at 598-99; see also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (upholding warrantless
inspection of licensed gun dealer's store-room). The Court in Dewey distinguishes Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), a decision invalidating an inspection provision of the
Occupational Health and Safety Act, emphasizing the unbridled discretion of inspectors
who carry out the searches. See Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603; cf. Colb, Innocence, supra note 9,
at 1488 (noting, in the context of identifying the targeting harm in Delaware v. Prouse, that
"[t]he Fourth Amendment... requires either 'less intrusion' (in terms of the substantive
1718 [Vol. 98:1642
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vidualized suspicion element to assure that the admittedly compelling in-
terest in protecting children would in fact be implicated when a particu-
lar social worker conducted a visit to a particular welfare family's home.
The consequence of this omission was that even as innocent parents
might be searched in large numbers by virtue of their receipt of govern-
ment assistance, child-welfare agencies would simultaneously devote
fewer of their limited resources to focusing investigative efforts upon the
individuals against whom complaints had already been made and as to
whom there could, therefore, be real dangers in government neglect. In
other words, targeting indigent families is not only unfair to these fami-
lies, but it is also an imprecise means of promoting child safety.
The difficulty with James was thus the reverse of what we typically see
in the Court's Fourth Amendment precedents. Just as we saw earlier that
the probable cause and warrant requirements could not effectively guar-
antee privacy without substantive Fourth Amendment standards, James
teaches that the requirement of a compelling or otherwise substantial
governmental interest supporting an intrusion also cannot guarantee a
meaningful level of privacy in the absence of quantitative measures that
fairly limit investigation to an appropriate subset of the population.
3 1
In addition to exposing many families to a gratuitous invasion of pri-
vacy, the failure of the Court to coordinate quantitative and qualitative
scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment perpetrates a targeting harm. In
this case, the government official does not select the target. Instead, the
welfare legislation at issue selects the target of the intrusion: those indi-
viduals who rely upon a specific kind of government benefit-one associ-
ated with poverty. Only such individuals will be subject to the indignity of
home visits.3 12 The targeting harm thus originates here in an authority to
search a particular category of individuals many of whose members have
seizure harm) 'or [methods] that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion'"
(citations omitted)).
311. In a similar vein, Christopher Slobogin has ably described the Fourth
Amendment analysis that might accompany the proposed use of torture to learn the
whereabouts of a nuclear bomb set to go off in New York City within twenty-four hours.
See Slobogin, supra note 12, at 48-49. Slobogin proposes that even in such a dire
situation, in which a civilized society might perhaps allow the limited use of torture, "we
would not permit the torture unless the state can show some degree of certainty that the
person tortured possesses the desired information." Id. at 48. Even under the threat of
nuclear disaster, then, Slobogin guesses that "virtually everyone would require the
government to demonstrate some level of suspicion .... " Id. at 49. The compelling
governmental interest, then, does not vitiate the need for some quantitatively
individualized level of suspicion to justify a significant intrusion. Though, as Slobogin
acknowledges, many would condemn the use of torture under any and all circumstances,
see id. at 47-48, the principle applied to the hypothetical torture scenario is nonetheless
instructive in the context of more accepted kinds of searches that purportedly serve
compelling governmental interests that fall short of the threat of nuclear disaster.
312. Justice Douglas took note in dissent of a further double standard applied there
to business and farm subsidies on the one hand, and AFDC benefits on the other. See
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 331-32 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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not shown themselves to be especially suspicious or otherwise deserving
of such a focus. 3 13
The implications of the Court's resolution of James extend beyond
the disproportionate intrusiveness of a home search unsupported by indi-
vidualized suspicion and the evident targeting of poor families. The deci-
sion in James also seems to disrupt the substantive parental rights an-
nounced in cases such as Meyer,314 Pierce,3 15 and Yoder,3 16 providing for
the rights, respectively, to teach one's children a foreign language, to
send one's children to private school, and to home-educate one's chil-
dren in accordance with one's religion. The decision similarly disrupts
other substantive privacy entitlements, such as the right to marry,317 to
procreate,31 8 and to use contraceptives.3 19 To engage in these activities
which the Court has designated as fundamental, people need a spatial
haven from government observation and inspection.
A parent must make many decisions about how to handle a child's
questions, requests, problems, and power struggles as the child grows and
evolves from a dependent infant into a rebellious adolescent and, ulti-
mately, into an adult. Conflicts between parent and child are unavoida-
ble and can provide important educational opportunities if resolved with
skill and sensitivity. Skillful resolution, in turn, requires self-confidence
and comfort on the part of the parent, along with a perceived ability to be
creative and spontaneous in unexpected or difficult circumstances. In
times of conflict, a child who knows that a third party sent by the govern-
ment monitors his parent's disciplinary moves might exploit the power
ambiguity that this situation creates. The child might, for example, mis-
behave or otherwise provoke the parent and then overreact to any disci-
pline in the hopes of forming an alliance with the third-party authority
figure. The child might view the social worker's visiting his mother's
313. See Colb, Innocence, supra note 9, at 1486-87. It is true that poverty is not a
suspect classification for purposes of Equal Protection analysis (or even for purposes of
federal anti-discrimination law). In the context of the struggle against very specific types of
discrimination, the targeting evident in James therefore does not qualify as being of the
most legally objectionable sort. The targeting harm is nonetheless an example of
prejudice. As James Jacobs and Kimberly Potter point out in a comprehensive analysis of
so-called "hate crime" legislation, "[a]t some level of abstraction all crime, or at least a
great deal of it, could be said to be motivated by manifest or latent prejudice-against
victims because they are tall, short, rich, poor, good-looking, bad-looking, cocky,
vulnerable, smart, dumb, members of one gang or another, and so forth. In contemporary
American society, however, certain prejudices are officially disfavored-especially those
based on race and religion." James B.Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Hate Crimes: A Critical
Perspective, in 22 Crime &Just. 1, 3 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997).
314. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
315. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530, 534-36 (1925).
316. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972).
317. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
318. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex re. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
319. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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home as an opportunity to manipulate his mother into giving him what
she has previously denied him.3 20 Because the social worker does not
participate in rearing the child, he might be unable to gauge when it is or
is not appropriate to interfere with what the mother has chosen to do. As
the mother's judge, rather than her colleague, his very presence is likely
to undermine the mother's authority in her home.321
In addition to generating conflict in households already subject
to the stresses of poverty, the presence of a social worker in the home
and a mother's knowledge that a child could be asked to "inform"
on her, could chill the exercise of the mother's right to parent her
child in her own, unique way.322 As with other fundamental rights,
government actions that could chill the exercise of parental rights
ought to be constitutionally suspect.3 23 A parent should not lightly
320. Cf. Benjamin Spock, Raising Children in a Difficult Time 130-36 (1974)
(explaining that it is natural for a child to try to control his parents through
manipulation).
321. Although social workers often intend to treat the family client as a unit, see, e.g.,
Louise C. Johnson, Social Work Practice: A Generalist Approach 188-89 (4th ed. 1992),
the law and their mission as child protection workers compel them to give more weight to
the claims of children when child abuse is suspected. See Frank D. Fincham et al., The
Professional Response to Child Sexual Abuse: Whose Interests Are Served?, 43 Family
Relations 244, 249 (1994) (discussing the pressure on social workers to ferret out child
abuse); see also Douglas J. Besharov, The Vulnerable Social Worker 85 (1985)
(recommending that social workers interview children in private when child abuse is
suspected (citing United States Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, Dep't of Health,
Education and Welfare, We Can Help: A Curriculum on Child Abuse and Neglect:
Resource Materials 71 (1979))); Frederic G. Reamer, Social Work Malpractice and Liability
102-10 (1994) (discussing the heightened legal liability and malpractice risks of social
workers engaged in protective services).
322. See Jane Ribbens, Mothers and Their Children: A Feminist Sociology of
Childrearing 198-204 (1994) (arguing that an integral part of a child's socialization is his
or her mother's acting as a "mediator" between the child and the outside world).
323. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965):
[i]t is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine which
expressions of view will be permitted and which will not or to engage in invidious
discrimination among persons or groups either by use of a statute providing a
system of broad discretionary licensing power or .. . the equivalent of such a
system by selective enforcement of an extremely broad prohibitory statute.
See also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 771-72 (1988) (holding
unconstitutional on its face a local ordinance that granted the mayor authority to approve
or deny applications for placing newsracks on public property); Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 630 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing how the Court "expressly
recognize[s] that overbreadth review is a necessary means of preventing a 'chilling effect'
on protected expression").
For application of chilling-effect overbreadth protection beyond the First Amendment
area, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893 (1992) (enumerating the sorts of
reasons that would motivate women "not wishing to inform their husbands of their
decision to obtain an abortion," including "justifiable fears of physical abuse," "a
reasonable fear that notifying their husbands will provoke further instances of child
abuse," fear of "devastating forms of psychological abuse from their husbands, including
verbal harassment, threats of future violence, the destruction of possessions, physical
confinement to the home, the withdrawal of financial support, or the disclosure of the
17211998]
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be subjected to a regime in which Big Brother (or Big Sister) is
watching.324
A 1970 article presents an insightful analysis of the connection I have
proposed between Fourth Amendment privacy and the substantive due
process right to raise one's children.325 The article was published after
the Court had noted probable jurisdiction in Wyman v. James, but before
it had handed down its decision. The author, Douglas Wickham, criti-
cized the lower court's reasoning deciding the case in favor of Mrs.
James.32 6 Wickham contended that the lower court's conclusion that the
caseworker in James should have obtained a search warrant prior to any
proposed search would do nothing to protect Mrs. James's privacy. Ab-
sent a requirement of individualized suspicion, a warrant requirement
would introduce a procedural step that would neither prevent nor justify
the arbitrary targeting of welfare-dependent families for suspicionless
searches. Wicklham proposed that, accordingly, a purely formal Fourth
Amendment device would not save the constitutionality of the challenged
policy.
3 2 7
Although Wickham appealed to constitutional provisions other than
the Fourth Amendment in his attempt to bar caseworkers from routine
home visits of welfare recipients, his argument was on all fours with my
abortion to family and friends," leading the Court to conclude that "[t]he spousal
notification requirement is thus likely to prevent a significant number of women from
obtaining an abortion"); Michael C. Doff, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes,
46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 268-71 (1994) (arguing that the logic of overbreadth analysis should
apply equally to fundamental rights outside the context of the First Amendment).
324. In Orwell's Oceania, the government regulated the relationship between parent
and child:
The family could not actually be abolished, and, indeed, people were encouraged
to be fond of their children in almost the old-fashioned way. The children, on
the other hand, were systematically turned against their parents and taught to spy
on them and report their deviations. The family had become in effect an
extension of the Thought Police.
George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 134 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich ed., 1984) (1949).
In recognizing how essential home privacy is to the exercise of parental rights, it
would follow not only that individualized suspicion ought to be a necessary precondition to
any governmental home "visits," but that only an individualized suspicion concerning a
serious offense (including such things as child abuse or neglect) ought to authorize such
an intrusion. As discussed in the context of vehicular stops and home searches for
evidence of obscene materials, the content of the laws being enforced is as critical to
privacy as the quantity of evidence that the government has to suspect a particular
individual.
325. See Douglas Q. Wickham, Restricting Home Visits: Toward Making the Life of
the Public Assistance Recipient Less Public, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1188 (1970).
326. See James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (three judge
panel). Recall that the respondent (Mrs. James) was a welfare recipient who refused to
consent to a caseworker's home visit and whose welfare benefits were subsequently
terminated. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 313-14 (1971).
327. For a decision approving such a search warrant not based upon any
individualized suspicion, see Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
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critique of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Payton, Steagald, and Welsh
for the failure to address substantive concerns with substantive meas-
ures.328 In evaluating the various conditions attached to the provision of
welfare benefits, Wickham saw the necessity for a certain amount of un-
regulated parental authority as part of any successful parent-child rela-
tionship. He proposed, for example, that "by conditioning the grant of
economic subsistence on the acceptance of social services such as instruc-
tion on house keeping, raising children, budgeting the grant, or con-
ducting one's social life, the administrators of public assistance deprive
the recipient of control over her existence."329 He suggested that "[t] o
enjoy privacy, the public assistance recipient ... alone must set the moral
tone of her home, and departmental investigations of her case should not
unnecessarily disrupt her relationships with her friends and family by
broadcasting the facts of her economic plight."3 30 Privacy from observa-
tion is an essential prerequisite to the ability to enjoy constitutionally pro-
tected relationships, and therefore, "[a]n attempt to expand the scope of
Mrs. James' privacy vis-a-vis the public assistance agency might simply re-
fer to Griswold and assert that the case stands for the proposition that the
government may not deprive individuals of control over certain aspects of
their lives." 33 '
CONCLUSION
Following the atrocities of World War I, there was an international
reassessment of the level of trust that people might safely place in the
hands of government officials.3 32 Within the United States, this reassess-
328. See supra Part II.B.
329. Wickham, supra note 325, at 1194.
330. Id. at 1195.
331., Id. at 1204.
332. Justice Jackson, who was a prosecutor at Nuremberg, contrasted the American
system of government with autocratic systems in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette:
Government of limited power need not be anemic government. Assurance that
rights are secure tends to diminish fear and jealousy of strong government, and
by making us feel safe to live under it makes for its better support. Without
promise of a limiting Bill of Rights it is doubtful if our Constitution could have
mustered enough strength to enable its ratification. To enforce those rights
today is not to choose weak government over strong government. It is only to
adhere as a means of strength to individual freedom of mind in preference to
officially disciplined uniformity for which history indicates a disappointing and
disastrous end.
319 U.S. 624, 636-37 (1943). The manifest distrust of autocratic states following World
War II is embodied in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, which resolves,
in part
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small, and
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ment included the Warren Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of
privacy, consisting of a right to avoid "the knock at the door" in the mid-
dle of the night that seemed to capture an image of fascism in which
searches and seizures are left largely unregulated.3 3 3 This doctrine of
Fourth Amendment privacy has evolved largely independently of a sepa-
rate, simultaneous set of developments in the law of substantive due pro-
cess privacy. Though the same judicial body, the highest court of the
United States, elaborated the two classes of privacy rights, this Court
failed to connect the procedural with the substantive and therefore failed
to provide an integrated and meaningful construction of "privacy" that
would appear coherent to readers ofjudicial opinions.3 34
The preceding pages have explained the nature of the procedure/
substance divide and have provided examples of cases in which the Court
has inched toward a more integrated doctrine of privacy. I have pro-
posed, on the basis of insights contained in such cases, that the Court
could construct a Fourth Amendment doctrine that consciously and con-
sistently inquires into the substantive and procedural features of chal-
lenged governmental activity. Such an inquiry would involve the balanc-
ing of intrusions against objectives-a balancing that would supplement
the bare, quantitative tests that courts currently apply in most cases. The
balancing inquiry would take into account the incremental impact of the
automatic search-and-seizure authority that currently accompanies all
criminal legislative enactments. The Supreme Court could accordingly
begin to employ an analysis that would probe the seriousness of criminal
acts the discovery of which might require intrusions that are either dis-
proportionate in relation to the loss of spatial privacy or unduly destruc-
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom ....
Two framers of the Charter construe the phrase "in larger freedom" to "suggest[ ] a
conception of freedom akin to that developed in President Roosevelt's annual message to
Congress ofJanuar 6, 1941 in which he listed 'four essential human freedoms.'" Leland
M. Goodrich & Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations 91 (2d ed. 1949). These
comprise "'freedom of speech and expression[,]' ... 'freedom of every person to worship
God in his own way[,]' . . . 'freedom from want[,]' . . . and 'freedom from fear'." Id.
(quoting Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Annual Message of the President to Congress, in
Documents on American Foreign Relations III, 1940-1941, at 33 (S. Shepard Jones &
Denys P. Myers eds., 1941)). These freedoms are routinely denied by autocratic regimes.
333. See Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "[t]he idea of the police unnecessarily forcing their way into the home in the
middle of the night-frequently, in narcotics cases, without knocking and announcing
their purpose-rousing the residents out of their beds, and forcing them to stand by in
indignity in their night clothes while the police rummage through their belongings does
indeed smack of a '"police state" lacking in the respect for.., the right of privacy dictated
by the U.S. Constitution.'" (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-538, at 12 (1969)) (ellipsis in
original)).
334. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 113, at 95-100 (criticizing the right to privacy as a
.constitutional time bomb"); Ely, supra note 113, at 15 (arguing that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should only ensure procedural fairness).
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five of the exercise of fundamental rights that require such spatial pri-
vacy. Through such reform of privacy law, the Court can put to rest the
suggestion that the "privacy" of substantive constitutional law and the
"privacy" of criminal procedure share only a name.
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